CHANGING RELATIONSHIPS IN EDUCATIONAL BARGAINING

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Education Relations Commission
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FOREWORD

The subject of teacher-school board relationships is of considerable importance to the *Education Relations Commission* and to the parties at the bargaining table in Ontario education. I have witnessed, as a third party for the Commission and as its Chairman, the primacy of relationships. On numerous occasions, we have seen at the Commission that the attitudes of the parties, more than any other single factor (including political and economic variables), determine the success and efficacy of the parties' negotiations.

When it comes to relationships, two other matters stand out as well. First, as one surveys the Province, there is a broad spectrum of relationship patterns - ranging from exceptionally poor and extremely adversarial to remarkably positive and cooperative. Second, it has not been obvious or clear to the Commission, nor I suspect to the parties, why relationships evolve to a particular mode or why they change (positively or negatively) as they occasionally do.

Against this background, Professors Gandz and Beatty have put together a study which is both fascinating and utilitarian. It clearly should be of value to practitioners in the field of teacher-board collective bargaining. Certainly it is the hope of the Commission that the Gandz-Beatty research will be carefully examined by the parties. There is still considerable room for improvement in teacher-board relationships and Gandz and Beatty have carefully and insightfully traced the causes underpinning and explaining the evolution of four actual teacher-board relationships in the Province. There is much to be learned from these case studies by all of us involved in teacher-board bargaining. In addition, their concluding chapter, which pulls together the major findings should be of particular value to those in the field.

The authors are uniquely qualified and equipped to undertake this study. They are academics in organizational behaviour and industrial relations - Gandz at the University of Western Ontario and Beatty at Queen's University. As such, they have a thorough grounding in labour relations. As well, both have worked extensively as third parties for the *Education Relations Commission*. As a consequence, they have brought to this assignment academic rigor tempered by pragmatic experience.

While the Commission funded this study, the authors' viewpoints of course do not necessarily represent the position of the *Education Relations Commission*. Nevertheless, the Commission welcomes their study as a significant contribution to the literature on collective negotiations and teacher-board relationships in Ontario education. In conclusion, therefore, I wish to express our appreciation to Jeffrey Gandz and Carol Beatty for preparing this study.

Bryan M. Downie
Chairman
Education Relations Commission
April 1986

INTRODUCTION

"Why does it have to be like this? Surely this is no way for intelligent people to be trying to settle their differences. Do other school boards have these kinds of bargaining sessions? Anyone would think that they were a bunch of Teamsters the way they're carrying on in there. Does it really have to be this way? Why can't we get together and work out a better way of dealing with our problems?"

The questions are familiar ones. On this particular occasion they were being asked by the chairman of a small school board, late at night, during a break between bargaining sessions, the last of which had been particularly acrimonious. But, as mediators and fact finders in educational sector negotiations for some years, we have heard them many times before. In fact we think that there are few people involved in collective bargaining in the educational sector who have not spent some time thinking about the basic nature of the relationship that exists between school boards and federation affiliates and who have not wondered - sometimes hopefully and often wistfully - whether their own relationship could be changed somehow.

This book is about the ways in which people have tried to change the bargaining relationship that exists between school boards and affiliates of teachers' federations. It is based on four actual, in-depth case studies of attempts to make such changes. All four cases share a common feature: in each case a strike - in one of the cases three strikes - occurred before serious attempts were made to change the fundamental nature of the bargaining relationship. In two of the four cases there was radical change in the nature of the relationship although the emergent relationship was highly cooperative in one and remained adversarial in the other. In the other two cases, the results of change efforts were less noticeable and durable.

The phrase 'bargaining relationship' needs some immediate clarification. We have not limited our study to bargaining in its narrow sense - the conduct of negotiations. Rather, we have looked at the behaviours, feelings, and attitudes of parties in a collective bargaining relationship, whether they be involved in actual table negotiations, grievance processing, informal discussions, joint or separate committees, or the other day-to-day activities in which administrators, trustees, federation affiliate officers, and teachers are involved. Our interest has been in the ways these relationships changed and matured over time.

We undertook this research to try to throw some light on the various factors which influence such change. Obviously, in highly complex situations, it is not possible to isolate and pin down the factors which explain the success of change efforts solely on the basis of studying four case histories. However, the findings of

this study, taken together with previous work done on organizational change and union-management relationships, provide some interesting insights into the change process. They suggest key factors which people who want to change bargaining relationships must consider and be prepared to act upon.

While the book may hold some appeal to those with a passive interest in educational administration, collective bargaining, and organizational change, that is not its main purpose. In the end analysis this book is prescriptive in nature. While recognizing that people seldom have full control of all of the variables which form the ingredients of successful change efforts, we believe that people who understand what factors influence change, and who have change management skills, stand a better chance of being successful managers of change than those who do not. Other things being equal, skilled change managers stand a higher probability of success than those who lack the relevant knowledge and skills. Our objective is to provide a useful book for people who want to try to change the bargaining relationship in their own school boards.

The first chapter briefly summarizes the history of federation-board bargaining in Ontario. Its purpose is to provide some background and to deal in a general way with many of the social and political forces which led to a general worsening of federation-board relationships throughout the province in the 1960s and early 1970s. In the second chapter we describe the methodology used in this study including the reasons for the choice of these particular cases, the sampling framework for interviews, the interview protocols, and some discussion of the benefits and limitations of this form of research methodology.

The next four chapters present the case studies themselves. Each chapter contains both description and analysis but the analysis in these chapters is restricted to that provided by those interviewed during the study. We have saved our own analysis of the four cases for chapter seven. Here we review the major relevant conceptual and theoretical studies, what little prior empirical work on changing bargaining relationships we have found useful, and then take an intensive look at what happened in each of these cases as it relates to this theoretical and empirical body of knowledge.

The eighth chapter develops a model of change management which we think will be useful for those who would like to attempt to change their own federation-board relationships. It takes established and developing models of individual and organizational change and relates them to the context of change in federation-board relationships. The final chapter summarizes the conclusions we have reached as a result of conducting this study.

1

Federation-Board Bargaining in Ontario

The cases described in the following chapters unfolded during an era of great instability and change in education in the province of Ontario. They were a part of an overall, increasing level of militancy in the teaching profession as teachers and school boards became involved in formal collective bargaining. The development of this collective bargaining has been fully documented elsewhere (1) and it is not our purpose to deal with it systematically and comprehensively. However, there are certain aspects of it which are necessary to an understanding of the cases which follow and we have included a brief summary here.

THE EARLY YEARS

Until 1944, teachers in Ontario were employees of one of 1,400 individual school boards. Despite the fact that the Ministry of Education issued recommended standard forms of teacher contracts in 1931, most teachers had very limited contractual protection or job security. They were usually hired on short-term agreements; salaries and benefits were established either through individual negotiations or unilaterally by school boards, and working conditions were determined by the boards. Although many teachers' associations were formed in the twenties and thirties to promote the interests of the profession, teachers were collectively weak and negotiated individually with their employers.

In 1944 the provincial government passed *The Teaching Professions Act*. This legislation effectively established a collective bargaining relationship between teachers and school boards. Teachers had to become members of one of five provincial teachers' associations or federations (2). All teachers, including principals and vice-principals, had to pay dues to their respective organizations. The associations and federations were given the power to discipline their members for breaches of professional ethics, thereby enhancing their organizational strength.

These associations or federations (subsequently referred to simply as federations) were designated in the *Act* as sole bargaining agents for teachers and, through the late forties, fifties, and sixties, they negotiated salaries, benefits, and a limited range of working conditions with a large number of usually small, local school boards. From an initial emphasis on minimum salaries, attention shifted toward salary scales or grids, special allowances for extra responsibilities or qualifications, professional development opportunities, class sizes, and other conditions of employment.

This early bargaining took place in a largely benign environment. The post-war baby boom resulted in large numbers of children entering the elementary and secondary school systems. There was great public interest and support for the educational system, which translated into excellent funding by all levels of government. There was a shortage of qualified teachers and heavy competition among school boards for their services. As a consequence, the teachers' federations were able to negotiate effectively on behalf of their members. Salary levels rose and working conditions improved. The teachers were satisfied . . . and the public appeared to be willing to pay the bills.

CHANGES IN THE SYSTEM

But the costs of education were beginning to cause some concern to the provincial government, particularly in the light of demographic projections made in the 1960's. These indicated sharp downturns in the birth rate and, consequently, a potentially reduced demand for school places in the 1970's and beyond. Furthermore, the intense competition among school boards for available teachers had resulted in an unevenness in educational quality, with the larger well-financed boards skimming the cream of available resources. In a move designed to increase the equality of educational opportunity while reducing administrative costs and improving efficiency, the Ontario government - against the wishes of most local school boards - dictated major changes in educational administration in 1969. The approximately 1,400 local boards of education were reorganized through consolidation into 77 public school boards and 49 separate school boards, the latter consisting of Roman Catholic schools only.

The consequences of this reorganization for existing relationships were dramatic. Before the reorganization, the teachers and trustees knew each other well on a personal level. The formalized collective bargaining took place within the context of social relationships established informally through contacts in retail stores, church, hockey rinks, or arenas of local communities. Any actions taken by either trustees or teachers were known in the community, and there was accountability to that community. Teachers and trustees wanted to do 'the right thing' and both recognized the common and superordinate goal of quality education for the community. The administration of the school system was done mainly by directors

and superintendents who came out of the local school systems and were known to teachers individually and on a personal level.

The creation of larger administrative units changed these relationships. Interpersonal and social relationships were disrupted. The teachers no longer knew many of the trustees, since new boards were created. Accountability of both trustees and teacher representatives was to much larger, diverse, and amorphous constituencies. The administrators whom the teachers dealt with on a day-to-day basis were unknown to many of them and had little familiarity with the organizational quirks and traditions which had developed in the schools they were managing. These strained social relationships invalidated many of the unofficial, informal agreements and understandings which had governed the pre-consolidation relationships. Centralization resulted in the formalization of many relationships and in more complex and legalistic collective agreements.

THE GROWTH OF MILITANCY

This externally-imposed shock to a previously stable school system was administered at a time when the bargaining environment turned from benign to hostile. Rapid growth in the system moderated as the lower birth rates of the late sixties led to lower enrollments. Low turnover in the schools, coupled with an increase in the qualifications of teachers in the system, caused increases in the costs of salaries and salary-related benefits, since the salary grid structures negotiated in the previous decade called for salaries related to seniority and qualifications. The Ministry of Education increased the minimum qualifications for teachers to the university degree level in 1973, further raising salary costs. It was becoming harder and harder for teachers to make gains in collective bargaining unless they were prepared to resort to threats and, sometimes, the actual use of sanctions. The militancy was most noticeable in some of the heavily unionized communities, but it was even being seen in smaller, county boards of education.

This development of highly sophisticated, militant teaching unions came as a shock to many trustees and school board administrators. They found it hard to believe that these same people, whom they had known for many years as dedicated, committed professionals, would be prepared to engage in such tactics. The evidence of the teachers' commitment to education was all around them, day in, day out in the smooth functioning of most of their schools. All too often the militancy was attributed to a few 'radicals' who had somehow gained control of the teachers' federations and were undermining the whole system.

The bargaining professionalism of the teachers' federations also came as a surprise to trustees and their associations. The teachers were using professional, trained negotiators in many situations. Sometimes these were lawyers, sometimes teachers trained in negotiating strategies and tactics. They prepared briefs; they developed and used data; they had a disciplined approach at the bargaining table; they

managed media relations and carefully orchestrated communications with the rank-and-file to maximize solidarity behind the federations' bargaining position. Sometimes the locally elected teachers' representatives handed over the conduct of negotiations to officials working with the head offices of their federations and trustees found themselves negotiating with experienced, tough, professional negotiators. Whipsawing, in which one teacher group tried to get what others had in their agreements - claiming either parity or the maintenance of traditional differentials, whichever suited the teachers' case - became the standard approach in negotiations. And there were spillovers from the negotiating table to the day-to-day relationships between administrators and teachers as the tensions during negotiations were reflected in the overall relationship.

In response, but only after a considerable time lag, trustees and their associations built up countervailing expertise and competence in the bargaining process. Trustees and their associations have invested in developing improved data for use in bargaining and have, in some cases, sought active assistance from experienced negotiators at the bargaining table or as background advisors. Boards started to resist teacher demands, to refuse to buckle under to threats of sanctions, to be prepared to take a strike. And, often groping their way through unknown territory, boards and their teachers began to find themselves involved in considerable amounts of overt conflict.

EDUCATIONAL POLICY AND CURRICULUM CHANGE

Apart from this collective bargaining turmoil, it is important to recognize the other pressures on teachers, particularly those in the secondary school system during the roller-coaster period of the sixties and seventies. Before 1962, Ontario's secondary school system consisted of two types of institutions. The Collegiate Institutes were elitist schools attended by that minority of students who were destined to go to universities. They focussed exclusively on 'academic' subjects such as Mathematics, History, English Literature, and so on. The majority of children went to vocational schools which concentrated on 'practical' subjects such as Business Math, English Language, Woodworking, Typing, Bookkeeping, and Shop.

The Robarts Plan, implemented in 1962, effectively did away with this elitist approach and reorganized the system into 'comprehensive' schools in which all subjects were taught and students could select from both 'academic' and 'practical' courses. This plan was Ontario's response to the federal government's Technical and Vocational Training Assistance Act , which started to funnel huge amounts of money into the school system to improve practical, job-oriented education and training. Almost every school sprouted new buildings, workshops equipped with the latest and best machinery, and hired teachers who were not then in the teaching profession but who came from the skilled, and very largely unionized, trades. Curriculum development was thrown into chaos, students were taking a hodgepodge of courses,

and no one was quite sure in which direction the system was headed. All of this was done without any overall manpower or industrial development policy. Schools gladly took the available funding with the approach 'get the federal money, put up the buildings, then we can use them as we wish in the future'. To quote Pitman (3), "... all philosophic thrusts were overwhelmed with growth - a growth in numbers coupled with a growth in the participation rate".

Then, in 1968, came the Hall-Denis report (4) which proposed a more 'humanistic' approach to education. The recommendations called for greater freedom of choice by students, greater influence by parents, and a liberalized and enriched curriculum with many new subjects from the fields of social studies and the humanities. The Hall-Dennis report not only suggested new things which should be taught, but also new ways of teaching. This called for even more resources to be spent on education, and the decade of the sixties saw frantic efforts to cope with what the public was perceived to want.

Picture the teachers in all of this. Brought into the school system directly from universities or through professional training, they found themselves with ill-defined roles, under attack for what they were teaching and how they were teaching it, and more accountable to students, parents, and the community than they had ever been (5). Moreover, the teaching profession was no longer homogeneous. Career history teachers taught alongside metal workers, with inevitable clashes in values, beliefs and expectations.

A CRISIS IN THE SYSTEM

The reaction to the sixties was not long in coming when people began to count the cost of implementing the Hall-Dennis recommendations in highly inflationary times. The public complained about taxes, there was widespread alleged illiteracy in basic quantitative and language skills, and a revulsion toward cafeteria-style approaches to course selection. Together with the stringent financial constraints of the mid-seventies came changes in the syllabus to re-emphasize the basic academic subjects.

Parents, angry at strikes and lost school days, annoyed with the rapid escalation of teachers' salaries and benefits, demanded greater accountability from teachers. 'Teacher-bashing' by the media and some politicians became common. The teachers, who perceived themselves as trying to cope as best they could with abrupt switches in educational policy, their salaries falling behind the rate of inflation, and having to work even harder, became frustrated, angry, and even more militant.

Inflation was running at high levels in the early seventies, culminating in the federal government's imposition of universal wage and price controls in the 1975-77 period. The provincial government, in an attempt to curb costs and promote equality of education, had imposed ceilings on educational expenditures by local school boards in 1973. In effect, the ceilings made it impossible for local school boards to increase their expenditures above some formula-derived maximum figure, even by raising

taxes. In the case of several major boards, this prevented them from raising salaries even by the inflation rate, unless they were prepared to reduce the number of staff to stay within the expenditures ceilings.

The teachers, now organized into quite militant federations, kept pushing for more; more salary, better benefits, more say in the decision-making processes within school boards. Job security emerged as a major bargaining issue as the demographic trends became more obvious and as it became clear to teachers and the leaders of teacher federations that limited opportunities existed to improve salaries because of ceilings and controls of various kinds. The teachers' associations and federations sought to lessen the impact of projected and actual enrollment declines by reducing class sizes, lowering pupil-teacher rations, limiting the 'stacking' of small classes in one classroom, and negotiating severance provisions, complex seniority rules, and supply pools for redundant teachers.

In this more difficult bargaining environment, teachers' federations increased their use of sanctions, and many boards countered with sanctions of their own. These sanctions and retaliatory measures escalated. Teachers' federations could specify that certain negotiations were 'in dispute' and notify their members not to apply for jobs with those boards. This sanction was known as 'pink' or 'grey' listing since the notice went out on distinctively colored notepaper, either pink or grey, depending on the particular affiliation. Teachers threatened mass resignations from boards where negotiations were 'in dispute'. Trustees countered by 'blacklisting' teachers who threatened to resign, in effect barring them from teaching in the province. Trustees attempted to rehire retired teachers, or teachers who belonged to another association or federation not involved in the sanction. This resulted in even more severe sanctions by the teachers, including the threatened expulsion from the umbrella organization, the Ontario Teachers' Federation (O.T.F.), of any teacher who went to work in a school which was 'pink' or 'grey' listed. Since membership in O.T.F. was mandatory under *The Education Act* passed in 1948, this amounted to being precluded from teaching in the province. Trustees responded to this approach by declaring a total moratorium on hiring, thereby closing down the job market for teachers who resigned from schools. The teachers shifted tactics and started experimenting with working-to-rule, threatening rotating strikes, and even a complete province-wide, total strike.

This escalating series of threatened and actual sanctions seemed to reach a climax in the fall and winter of 1973 when over 8,000 teachers in 17 school boards tendered their resignations. In an attempt to head off this action, the government tabled emergency legislation to delay the effective date of mass resignations, and a more comprehensive bill to regulate federation-board negotiations. This latter bill was intended to remove the right to strike from teachers, substituting compulsory arbitration. Both pieces of legislation were bitterly opposed by the teachers, the depth of opposition being indicated by a mass rally of approximately 30,000 at the Ontario legislature on December 18, 1973. Neither piece of proposed legislation was ever enacted.

A BALANCE OF POWER

The current statute governing teacher-school board bargaining in Ontario, *The School Boards and Teachers Collective Negotiations Act, 1975*, emerged following consultations between teachers' and trustees' associations and federations, and the government. It regulates the process of collective bargaining in a number of ways. It allows the right to strike, but only after a number of compulsory conflict regulation processes including fact-finding and mediation, and after certain waiting and notification periods have expired. The Education Relations Commission (E.R.C.), established under the *Act* , oversees the whole process and intervenes where indicated, offering specialized conflict resolution assistance in both the acute conflict stages and in the prevention of the exercise of sanctions.

Some observers would say that there is a maturity to the bargaining relationship which is now apparent and which is being manifested in fewer breakdowns in negotiations and the lower incidence of the use of sanctions. Over the span of several years, many administrators and trustees have come to recognize that a dual loyalty can exist, that teachers can be highly committed to their profession, and to a school system, as well as to their association or federation. An uneasy 'balance of power' has emerged in which both parties recognize the resolve of the other, and neither takes the others' threats lightly.

In its 1980 review of the Act, the Matthews Commission (6) stated that, whereas in the three years preceding passage of the *Act*, 28 strikes had taken place, the four years after passage of the *Act* saw only 18 strikes out of 811 sets of negotiations; the record has continued to reflect a low-level use of sanctions in the 1980-85 period although this can be attributed, at least in part, to public sector wage restraints in effect, at least to some extent, since 1982. At the time of writing these case studies, these restraints were still in effect, albeit in voluntary form, but appeared to be being largely ignored by the parties in negotiations.

Other pressures are emerging however, as the Government of Ontario's plan to fund all grades in Catholic high schools is being implemented and public secondary school teachers are becoming fearful of the loss of enrollment, and therefore jobs, as a result of the probable transfer of large numbers of students from the public schools to the separate school system. The mixing of teachers transferred from the public school system with teachers in the separate school system whose salaries and working conditions are usually, although not invariably, inferior, poses its own set of potential problems. It remains to be seen whether the conflicts in the bargaining relationships will erupt once the implications of this new funding scheme become clear.

1. Downie, B. *Collective Bargaining and Conflict Resolution in Education: The Evolution of Public Policy in Ontario.* Research and Current Issues Series, #36. Kingston, Ont.: Queen's University, Industrial Relations Centre, 1978.
The Report of a Commission to Review the Collective Negotiation Process between Teachers and School Boards, Toronto, Ont.; Ministry of Education, 1980.
2. There are five teacher federations:
Ontario Secondary School Teachers' Federation (O.S.S.T.F.) representing teachers in the public secondary schools (membership 35,400).
Federation of Women Teachers' Association of Ontario (F.W.T.A.O.) representing female teachers in public elementary schools (membership 30,240).
Ontario Public School Teachers' Federation (O.P.S.T.F.) representing male public school teachers (membership 14,600).
Ontario English Catholic Teachers' Association (O.E.C.T.A.) representing both mostly male and female teachers in separate (Roman Catholic) schools (membership 20,400).
L'association des enseignants franco-ontarien (A.E.F.O.) representing male and female teachers in francophone schools (membership 5,354).
3. Pitman, W. "Unrealistic Hopes and Missed Opportunities: The '60's in Canadian Education." in Wilson, J.D. (ed.), *Canadian Education in the 1980s*, Calgary, Alta.: Detselig, 1981.
4. *Living and Learning: The Report of the Provincial Committee on Aims and Objectives in the Schools of Ontario.* Toronto, Ont.: Queens Printer, 1968.
5. A summary of these pressures, and those which teachers continue to face, is found in:
Henchey, N. "Pressures for Professional Autonomy and Public Controls" in H.A. Stevenson and J. Donald Wilson (eds.) *Precepts, Policy, and Process: Perspectives on Contemporary Canadian Education.* London, Ont.: Alexander, Blake, 1977.
Henchey, N. "Alternatives to decay: Prospects for the Teaching Profession in the Eighties." in Wilson, J.D. (ed.), *Canadian Education in the 1980s.* Calgary, Alta.: Detselig, 1981.
6. Op. cit. footnote 1.

2

Study Methodology

We had three objectives in mind in deciding to undertake these case studies of changing federation-board relationships:

- To identify the variables which had played a part in the change process in different situations.
- To build a prescriptive framework or model which would help people who wanted to try to change the relationships in their own boards, initiate and manage the change process.
- To provide the material from which good teaching cases could be developed for use in the training and development of school board administrators, trustees, and teachers.

Following extensive discussions with the staff of the Education Relations Commission, a short list of seven possible situations was identified as having the potential for satisfying these objectives. The decision to select the four cases represented in this book was made by the research team on the basis of several criteria. We consciously sought both 'successes' and 'failures'. We wanted those organizations which had succeeded in effecting a planned change of relationship and those which had made efforts but had been less successful. We needed to be assured that enough of the key participants in the change process would be available and willing to speak with us. We needed to have confidence that administrators, trustees, and teacher representatives would talk with us candidly. After initial discussions, we settled on the four case studies described in the following chapters.

Armed with very sketchy initial descriptions of what had taken place in each of the cases, we visited the sites and started interviewing everyone we could find who had been involved in the process and who would agree to speak with us. Trustees, administrators, teachers, federation officers, and knowledgeable citizens in the community were used as sources. Interviews were very loosely structured to encourage maximum freedom of expression by interviewees. Since in each case the boards had experienced a strike, we asked questions along four lines:

- What caused the strike in this school board?
- How have things changed since the strike?
- Why have things changed?
- What do you think will happen to this federation-board relationship in the future?

We attempted to be non-directive in the interviewing process, preferring to allow the interviewees to lead us through their own analysis, however unstructured. Most of the interviews were tape-recorded unless interviewees requested otherwise or we thought that they appeared ill at ease with the intrusive presence of the tape recorder. In many cases, following transcription of the tapes, it was necessary to return to interview the person a second or even third time. Often, of course, one interview led to the need to interview another person, and so on.

We spoke to members of trustee associations, federation officers both inside and outside the particular boards studied, teachers not involved in negotiations as well as those who were, professional negotiators, and numerous others who had some exposure to the situation or an opinion about the reasons for the strike, the subsequent changes, and their success or failure. We stopped interviewing when we were learning nothing new, or when there was good convergence and the returns to increased efforts were minimal.

Much of the material in the cases is highly personal in nature. We had to guarantee the respondents to our requests for interviews two things. First, that they would not be personally identified or described in a way that they could be identified by those who are 'in the know' about the situation. Second, that the cases would be disguised so that it would not be possible to identify them. We have done this. Places have been changed, dates have been changed, names have been eliminated, certain fact situations which would have been too revealing have been altered, and so on. Readers may, nevertheless, think that they can identify the cases since almost any disguise is penetrable if one is intimately aware of the identity of the disguised.

Wherever documentation was available, we sought copies. However, many things which took place had to be reconstructed from individuals' memories. We followed the journalists' principles of validation, rather than those which are more acceptable to the scientific community, in that we sought corroboration from multiple sources wherever possible rather than relying on one person's recollection of the facts.

Following completion of the manuscript we sent draft copies back to at least one, and in some cases more than one, key person in both the federation and the school board administration involved in the situation so that they could comment on the cases and our conclusions. These comments were useful in getting revisions to the manuscript completed. Sometimes they argued with our conclusions. We listened to their arguments and, if we were convinced, we changed our minds!

Given the nature of the research methodology, we make no claims as to the absolute reliability and validity of our data, nor can we hope to present a fully determined model of the change process as a result of our investigation. There are numerous problems commonly associated with the use of case studies as a research methodology - and most of them were encountered in this particular series of studies! The greatest problem is untangling causal relationships between variables, trying to figure out which of many variables led to certain outcomes. In its simplest terms, was the strike in a particular school board a result of economic problems, personality clashes, union politics, management intransigence, or some combination of all of these plus others as yet unidentified? Even if the data from one school board were clear enough to indicate causal relationships in that situation, there are insufficient cases to allow researchers to generalize to other, non-identical fact situations with much confidence. Therefore, while a successful change in one school board may be attributable to the investment in training of staff in problem-solving techniques, one cannot say that in general additional training of staff will lead to successful change in relationships - however intuitively appealing that may be. Certainly it is not possible to assign weights to different influences. Therefore, it is not possible to say how much of the improvement might be attributed to changed attitudes and how much to increased funding for professional development, for example.

Another problem with case studies lies in the interaction between researcher and those who are interviewed. It was clear throughout the study that our interviewees were not dispassionate observers of their own situations. They often had strong points of view and, quite obviously, the data they provided were usually consistent with their interpretations of the factors influencing both the deterioration and subsequent improvement of relationships. Furthermore, those we interviewed were often anxious to convince us as to the rightness of their points of view. Although as researchers we strive for objectivity, extended conversations with interviewees naturally resulted in some being accorded a higher level of credibility than others. Some explanations were accepted, others rejected as too self-serving, or as artificially constructed to serve a political purpose. To some extent, therefore, this

method is influenced by our own ability to assess the validity of conflicting data. This, in turn, is no doubt influenced by our own values, beliefs, and biases.

The advantages of this loosely structured, approach are numerous, however. Firstly, there are the large number and variety of data. Using very loosely structured interview schedules gave interviewees the opportunity to range widely in their discussions, unconstrained by a tight line of questioning by the researchers. In many cases, new variables were introduced by the respondents to our survey which we, as researchers, had no awareness of going into the study. Secondly, we had the opportunity to sound out some respondents about hypotheses proposed by people we had interviewed earlier. Thirdly, because the interviews were conducted face-to-face, we had the opportunity to gauge the 'depth' of feelings about various issues, to sort out superficial factors from those which apparently went to the root of things. Fourthly, because of the informality with which the interviews were conducted - or perhaps because of the extent of emotional involvement of many of those interviewed - we found people ready to talk freely about the personalities involved in the cases. And, as our cases show, the analysis of events leading up to these strikes and the subsequent efforts to change relationships cannot be viewed without considerable attention being paid to the personalities involved. The last strength of the case study method will, we hope, show itself in the ensuing stories - they make for interesting reading!

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The Alpha Board of Education

The 1978-81 agreement between the teachers and the Alpha Board of Education was the first to have been freely negotiated between the parties for seven years. It followed a mass resignation of teachers in 1973, a strike in 1974, and another in 1976. In the three and one-half years preceding the 1978-81 agreement there were 34 negotiation sessions, 20 mediation sessions with two different mediators, four meetings with the Minister of Education, five fact-finding hearings, two sets of strike votes, a strike, a lock-out, a closing of schools, special legislation to end the strike followed by an arbitrated settlement, a charge of bad faith bargaining, a consent for leave to prosecute the board, and legal proceedings involving the Anti-Inflation Board. Yet more than an agreement came out of the 1978-81 negotiations. What emerged from this protracted period of conflict was a new, grudgingly respectful, sometimes cooperative relationship between the administration of the board and the teachers' federation.

BACKGROUND

Alpha is an industrial city, heavily dependent on the cyclical steel industry. The population of 400,000 is of mixed ethnic origins, predominantly British, French, Italian, and German. Over 45 percent of the labor force is directly involved in manufacturing, nearly all in unionized operations. Through the period 1972-1981 employment levels and earnings were well above the Canadian average, although employment levels fluctuated with the cycle of the steel business. The public has a union-consciousness, and the traditional patterns of negotiations, threats, brinkmanship, and strikes were no strangers to the population of Alpha.

During the period 1972-81, the composition of the Alpha board reflected a changing trend in Ontario boards towards less service by professionals such as accountants, lawyers, and doctors, and more involvement by active and retired teachers from other boards, spouses of teachers, and homemakers interested in education. Many of those interviewed felt that this composition of the board had some direct bearing on the events in Alpha, but there was a lack of consensus about

whether the impact of teacher-involvement in the board was to make it more or less sympathetic toward the teachers.

> "I'd like to have somebody who is intelligent enough on the board. But there's never any guarantee because we have teachers on the board who are from the separate school system who I think are self-serving in the long run. They are interested in education to a certain extent, but I don't think they are able to go above their own particular system. Like with (a separate school teacher who serves as a public school trustee). I think that one of the things that he's been trying to do is to bring us in line with the separate system more than anything else. In terms of things, like in setting up the calendar, we can't have our kids getting out earlier than the separate school kids because that would give them an unfair advantage in finding jobs" (a teacher).

> "Another very strong trustee who was chairman of the board during our last problem with the teachers was probably one of the most responsible trustees when it came to negotiations. He was a secondary school teacher at another private high school, a Catholic high school. He was probably the hardest on the teachers" (an administrator).

> "We have a number of teachers as trustees. They seem to have an either-or orientation: either too sympathetic or too hard. Too hard because of either over-compensation or the attitude that 'I don't make as much money, and I'm a teacher'" (a trustee).

Before the seventies, teacher-board negotiations in Alpha were largely informal, quick sessions. The board would announce to the teacher representatives the percentage increase they could afford to offer for the year. Conditions of work were never discussed. By the early seventies, teacher militancy was growing. Although the key issue was money, there were other factors. There was a resentment by younger teachers of the paternalism of the trustees - a 'take it or leave it' attitude toward salaries and working conditions and an insensitivity to the increasing desire of teachers to participate in the decision-making process. The autocratic stance of the board was reflected in the attitudes and behaviours of many administrators in the Alpha system, including the director of education. There was a tendency to do things by fiat, unilaterally, and without adequate consultation with teachers or their representatives.

"My father was a teacher and a negotiator. They used to decide over tea. The board would make an offer and they'd accept it. There were no negotiations *per se*" (a teacher).

"It used to be that if the board said 'that's all we have,' the teachers would believe. But the board regularly gave back money to the taxpayers from the year-end surplus, so we lost our belief in the board. Also, teachers were falling behind community increases" (a teacher).

"Because we were a steel city and workers were doing better than teachers, we started comparing ourselves to other professions. Some board members thought we were being led astray by young radicals like (two teachers), but all of the older teachers were also adamant that things had to be done now" (a teacher).

Many people thought that community values and norms had a major role to play in the developing conflicts.

"Our teachers have been more militant over the years. Alpha is a labor-union town. Politically, people here would probably accept strikes more readily than in, say, (another city). We've got problems right now that other cities don't have because of the ups and downs of the steel industry" (the director of education).

"The attitude by the board was truly the epitome of the master-servant relationship. We are the master, you are the servant. Whatever we give to you is by our generosity and great beneficence. You should take it.

"Young folks came along. Young folks of commitment to the teaching profession. Younger people who had a different attitude. They were not prepared to take this 'beneficence' swill. I think the patronizing attitude began to grate on these teachers. And as the teachers fell further and further behind the galloping inflation of the economy, and as the Province of Ontario started to take a more active and aggressive role in regulating expenditures, a crisis was bound to come about, because the teachers' salaries formed a very significant portion of the overall expenditure budgets.The net result was that inevitably if you are going to cut it, don't cut the paper out, that's 2 percent, cut the teachers out, who are 90 percent. That may not be the accurate number. And that's what started it.

> "It wasn't done very credibly in my judgement. Back to the old problems of communication. Rather than asking and developing a cooperative approach to it, the board, very unfortunately, and because of their lack of professionalism - they didn't have any professional negotiators at that time - took a very arbitrary point of view. In my judgement that arbitrariness was probably singularly the first blow, if you will" (the teachers' lawyer).

Starting in 1972, the teachers set out to win concessions on several fronts. They wanted a collective agreement, just like industry had, instead of an informal memorandum of agreement. They wanted more control over working conditions. They wanted a more equal relationship with the board and administration, some significant degree of power-sharing.

THE EARLY TROUBLES

Although this undercurrent of militancy was there, and the teachers had clear models of industrial unionism all around them, they lacked the expertise to turn their militancy into an organized approach to bargaining. Then they found a local lawyer, extremely experienced in negotiations, to represent them. He organized the teachers into a well-informed, cohesive, militant bargaining group. As they organized themselves for negotiations, the teachers also started developing considerable expertise in the critical support functions necessary to back up negotiating positions and their use of comparative data on salaries, workloads, class sizes and other working conditions - obtained through painstaking surveys of surrounding boards - represented the first use of such data in the province. These data were then used to compare Alpha's position to that of the other large urban centres and to make a case for larger salary increases. It was the start of an era of leapfrogging which would lead to large increases in salaries and benefits, as well as to significant alterations in contract language, for all secondary school teachers in Ontario.

While the teachers were becoming more militant and were developing bargaining expertise, the trustees were acting as if nothing was happening. They refused to take the teacher's negotiating demands and tactics seriously; they still thought that it was "Daddy sitting down with the kids to negotiate an allowance", and they were still doing the negotiating themselves through a negotiating committee of the board. There also appeared to be a real reluctance on the part of trustees to recognize how serious the teachers' demands for improved salaries were. Too many trustees were still clinging to the vocational view of teaching, ignoring the self-perception of the newer teacher as a professional worth a high professional salary.

THE FIRST WALK-OUT

When the teachers resigned *en masse* in December 1972 and did not report for work in January 1973, the trustees were surprised and unprepared. The walkout lasted only 17 days because the teachers were legislated back to work, and the parties were forced into binding arbitration by the legislation. In the arbitration process there was sharp disagreement between what the board said it could afford to pay the teachers and what funds the teachers claimed were available. In effect, the teachers accused the board of 'fudging' the budget, covering up the availability of several hundred-thousand dollars. The teachers felt they gained some points in this arbitration, but the arbitration only postponed the conflict which was to come.

There was sharp disagreement among the teachers and the administration about what happened next. According to the teachers, in April 1974 they tried, through their lawyer, to make a first effort to change the structure and approach to collective bargaining from the adversarial mode to one involving more problem-solving through joint team sessions. Instead of presenting demands to the board, the lawyer presented an analysis of the problems facing the teachers; problems of salaries falling behind the inflation rate, problems of poor relationships between teachers and administrators, and a collective bargaining approach which was becoming more legalistic and conflictful. According to the teachers this approach was instantly rebuffed and ridiculed. It was seen as a tactic, a device to get more. The board could not or would not see it as an olive branch. And the ridicule simply strengthened the teachers' resolve to wage all-out war if that was what it took to raise their salaries and improve their working conditions.

> "We had the opportunity for the first time of being the leaders in how these negotiations should take place. What the hell were we doing, using the worn-out, tired and tiresome methods of labour relations that have been used in collective-bargaining for years? Why didn't we find something new?
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> "The proposal that I came up with was - there was no stroke of genius, don't misunderstand me - was basically to say: number one, let us recognize we are going to negotiate. We are going to have to have some by-play between us. Secondly, let's do it differently than industry has. Thirdly, I don't know what all the answers are. Let's work together to develop a course of conduct that will bring about a cooperative and mutually satisfactory result. I believed then and I believe now that any result that is totally one-sided is bad. As I said then, and I often say now, probably the best settlements are those where people walk away from the table

saying 'well damn, we should have gotten more.' The other side saying 'darn we shouldn't have given as much.' That's a pretty good settlement. Both parties have come to grips with it.

"We went to the board. We made a very strong plea to that end about April 9, 1974. As I said to them, for example, rather than us coming to you and saying 'here are our demands for 1970', or whatever, and you are saying 'they are all too high, go away', why couldn't we come to you with problems? Say, 'here is a problem we have. For example with wages because the economy is running at 10 percent inflation, we're falling behind. We've fallen behind. How can we work to bring ourselves into a position that is reflective of the position we have in the community and the obligations we have as teachers?'

"I also told them, get rid of the lawyers. Kick these damn lawyers to hell out of here. Me in particular. Sit down between yourselves and solve these problems. When it comes down to having to draw an agreement, or drawing a letter of understanding, you can do it yourselves. You don't need lawyers to tell you the comma should be there and the within should be there. If you come to the table in good spirit and well-motivated, you might end up with a very little documentation, because most of it will be like our former constitution. It would be based on precedent and understanding and tradition. If you don't do it, I predict that you are going to have one fight after another. You will eventually get to the point where you will have a collective agreement that will number in the hundreds of pages, and I'm afraid that you will end up with everyone in the system from the director down to the teacher walking with their books in one hand and their collective agreement in the other to decide on what they should do. That was probably an over-dramatization, but it isn't very far from that.

"They did a hell of a bad thing I think. They really killed it. The one thing I don't like is ridicule. The one thing I won't stand for is being laughed at. Not when I've been sincere. From then on they had themselves a fight" (the teachers' lawyer).

In recalling this approach, the administrators who were involved at the time saw it quite differently. They thought that it was a device, a tactic to 'soften-up' the board for bargaining and that such a problem-solving approach was totally out-of-

keeping with the philosophy of bargaining expressed on many occasions by the teachers' lawyer.

THE FIRST STRIKE

From September 1, 1974 the teachers in Alpha were working without a collective agreement and negotiations were totally stalled. In November 1974, Alpha teachers went out on an eight-week strike without submitting their resignations. It was the first time in Ontario that teachers had decided to test the legality of strike action. The board responded by requesting an injunction against the teachers to have the picketing stopped and the strike declared illegal. The courts refused to declare the strike illegal, a decision subsequently upheld by the Supreme Court of Canada.

The strike dragged on through the Christmas break. One analysis suggests that the teachers were able to take control of the situation during the 1974-75 strike and shift the balance of power in their favor. Several factors contributed to this. The teachers were able to muster solid support for their position among the rank and file whereas the board was far from solid in its position. The public appeared sympathetic to the teachers' economic demands. This sympathy was enhanced by the teachers arguing that the strike could have been averted if the board accepted the principles of justice and equity. This, they claimed, was necessary, since they did not have the right to strike. Third, the board that found itself in the strike situation was a 'lame-duck' board, many of whose members had resigned or lost their seats in the recent elections and they had no desire to take bold actions to resolve the dispute. In addition, the new board did not want to inherit a strike. Finally there was the absence of any legislative provisions governing the actions of the parties during strike sanctions.

Another point of view, promoted by the chief negotiator for the teachers, is that the teachers simply did not know what they were getting into. There was a sense of adventure, of 'going off to war'.

> "I was reading recently about what was happening on December 7, 1941 in the United States. Everybody was going off to the big party. 'Go on up and join, we're going off to war, boys.' Tally-ho, you know, I get my uniform and I'm going to be a whatever and I'm going to war, Mom. I'll be back in two weeks.
>
> "Five years later, or four years later those who came back could not begin to imagine what mental processes they had been going through to think that they were going off to any kind of party. So I think they have been far, far more careful about wandering off into war as though it were a frolic. I think the strike started off that

way. God damn, we're going to have some time off!" (the teachers' lawyer).

THE 'GIVE-AWAY' AGREEMENT

A mediator was appointed by the Minister of Education. In the ensuing, high-pressure negotiations, the board capitulated totally to the teachers' demands and the result was widely hailed as a victory for the teachers. The teachers won a 'one-for-one' C.O.L.A. clause and an increase in salaries of 27 percent. The parties agreed to a new clause in the 1975 agreement which, in effect, removed the right of management to change existing practices and policies.

> 19:01 All existing determination, authorizations, by-laws, regulations, rules, rulings, resolutions, certifications, orders, directive and other actions made, issued or entered into by the board of education governing or affecting salary and working conditions of the members of District X, O.S.S.T.F. shall continue in force during the term of this Agreement and after the term of this Agreement until a new Agreement is settled between the two parties.

In the words of one administrator, this clause

> "took away all the rights of the board to change anything that was going on in the schools, almost to the point . . . where you couldn't change a light bulb without being subject to a grievance."

The clause went far beyond anything agreed to by school boards in negotiations with other teacher groups. There is much evidence that the board's negotiators were so lacking in expertise that they did not know what they were agreeing to.

> "The trustees kept on initialing item by item. Helped by the mediator, we were nickled and dimed to death. Emotions ran high. It was a big mistake as there was a sense of urgency. We felt closing the schools was a matter of life and death. Education was an essential service. This resulted in giving away the ship. There was a C.O.L.A. (cost-of-living allowance), folded in one-for-one monthly. This clause was a result of our ignorance of C.O.L.A. and of emotions" (a trustee).

And even some of the teachers now recognize that the seeds of the future conflict were well and truly sown in that agreement:

> "We got C.O.L.A. and a 27-28 percent increase. Objectively speaking, you shouldn't get everything you want because the other side bleeds too much and wants revenge" (a teacher).

THE SECOND STRIKE

This agreement was to run until December 31, 1975. By the time it was signed, it was time to begin gearing up for new negotiations for 1976. And, when negotiations for the 1976 agreement did get underway, it was immediately apparent that there would be another serious conflict. While the trustees thought that the cost-of-living allowance clause they had agreed to in the previous set of negotiations would be a substitute for a salary increase in 1976, the teachers approached negotiations demanding a large increase in addition to the C.O.L.A. And the board was determined to restore its 'management rights' which it had conceded in the previous negotiations.

> "The board somehow got the idea that the C.O.L.A. clause was only a one time shot and I don't know what kind of wheeling and dealing, again, went on behind the doors of the boardroom to convince them that way because that certainly never was the way it was presented to teachers. It certainly was, we felt, a way out of this constant haggling for what percentage do we go for. We thought it would really ease the tension between the two groups and help to produce more equitable and fair settlements without some of the hassling and wrangling that goes on. It didn't turn out that way. We were back into it again. No sooner did we get the contract than we were ready to start again. This time with Bill 100 telling us what the time lines were going to be and some of the framework" (a teacher).

But things had changed between the two sets of negotiations. Smarting from their previous capitulation - and the attendant criticism from other trustee groups - the board had prepared a strategy and, furthermore, had decided to turn over the negotiating function to an experienced professional. In November, the Minister of Education had announced ceilings on expenditures. The impact of the C.O.L.A. clause in the previous agreement had been to make the board's expenditures increase beyond the provincial ceilings on expenditures. This, in turn, had resulted in the province levying a 'fine' of the amount that the expenditures had exceeded the ceilings. This was particularly frustrating to the trustees, since they had assumed

that the mediator in the previous dispute had acted and pressured the board to adopt the C.O.L.A. formula with the tacit approval of the Minister of Education. In the end analysis, these spending ceilings forced the board to renege on the salary offer that it had already put on the table in negotiations.

> "The board of education decided after the 1974-75 strike that it was too time-consuming, too tiresome, too complicated and they thought that this was a job of a professional rather than them going into it on a part-time basis. That's why I guess I was hired and I found this situation quite tense. There were questions raised as to whether the trustees were abandoning their responsibility to do what they were supposed to do. At least to look after the business of the board. However, at the beginning when I came here I was somehow accepted by the teachers, although that acceptance was very cautious, and very reserved.
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> "As we began the negotiations in September, October and November, things got complicated at that point in time. The Minister of Education, Tom Wells, brought bad news to the boards of education. The policy that he was advocating, if adopted, it would result in the boards getting a lot less money than what they expected and by that time we had prepared our position. And the position of the board was prepared before I came into the picture. That is a negotiating position, so I took the proposals by the board and I had to go in there and negotiate.
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> "Then in November, as a result of Mr. Wells' budget proposals, we had to go to the teachers and revise our proposals. That, I guess, began the downhill slide in our relations insofar as that set of negotiations was concerned. It was extremely sad and extremely tense. I tried to explain to the teachers the position that the board was in and I guess the teachers at that time were not prepared to listen. They had a strange notion at that point in time that if they pushed hard they'd get whatever they wanted. Because it worked in the past and they thought it was going to work in the future. Why not? There is no reason why it shouldn't work in the future and they wouldn't listen to anything else. They kept pressing for their demands. I guess that resulted in a strike" (the board's negotiator).

In this set of negotiations the teachers' initial demands were for the continuation of the 'one-for-one' folded-in C.O.L.A. plus a 16 percent increase. The response of the trustees was flat disbelief and outrage.

"And the next year, the man came back for another 20 percent increase or whatever. It was a huge amount. And it was interesting to watch the trustees. Some of them had been very pro-teacher in January, by June they were flipped. Just almost 180 degrees to the point that they were just as anti-teacher as they had been pro. That's the point I was talking about where I felt the leadership, in my opinion, at that point maybe could have blown it. Because that's when we had the real bitter strike. And it went on for 35 or 36 days or whatever." (an administrator)

"I was told that the teachers and the board had settled on salary. We don't have to worry about it, just keep the C.O.L.A. in the future. Okay - one percent for one percent. Then in September of '75, when the negotiations began, the teachers came with a proposal. A similar cost of living plus 16 percent increase. I think it was 16 percent increase over and above the C.O.L.A. And of course a lot of other things like decrease in PTR, more positions of responsibility, more benefits, and so on and so forth. Very, very rich package in so far as the board was concerned. And that angered a lot of trustees. In 1975 they said 'look we're negotiating in good faith. We feel that from now on the salary is settled and we will turn ourselves to the educational aspect.' When they saw that hefty package they became angry, very angry. Some of them who were supporters of the teachers in the 1974/75 strike made 180 degree turns against the teachers because of those demands" (the board's negotiator).

However, not everyone saw the actions of the board as merely a reaction to the teachers' bargaining position. Some thought that the board was determined to recover from its capitulation of the previous year and to strip the agreement of the favorable provisions that the teachers had gained as a result of their strike action.

The teachers had boycotted the mandatory fact-finding process in January and called for a strike vote in March 1976. In this vote, 97 percent of the teachers voted for the rejection of the board's offer and 79 percent voted in favor of strike action. For the third time in as many years, the Alpha teachers left their classrooms, this time for the longest and most bitter battle. But this time the odds were not as much in their favor. The board had determination, a skillful professional negotiator who had been hired as director of personnel, more backing from the community and media, and an unexpected boost from the federal government in the form of wage and price controls which - in the board's view - clearly regulated the extent to which salaries could be increased in the Alpha board.

The board tried to enlist the support of teachers and local taxpayers by sending letters to them pointing out the virtues of the board's position. The impact was to solidify teacher opposition. On March 30, the secondary school teachers went on a one-day strike, announcing that they would commence rotating strikes the following week. On March 31, the board voted to lock out the teachers. After teachers defied the lockout, the board physically closed the schools on April 4.

Later that month the O.S.S.T.F., the federation representing the secondary school teachers, began to run 'alternate schools' for grade 12 and 13 children so they would not lose their year, vital for those intending to go onto post-secondary educational institutions. The board, by now with the bit firmly between its teeth, asked the Education Relations Commission to begin 'Jeopardy' (1) hearings as, so the board hoped, a prelude to recommending a legislated settlement. The E.R.C. refused. The Minister of Education asked the board to lift its lockout - the board refused. The Ministry of Education evaluated the alternate schools established by the O.S.S.T.F. and reported that they were of acceptable quality. Finally, under further pressure from the board, the E.R.C. held jeopardy hearings and reported that the students' education was not in jeopardy.

This strike was particularly bitter because of the personal accusations and counter-accusations that flew privately and through the public media. Billboards were put up with the slogan 'Do you want your child to lose his year?' Telephone complaint campaigns were organized by the teachers, open line radio shows were used to whip-up feelings against the board and certain targeted trustees, and there was extensive harassment of trustees and administrators.

> "We conducted, in Alpha, guerrilla warfare. A propaganda warfare against first of all the trustees, ultimately the administration. We put up billboards. 'Do you want your child to lose his year?' Around the billboard we put the telephone numbers and names of all the trustees to call if you were concerned about it. We had them throughout the city. We got on radio programs and became very opinionated, because I have another bit of philosophy. I really believe that as far as teachers are concerned, the public be damned. I don't really care what the public thinks about what we do. The only thing I care about what we do is, if it is fundamental and has integrity and is an honest address of whatever the problem is. I think that is the mistake the organization has made for too long and that is to care too much about what the community thinks" (an O.S.S.T.F. official).

> "The Alpha operation was one within which we felt getting to the trustees was absolutely key. We absolutely ignored the

administration and made fun of them, disparaged and discredited them every chance we could" (an O.S.S.T.F. official).

"It was very bitter. Each campaign they focussed in on one particular official and proceeded to try and, well, discredit them as best they could. And of course, that didn't help relationships" (an administrator).

There are different views about the attitudes that the administration expressed toward its teachers during those difficult months. Some teachers saw the administrators as continually trying to disparage them. The administrators, on the other hand, believed that they had tried to maintain a sense of respect for the teachers, particularly in the eyes of the public.

"The fact is that we don't see them as very effective administrators. They don't seem to stand up for teachers. When it comes to talking to the work that teachers do in the classroom they don't seem to give the idea that they support the teacher in the classroom. They wouldn't go against the board, who might take a look at the teacher in the classroom and say, yeah, he's doing 3 1/2 hours in school. That is all, 9 to 3 and that's it and he's gone, something like that. You've just got that feeling you would never get that kind of strong support from them saying, 'these teachers are good and I think it's about time you gave them some credit,' that kind of thing. You just never get that kind of feeling from the administrators down there" (a teacher).

"It was during the strike and we had to go on an open-line radio show and put the board's issues squarely before the public, the financial issues. And then parents were invited to phone in. They began to phone in and complain about the guidance, etc., and I found myself in the position of defending the profession and the things we do and tried to make it clear that the teachers are on strike, teachers work hard, and spoke positively about the teaching job itself. I got a lot of feedback from teachers on that, that they were pleased that had happened. I decided that no matter how tense the situation is, I will never poor-mouth the profession" (the director of education.)

AFTER THE STRIKE

The strike/lockout was ended in May 1976 and the issue was referred to compulsory arbitration by special legislation. Two comments about the earlier strikes and this later strike - one from the local federation's chief negotiator and one from the chief negotiator for the board - seem to reflect the new state of affairs which had developed.

> "They felt they had the statistics to prove it, and I think they had certain radicals in the leadership position at that time that knew what it took to make big gains in short periods of time. I think they were bent on doing that. They were successful. Of course, they had a lawyer involved with them that had the same kind of reputation as a maverick. And they were successful I think in leading the teachers in the province to a certain salary level. And I think that once that happened then I think we had to go through a period where they felt they were very powerful and could really get the board on the run. And of course this is while they were still negotiating with the board of directors and trustees. We had to go through that last strike (1976), I believe, to show them that there's a point at which the board would say 'No, that's it and we're willing to take the consequences.' And once that happened, then I think that we gained the respect" (an administrator).

> "I said don't ever count on 'might being right' because you'll be sorry. Never found too many people who made that statement that might is right where in the end they didn't find out that might can be used against you. The teachers found that out too. And that's what it took in the end. They eventually each tested their muscle. The teachers exercised theirs very effectively at first, but in the end the board caught on how to use its muscle. They got a couple of licks in too. Eventually everybody got the idea that, say, there were some pretty tough guys on the other side. Maybe what we should do instead of war, because those cats are tough guys, is make peace" (the teachers' lawyer).

TOWARD A NEW RELATIONSHIP

Although the strike/lockout was eventually ended by legislation and compulsory arbitration, and although the arbitration award was largely in favor of the teachers, a lesson had been learned by both parties. The board had learned that it could 'stand up for its position' and make some tough decisions such as locking the teachers out,

while the teachers had learned that this was no longer a board which would 'roll over and play dead' when pressure tactics were used.

A collective agreement implementing the arbitration award, signed in August, was rolled back by the Anti-Inflation Board (A.I.B.) established under federal government legislation to restrain wages, and the teachers received the maximum allowable under the regulations. The C.O.L.A. clause and the contentious clause limiting managements' rights negotiated in the previous agreement, were maintained. However, there was some respite for the board, as the teachers turned their attention to fighting the A.I.B. ruling - without any success.

The parties were unable to come to terms on a collective agreement for 1977. However, since the C.O.L.A. clause in the previous agreement generated the maximum which would have been allowable under the A.I.B. guidelines, the board and the teachers decided simply to work without a collective agreement.

This intervening time was used well by the board's director of personnel and the director of education. Great care was exercised to ensure that the school system ran smoothly during this period. Any grievances were thoroughly investigated and both administrators were highly visible in the school system. The director of personnel worked with the superintendents and other senior administrators to make sure that any issue with potential labor relations dimensions was brought to his attention; and he also sought to build a consciousness of the labor relations implications into the decision-making processes within the board. The director of education, through the nature of his public statements and personal contact with teachers, sought to smooth over the interpersonal conflicts and stresses which had erupted during the previous strike.

Their success in these endeavours appeared to hinge as much on personal qualities as on any concrete actions or structural changes. Perhaps because of his late arrival on the scene, immediately before the 1976 strike/lockout, the director of personnel emerged from that conflict largely unscathed. And his subsequent actions created a reputation for integrity and openness. He was seen as having influence with the director of education, the superintendents, and board members. The teachers and federation officials trusted him and liked him personally. He asked for reasons underlying requests and sought to understand them. He never promised things that he could not deliver. He was not seen as someone who would take advantage of someone else. At the same time he was seen as smart - having 'savvy'. So he earned the respect as well as the trust and liking of the teachers.

> "I think (the director of personnel) has to have a lot to do with it. I don't envy him sometimes, working for the board or the administration. I think he's put into a conflicting situation where he can't work out a negotiated settlement and reasonable one. Maybe it's true more in the past; maybe not so much now. Maybe he can get them to think along his way" (a teacher).

"I think generally, those of us who know him, feel quite confident in that he wouldn't cheat us. He wouldn't lie to us. Trust, that's what it boils down to. You feel that if you talk to him, can at least have a reasonable hearing. It will be done with reasons, and if he's not too sure, he'll ask further clarification from whoever he has to ask for. If he can get it, he'll do it. I think it is that kind of approach we have with him, so that he is very good that way. There is always something you always hear, and I don't know to what extent he is involved in it, but he is a key figure down at the board. He seems to run the board, board administration, board members as well" (a teacher).

"I believe that professionals like (the director of personnel) are quite prepared to be firm but they are quite prepared to look at the long range personnel view" (the teachers' lawyer).

"I have a real respect for him. I think (the director of personnel) is not about to take advantage. Like any good negotiator, he recognizes that perhaps in this field, he could, if he wanted to, occasionally slip something in to take advantage. That's a very short-run view of it, and I think it's inevitable that that will cause a tremendous reaction, because my judgment of these teachers is there is nothing that offends them more than unfairness or apparent unfairness. I think that he recognizes that. I think that because of that he will not knowingly take advantage of them in a situation in kind of an unfair fashion. I'm sure that if he negotiates with them, he will try to do his best to maintain his responsibility to his principals. But there is a big difference between retaining your responsibility to your principals, and isn't part of your responsibility to your principals to maintain some credibility with the people with whom you are negotiating with. And I think he'd do that" (the teachers' lawyer).

"I think that the hiring of this negotiator was the key. He brought some fresh ideas to tactical maneuvers at last and debating ability at the table. We really haven't, other than that, we haven't had any great changes at the table. Our administration has been basically the same as it was back in those days" (an administrator).

"He was given an impossible task: negotiate a new contract and at the same time withdraw part of the old contract. He brought

respectability and expertise, which made the teachers respect him. They knew they couldn't con him. They were evenly matched and that led to better contracts. The trustees ran from being involved at the negotiating table. As long as they were around, they could be goaded by teachers into participation and into breaking rank" (a trustee).

And the relationship between negotiating and the day-to-day activities within the school system was also described:

"He administers the contract, too. He's not moving from board to board. He has to live with it, so that makes him thoughtful and understanding of the teaching environment. He brings a certain amount of class to the job. I don't always agree with him, but I have respect for him, because he's extremely honest in contract administration" (a teacher).

"In the previous agreement, the lawyer was negotiating the collective agreements and that's it. That agreement was left to the administration and the administration could put any interpretation they wanted. Of course they were consulting the lawyer, but the lawyer was not here every day. I mean I'm here now, I'm responsible for the interpretation of the collective agreement, and if there are any problems at all, the superintendents will come to me and say, O.K., what do you think about this section? It seems unclear, what was the intention? Sit down and then discuss this thing. We may have problems.

"I sometimes call up the other Local (federation) president, and I say 'Fred, what do you think? We have some difficulty and we don't want to get into problems, what is your interpretation of that particular section?' We can discuss things together, and come up with a mutually satisfactory solution to their problems. I think that's very important. You've got to establish trust" (the director of personnel).

"There's got to be this kind of openness and communication after the contract has been signed to make it work, and it is time-consuming and a big load on the administrative staff. But we've come to the conclusion that's the only way we can do it and keep the thing operating smoothly.

> "Trust and integrity are paramount. Once you commit yourself, you are committed" (the director of education).

In addition to the arrival of the new director of personnel, there was also the promotion of a well-respected superintendent to the position of director of education in 1975, and the more recent appointment of a new superintendent of operations in 1980.

> "He's (the new superintendent) anxious to consult - he bends over backwards to be fair, and I think the teachers see this. Even when hard decisions have to be made, I think they know he's fair, and he's going to do what he can to resolve the situation so the fewest number of people are hurt in a redundancy situation" (the director).

> "I think he developed a lot of credibility with the teachers here. They thought he was someone that would listen to them and take their comments into consideration. I think that that changed a lot too. They felt a real confidence that they had a key administrator on the acting side that they had access to and that would listen to them. I think that probably was also the reason for them changing their attitude. He was sympathetic to their concerns and then they became sympathetic to some of the concerns that we had" (an administrator).

POST-A.I.B. NEGOTIATIONS

Negotiations for the first, post-A.I.B. collective agreement began in January 1977, for a contract to run from September 1, 1977. They went on for 19 months, without any agreement being reached. The board again pushed for the abolition of C.O.L.A. and rescinding of the clause limiting managements' rights. The teachers resisted any such changes. Negotiations went through 1977 without substantial movement by either party. Buoyed by a fact-finder's report supporting its monetary position, the board unilaterally amended the collective agreement, as it was entitled to by law, thereby clearly throwing down the gauntlet to the federation - strike if you don't like the change! The teacher's provincial federation wanted the Alpha teachers to strike, but the memory of the 1976 lockout was too vivid and the strike ballot resulted in a resounding no-strike vote.

Around November 1978 the teachers indicated that they were prepared to accept changes in the C.O.L.A. and managements' rights clauses. The board made a number of concessions, inserting a number of provisions to cushion the impact of declining enrollments such as a permanent supply pool, more liberal leaves of absence, and an incentive plan to get teachers to retire early so that the board could

keep teachers who may otherwise be redundant. These were innovative things that were not in many other collective agreements.

It was the first agreement in many years that was freely negotiated by the parties and it set the stage for better relations. After the agreement was signed a few other problems came up with respect to redundancy and these were resolved amicably, with much of the credit being given to the director of personnel. There was also a sense of give-and-take in this set of negotiations, a feeling that reasonable persuasion could be used effectively. In part, this was attributed to the skilled, low-pressure approach of the mediator, a sharp contrast to the high pressure technique of the previous mediator in the 1976 negotiations. He would work to show the joint gains out of proposals such as a supply pool, rather than focus on the differences between the parties.

TWO YEARS LATER

When we checked back with the parties two years later, there was little doubt that the relationship between the Alpha Board of Education and its teachers was still an adversarial one. While there had been changes in the ways they did things, and some major changes in the structure of the collective agreement, they had been achieved in the adversarial mode. But the parties had developed a healthy mutual respect, largely based on the recognition of the countervailing power they have, but also tinged with some respect and even liking.

The three year agreement negotiated for 1978/81 gave some breathing room, time for the relationship to cool down. And subsequent agreements have been negotiated without work sanctions, an occurrence partly influenced by the extremely depressed state of the local economy which has blunted the militance of teachers. And, of course, the 1983 negotiations were carried out under the braking effect of provincial wage controls on the public sector.

The best comments on the state of the relationship and a forecast for the future came from some of those interviewed for this study:

> "The administration here I guess has matured as well, in that they no longer feel threatened by having to talk with the federation on issues before they make the decision. I think it's just that attitude that has been developed that's more cooperative, and so far I think the teachers feel that they have a greater part in the action; they're not just out there as a fifth wheel doing their job and these people are laying everything on them. They know they have input into some of the decisions that have been made. When you have input, then you have to support some of the decisions. I think that we'll probably end up with another three-year agreement with our

teachers here without any major give-aways or take-aways on their part" (an administrator).

"I doubt, unfortunately, that there is any room left now for a cooperative sense of bargaining. It may happen in years to come, I don't know...I suspect, though, they'll have to have one more blowout before they grow up" (the teachers' lawyer).

"The relationship has matured. Both parties had to grow up, stop name-calling, stop taking things personally. We've grown up in ten years, whereas most industries did it in 50-100 years. When it comes to dollars, it's theirs to give and we have to take it away. We're dealing with politicians" (a teacher).

"We want to retain management rights. We want to be able to run the system without having to go to the federation for every decision. We want to have enough authority to exercise the responsibility that we have under the *Act* and under the regulations given to us by the board" (the director of education).

"I don't think we're there yet, but we may be moving toward some full-table, single-table bargaining... Some people might say it's a poor way to bargain. I, personally, see it as a good way" (an administrator).

"Giving birth to a new era in collective bargaining where you go from the old style autocratic, more or less patriarchal system, to a more consultative and cooperative model - that's a big step. We are still not there in Alpha. We're still with the adversarial model. But there is peace, and there is mutual respect, and there is also a lot of expertise on both sides" (the teachers' lawyer).

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1. Under the *School Boards and Teachers Collective Negotiations Act* , R.S.O. 1980, the Education Relations Commission may hold hearings to determine if students' education is in jeopardy. This is the usual prelude to any form of back-to-work legislation.

4

The Beta Board of Education

The relationship between the federations and the board in Beta clearly moved from conflict to cooperation over a period of approximately five years. Emerging from a highly disruptive and lengthy strike in 1975, the board and its teachers developed a model of cooperative federation-board relationships involving single-team bargaining. Several years after this change began, the relationship was free of disruptions, and there was a significant degree of cooperation and even, to some extent, co-management within the Beta board.

BACKGROUND

The Beta Board of Education was formed in 1969 from the forced amalgamation of two large and several smaller municipal boards, dictated by the provincial government in the interests of greater administrative efficiency and educational quality. However, it led directly to a number of problems. The two large boards had historically been very competitive in the areas of curriculum development and innovation, hiring of staff, and both scholastic and athletic achievements. Each large board, and many of the smaller ones had their own administrators, policies and procedures, and methods of operation. The federation-board relationships varied from close cooperation to some in which relationships were adversarial or strained. However, the people involved knew each other. Bargaining approaches were different in each board, but they were almost universally informal, unsophisticated, and had always resulted in settlements by mutual consent.

This stable pattern of relationships and diversity of operational methods and organizational structures was disrupted with amalgamation. A single, large board, with one administrative structure, a common operating system, and a single set of policies, procedures, and practices was imposed on everyone. Choices had to be made from among administrators, operating policies, locations, priorities for expenditures, and so on. As established relationships were disrupted, the gulf between trustees, administrators, and teachers grew. Some misunderstandings arose, mistrust developed, and bargaining became more formalized and adversarial.

At the same time the amalgamated system was experiencing significant growth in enrollments. Four new elementary schools were built shortly after the amalgamation, and several of the smaller, rural schools were closed or 'folded into' these new ones. Reflecting the geographical dispersion, size, and complexity of this system, the administration of the Beta board was divided into four zones, each with a superintendent and assistant superintendent. In addition to their general supervisory duties covering schools in their assigned zones, each of these four superintendents had functional responsibility for one of the following areas: curriculum development, academic personnel, professional development, or special education.

Two non-academic superintendents, one for business and one for physical plant, were also appointed. Along with the director of education, the six superintendents constituted the Administrative Council which was to be the major decision-making body of the new Beta board. To aid the Administrative Council and the trustees in serving the expanding needs of the system, six major standing committees, numerous joint committees with other agencies, many sub-committees, and task forces were appointed.

EMERGING PROBLEMS

The expanding system started to get out of hand around this time and the situation worsened in 1974 when two superintendents retired and were not replaced.

Communication lines broke down and the zone responsibilities of the superintendents began to be neglected. People started to circumvent the established lines of authority as the system bogged down and became slower and slower in its response. The Administrative Council began to be viewed as an impediment to decision making.

> "My principal said he couldn't phone direct, he had to phone the assistant superintendent who would okay it with the superintendent who would okay it with the director's secretary, who would okay it with the director" (an administrator, formerly a teacher).

> "Because of a lot of these problems people forgot the human aspect of dealing with each other. A lot of that stuff was neglected. The maintenance of personal relationships was dropped. Even though you were conscious that you were working for the lives of human beings, you sort of neglected it. There was a focus on getting the system going, ignoring the fact that we were dealing with human beings, both staff and students" (an administrator).

Given this lack of responsiveness by the Administrative Council, an apparent lack of established agreed-upon priorities, as well as a significant amount of

confusion on the part of the administration as to the directions in which it shou moving and who would be doing what, it was probably inevitable that tru teacher groups, and other pressure groups began to circumvent the administ structure. They began to by-pass lines of authority to try to accomplish their goals. Teachers would initiate contact directly with trustees, and vice Administrators would individually try to deal with teachers instead of wo through the Administrative Council, and so on. Meanwhile, it appeared th Administrative Council was becoming increasingly isolated and unaware of th that its decisions and procedures were under attack and that the underpinnings power were being rapidly eroded.

THE 1975 STRIKE

The provincial government had imposed spending ceilings in 1973, granting sc boards the right to spend up to a certain amount determined by a formula drive enrollment, tax base, curriculum, and other factors. This brought discussic financing out into the open for the first time.

> "I had no real concerns personally about money until we got some figures from the Council which indicated that the Council spending was increasing at a certain rate and the school board levy was decreasing. So we began with our team (local O.S.S.T.F. salary negotiating team) to investigate the financial situation and found we had been taking a beating over the years relative to inflation and the GNP" (a teacher).

The imposition of mandatory spending ceilings by the provin government had limited the increase in teacher salaries. Inflation, at least as meas by the Consumer Price Index (CPI), was rapidly increasing, and by early 1975, t were rumors about the possible imposition of wage controls.

As these data on expenditures came more into public view, it was appa to the teachers that the board was pursuing extremely conservative fiscal policie the face of increasingly militant demands by teachers for improved salaries. At time the board was not spending up to its maximum allowed by the funding form The teachers knew that it was well below maximum, and knew it was entirely wit the board's capabilities to give them what they were asking for. This conservat among the trustees was compounded by a desire to keep expenditures down and b sense of social responsibility to refrain from spending in what some would h considered to be a profligate manner. The elements of the clash which was to co are reflected in comments from both teachers and administrators:

"Teachers were determined to catch up. They could see wage and price controls coming into existence and they had already suffered the impact of that through the Ministry of Education imposing ceilings ...They were determined to get into a position where they were safe" (an administrator).

"At that time the board was not spending up to its maximum. It was well below it, so we know it was entirely within its capabilities to give us what we were asking for" (a teacher).

"There was also among the trustees a small element who believed in the economy of Canada and that they had to control the inflation. If we set the example and kept things cool, then maybe the rest of Canada would follow" (an administrator).

Money was an important source of tension between the teachers and the board, but perhaps even more important was the clash of management styles, values, and beliefs of some of the trustees, administrators, and teachers. This was noticed particularly in the collective bargaining process, with the Beta board seeing the same kind of militance among its teachers as the Alpha board experienced. The teachers were pushing for a greater role in bargaining working conditions, including class sizes, pupil-teacher ratios, and such other conditions as preparation times, leaves, and professional development funds. Many of these 'non-economic' issues were seen by teachers as fundamental working conditions which they had a right to negotiate. The board, however, tended to focus only on the economic impact of these changed working conditions viewing the rest as 'management's rights' issues.

Many in the Beta board saw the deterioration in their local relationships and the ensuing strike as an inevitable consequence of social and political factors beyond their control. The sense of being victims of circumstances, rather than participants in a process over which they had some control, was widespread. In particular, many trustees thought the villain of the piece was the Ontario Secondary School Teachers' Federation (O.S.S.T.F.) which was seen as whipping up the Beta teachers to a strike fever in an attempt to get a landmark settlement.

"They (O.S.S.T.F.) were egging our people on - they wanted a strike, they wanted to test the waters, they wanted a landmark settlement, and that's what happened" (an administrator).

"Yes, teachers have become more militant...I think a lot of things that have been gained have been through strength of unity. There's a younger group of teachers in there that came in the 60's and I think younger people are more militant" (an administrator).

On the other hand, trustees were determined to hold on to what they considered management rights and the traditional method of awarding increases.

> "And of course there were a great many things that were not part of our contract because at that time, working conditions were thought not to be negotiable. We had all these policy statements that could be changed arbitrarily that were attached to the end of the contract" (a teacher).

> "I don't think the issue was money alone; I think money became the fact that formalized a lot of other feelings . . . my perception was that there was a paternalistic attitude, approach, that the teachers were being hard done by, not fairly treated, not listened to, and that just polarizes groups and starts small groups and grows until everybody feels that way" (an administrator).

There were some suspicions that at least some of the trustees were less interested in the local issues than in trying to build a reputation for themselves in the broader sphere of 'trustee politics'. And some of the trustees were not above using the most forceful language to denigrate the rights of teachers to encroach on these traditional preserves of management.

> "The board members who were doing the negotiations then,... the head member had a process of stonewalling. He was head of the public school trustees association that year so he didn't want to betray trustees by giving the highest settlement in the country" (an administrator).

> "The board chairman described it as a holy war. He described us (teachers) at one point as lemmings" (a teacher).

THE STRIKE AND ITS AFTERMATH

In the 1974/5 school year the negotiations between the federations and the board were protracted and very difficult, and the secondary school teachers struck for seven weeks. It was a bitter strike, in which allegations and counter-allegations were hurled back and forth in the media; personal issues surfaced, and the reasons for the strike were obscured in the ensuing rhetoric.

School board elections were held in the middle of the strike. Some trustees resigned, some were not re-elected, and some decided not to seek re-election. Under

intense pressure from a small group of trustees - some of whom had only recently been elected - and following the intervention of the Minister of Education, and after extensive mediation, the parties settled, for very significant salary increases.

TOWARD A NEW RELATIONSHIP

Within weeks of the end of the strike the director of education retired, the board's chief negotiator left, the board chairman died, and a new chairman was elected. Whereas the previous chairman would always appear to reduce teachers' concerns to economic matters - and therefore see them as bargaining chips - this new chairman was perceived as sympathetic, caring, and as trying to understand the real nature of the teachers' complaints.

> "I have some regrets about (the former director of education). He was a personal friend and I don't think to this day he understands what the teachers did to him. He thought he had our loyalty but I think his problem was getting under the thumb of (the board chairman) and somehow getting out of touch and perhaps being of the old school - the type of thing you still see in the elementary schools where the teachers still click their heels when the principal walks by" (a teacher).

> "She (the new chairman) was a person who could be appealed to on a level more than just the economic level of arguing. She understood other issues than just the economic and she was committed to achieving good employee-employer relations and to salvaging whatever could be salvaged of the whole situation" (a teacher).

> "One of the stories we heard was that (the new chairman) had at one point threatened to resign and go public unless the board started negotiating seriously during the strike" (a teacher).

While the strike was bitter, the aftermath - perhaps surprisingly - was not. The high turnover of trustees and administrators was one reason cited. There was a critical mass of new people who had no ownership of, or interest in, past approaches. And many continuing trustees and administrators had been so shocked by the strike that they were really motivated to seek a better way of managing the relationships with their teachers. Both administrators and teachers recognized that things would never be the same after the strike. Perhaps the most significant change was the recognition and acceptance of the O.S.S.T.F. by the trustees and administrators as the legitimate representative of the teachers rather than as some interloper on the local

scene. That is not to say that they liked the situation, but that they faced reality and decided to make the best of it.

> "I think the trustees realized the federation really is the teachers...You're no longer questioning who you are dealing with. You're dealing with the federation now, a branch of it" (an administrator).

> "After the strike, and it was a bitter strike, the teachers had a sense of having won something and knowing we had been led well. We felt we came out as winners and that was important. We had gained a power base and history was on our side. I think the leaving of (the board's chief negotiator) and the death of (the board chairman) allowed a vacuum to be created that then could be filled. Some of the trustees who had been elected that year came in wanting to know why this kind of thing could happen in our community, and they were quite concerned that a new avenue should be taken to deal with teachers. Along with the board personnel changing and with a new elected group plus a new chairman, one who was concerned about inter-relationships and more open communication, the board started to look for the kind of personnel who could bring that about" (a teacher).

Well before the strike, a small group of principals had initiated a critical examination of the role of principals within the Beta system. In large measure this was a reflection of their own need for identification with some group, caught as they were between their relationships with their teaching peer group and the demands of the administration. They started to organize themselves, saying they really needed a leadership program of their own. They started doing workshops on basic leadership style and communications, listening skills, and other activities..

The secondary school principals were strongly supportive of the strike action by teachers, separating themselves clearly from the central administration. While this created tensions among some administrators and the principals, and while some trustees felt that the principals should have acted more as management people and supported the board, the support of the principals for the teachers left them with a legacy of trust after the strike. This allowed them to play the subsequent important role of integrators in the structure and administrative system which developed after the strike.

Soon after the strike was concluded, the trustees commissioned a study of the Beta board's organization strategy and structure by a team from the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education. The resulting report caused a systematic rethinking of the roles, responsibilities, and contributions of the senior administration in the

functioning of the system. It identified a clear requirement for a system by which the organization's needs could be determined, objectives and priorities could be established, and key decisions could be made. The report also identified the need to build mutual trust and respect between the board, administration, and teachers.

Many such reports have been merely filed away. That this did not happen in the Beta case was due to three factors: a sufficient number of board members, led by the chairman, supported the need to do something; there were three new superintendents, appointed by the outgoing director just before his resignation and described by the chairman as "three, top-notch people, young and innovative, with high energy levels, and well respected in the system"; and the appointment of a new director of education with the management skills to turn the report into actionable programs.

The selection of the new director was done with great care. The criteria for selection were established after extensive consultation between the board and all employee groups including teachers, non-academic support staff, and even custodians. While individual teachers and principals were consulted, the federations did not have formal input into the selection criteria. The board did not see such input as either a right of the federation or useful to the process. However, criteria were established and a consulting firm was retained to conduct an extensive search for this new director. The successful candidate for the director's position was then a superintendent with another, larger board. He had excellent credentials as a teacher, vice-principal, and principal. In several interviews with a committee of the board, he impressed them with his ideas for improving the overall climate of teacher-board relationships and organizing the administration of the board to minimize conflicts and promote greater cooperation between teachers, trustees, and administrators. This was just the kind of focus that this board was ready to see.

MANAGING THE CHANGE PROCESS

One of the new director's first actions was to develop a statement of expectations, key tasks, and goals for himself. This was developed following consultations with the board, administrators, and both academic and non-academic staff at all levels. While the objectives were stated in general terms, each objective was broken down into several key tasks, each of which had a due date. For example, one of the overall objectives was "To provide strong, active, persuasive leadership with trustees, staff, professional and other agencies." This could easily be a 'motherhood' statement. However, it was operationalized into a set of eight key tasks. One of these key tasks was "To clarify role and responsibilities of senior administration." This key task was broken down in to smaller, specific tasks, each with a due date. For example, "develop process of interim designation of schools to zones (September 8th)", "between September and May conduct two (2) informal sessions with each

superintendent (May 30th)," and "develop purpose, meeting times, structure, etc. of the Administrative Council (September 15th)".

Following the development of this extensive, 12-page statement, it was widely distributed to trustees, teachers, administrators, and other staff. It was both an explicit statement of intent and a scoresheet by which the director could be judged. No one was left in any doubt about the direction which he would take. Clearly, however, his future credibility would rest on the extent to which he was able to 'deliver' on these concrete commitments.

Thus the commitment to intensive self-examination and management by objectives began with this new director. There was already a strong commitment to improved leadership among the principals and vice-principals. To this core, other groups were added including trustees, superintendents, and federation officials. This resulted in a large cadre of key people interested in good management and committed to developing management skills. The next several years were spent initiating and consolidating changes in structure, processes, and skills as they pursued the objectives of building more constructive relationships between all of the stakeholders in the Beta system: children, parents, teachers, administrators, and trustees.

There have been many such changes since the strike in 1975. The major ones which have impacted teacher-board relationships have been leadership training; policy development, implementation, and review; professional development; curriculum development; bargaining procedures; trustee orientation; committee structures; long-term planning; budgeting; community involvement; and commitment to the employees of the board.

Leadership Program

The leadership program was intended to develop human relations skills among administrators, principals, and vice-principals. Based on techniques developed in the National Training Laboratories, and using skilled instructors with NTL training for the in-depth sessions required, some 20 administrators went through this long-term developmental program. This was not a one-shot, flash-in-the-pan, 'quickie' seminar conducted in anticipation of dramatic and immediate results. It was a sustained effort to build high levels of interpersonal and group management skills among those responsible for managing the system. And it was used in such a way that the training was 'tested' on real problems facing the participants.

> "What is exciting about it is when you review the literature on leadership (training), a lot of it says that it doesn't work. It's a one-shot deal, it's not reinforcing, sequential and all the things that are important for leadership to work. With our program - it being long-term, sequential and reinforcing - we evaluated the conflict component very extensively ...We developed a recipient feedback

> form and we said, 'go back to your group and find a potential conflict area.' We had them try the skills they had learned at the course. We had them comment on how successful these skills were at helping them" (an administrator).

Of crucial significance to the success of this program was that the people who went through it had identified themselves as potential beneficiaries. It was not imposed on some unwilling group of administrators who were feeling defensive about their lack of management skills. This happened, at least in part, because the value of taking the program was emphasized continually by the board chairman and the director, who went through the program themselves. Soon people were clamoring to take it, encouraged by the chairman and the director as well as by the early, favorable experiences of those who had taken it. And those who had been through introductory sessions wanted more. The investment in such a program was considerable in both time and money. The best trainers in this field are expensive, and only the best were used. The program was too central to the thrust of the development of managerial competence in the Beta board to be entrusted to anybody but the best.

Professional Development

The late 1970's saw a vastly increased commitment to professional development in the Beta board. Instead of taking the view that professional development days were 'fringe benefits' - equivalent to 'days off work' - administrators and trustees openly stated that they were investments in improving educational quality within the system and were, therefore, highly desirable. Administrators participated in them, as did trustees. They got the very best guest speakers, jointly planned the programs with teacher representatives, and allocated substantial budgets for professional development. There appeared to be consensus that this investment in professional development had two impacts: as well as actually upgrading many teachers' skills, it improved satisfaction levels by providing a challenge as well as some sense of achievement and personal growth. This, in turn, increased commitment to the organization.

Policy Development

One legacy of the poorly-functioning Administrative Council, was chaos in the area of policy formulation and implementation. Either policies were not being developed or, when they were, there was a lack of comprehension or commitment to them. One of the earliest changes initiated by the director was the development of a process for developing policies or, as it became known, a 'meta-policy'.

> "It's something every organization needs. You have to have something to run by, but it's very abstract and elusive... The basic model of what policy is, is the identification of policy issues (identified by) input from the public, trustees, board employees, Ministry ...then we test the policy we've written, then it's refined, then it goes into implementation. Policies have to be reviewed. You have to check out the scope, who are the constituent groups, what are the precedents, have you explored all alternatives, and so on." (an administrator)

This 'meta-policy' was developed in order to encourage the involvement of groups and individuals in a systematic way, while still leaving the Administrative Council and board with the final say. Most importantly, the development of widely applicable and substantive policies was separated from the minutiae of procedures. Policy formulation started with the identification of policy issues. This could be done by trustees, board employees, the Ministry of Education, students, parents, or members of the general public. The identification stage of policy development then followed a pathway involving interaction between the Administrative Council, board committees, and the full board itself. Once a priority had been established, the development phase started and led, through a series of planned steps, to the testing and refinement of a policy. This went through an approval stage, involving the constituent groups affected by the policy, before moving to full, system-wide implementation. Each policy contained a specific time-line implementation for a review process after implementation.

Curriculum Development

One early development in the Beta board was the elimination of the positions of Consultant and Coordinator. This was based on the philosophy that teachers would find it more rewarding to be directly involved in the development of the curriculum. A series of task forces and committees were struck to undertake ongoing curriculum reform. There is little doubt that this action increased the workload of many teachers. Some teachers viewed this negatively, citing both workload considerations and the fact that this approach eliminated bargaining-unit positions and the availability of promotional opportunities to higher-paying jobs. To some extent, this latter concern was alleviated by ploughing back any money saved into salary increases for all teachers, helping to fund the very considerable improvement in teachers' salaries in the Beta board relative to the Ontario average salaries. Nevertheless, there remained some opposition to this way of doing things when we last interviewed teachers and federation officers in the Beta board.

Bargaining Procedures

There was also widespread consensus that the teachers and board in Beta had found a better way of negotiating with each other. This was single-team bargaining or, as it is sometimes called, single-team problem solving. There was widespread frustration with the previous system of adversarial bargaining:

> "There has been tremendous change. When I first started there was a large number of trustees involved at the table. The trustees were the spokesmen. There were three or four administrators; the caucus room was quite often like grand central station - a lot of different opinions, very little preparation was done beforehand in my opinion, anyway. A lack of information, a lack of policies as to where we might want to be going, developing them in the caucus room sometimes I suppose at two and three o'clock in the morning" (an administrator).

> "In the first few years I was involved, it was much more of a traditional format of negotiations. We received the teachers' brief which contained all of their requests. At some point the board tabled all of their requests. In my opinion much of the debate centered around presenting your own requests without listening to other points of view" (an administrator).

> "We negotiated three contracts in the adversarial mode. I was very distressed with the process - it was a waste of time. You spent so much time in conference rooms while the two chief negotiators were somewhere in a closet making the deals. I kept thinking "why do I distrust my own chairman of the team; I don't know that he's telling me everything that's going on." You know you are only hearing half of the deals. I didn't care for the process ...Just through small things that were done that made you block your perceptions of what was happening (it could have fallen apart). For example, accepting your counter-proposal without any comment, going away and then the other side's coming back and not even referring to the proposal that you had made. Where you started to build up a lot of animosity and you'd go to another room and you'd call them down and then you would go back in and you would be very angry" (a teacher).

> "You can prove very quickly, I suppose in a two-hour simulation, that the more time you spend developing a particular proposal or

> solution to a problem, the more committed you become to it, the less likely you are to change ...I used to sit down with the board and unilaterally we looked at what were our objectives, the kind of things that we wanted to take out of the collective agreement, the kinds of things that we would like to put in. In most cases it was take out ...We built a package in isolation. The teachers did the same thing. And I described it in workshops as a 'Christmas stocking approach'. I did the same thing with the board: the teacher negotiating team basically went to the teachers and said; 'What do you want for Christmas?' Everybody loaded everything they wanted into the stocking. Now the people who are actually negotiating and know something about it ...they realize that some of that stuff in that stocking is there as traders in the traditional process. The membership out there doesn't know that ...The process builds expectations. It tends to cement people's positions. Then you come together and you trade these things away, and you are supposed to go back and everybody is supposed to feel good with what a few people have come up with. This is how I understand conflict resolution theory and what some of the things that led to it (are) and (what) leads to the escalation of conflict and so forth. I almost feel that that form of collective bargaining is almost programmed to failure." (the board's negotiator)

A group of negotiators from the Beta board, including teachers, administrators, and trustees, attended a collective bargaining workshop in Kingston and talked about some of their experiences:

> "We had done some exercises. After one exercise, we were winning - it was obvious. We had the best settlement, we knew that and the chairman of (our) negotiating team was prepared to throw everything out in order to make another point. I just said ...there has to be a better way" (a teacher).

> "So we started to say there's got to be a better process. So we were looking for alternatives ...Anyway, (a consultant on single-team bargaining) was invited in here for a workshop ...Our commitment when we brought him in here was that we would make a decision following that workshop whether we wanted to try a different approach to negotiations. And following the workshop, everybody agreed that they wanted to try something different. So we went into single-team problem solving" (a teacher).

Single-team problem-solving as practised by the Beta board involved a small team of seven to nine people. The ground rules dictated that group members came to the table with identified areas of concern but without preconceived solutions. The first step was to understand the problem thoroughly, to find the relevant information, to find out what was right rather than who was right. There was complete sharing of information, including all details of the board's budget.

The group started with an issue about which they expected little conflict. This gave the group a chance to function and the incentive of early success. There was no group spokesperson and the chair position was rotated. They thrashed out a subject until there was consensus. Efforts were made to avoid taking votes to resolve issues.

There was very broad consensus among trustees, teachers, and administrators that this approach worked very well for non-monetary issues, but there was some distrust about using it for monetary issues, especially among elementary school negotiators.

The group often came up with decidedly non-traditional ways of resolving the inevitable impasses which arose at some points during negotiations. For example, a unique solution to a monetary issue was found one year when someone in the group said; "We're beating around the bush. Why don't we take a slip of paper and each of us write down a solution, and then pool them?" There was only a quarter of a percent difference between the figures written down.

There was clear recognition that this process was not a panacea, and that it had both advantages and disadvantages. Among the advantages cited by various people we interviewed were:

- Presenting problems instead of demands prevents becoming 'dug in' on one solution.
- Management is more willing to be co-operative if it sees the Union proposals as reasonable.
- Each side has more flexibility.
- More commitment is achieved if all have helped shape the solution.
- Real causes are dealt with, not just the symptoms, because they are more readily identified.

- The adversary element disappears and sincerity, friendliness take its place.
- In terms of transactional analysis, an adult/adult relationship is supportive. Games are out of order and totally inappropriate.
- Positive feelings of mutual respect and teamwork bring the sides closer together.
- Problem-solving in single-team bargaining spills over into day-to-day relationships with good results.
- The level of trust goes up, making bargaining of monetary items less difficult.
- Pride in getting good solutions at bargaining creates the expectation that the 'team' will do just as well outside of bargaining.

However, there were many disadvantages and limitations cited, even by people who were in general, supportive of this form of bargaining:

- It will not work where a lack of trust exists.
- It is difficult for management not to know the outcome in advance.
- Reservations about openness are quite natural but management should be consistent in its treatment of employees, treating them fairly all the time.
- It is harder work and takes more time.
- Everyone must be equally determined to make it work.

Contract Administration

In addition to investing in a changed bargaining process, with the concomitant expenditure of time and effort, the board also appointed a full-time, senior

administrator, to negotiate and administer the collective agreements. This resource was critical to making problem-solving an ongoing activity rather than an activity which occurred sporadically under the extreme pressures of formal negotiations. This administrator clearly focused on implementing the intent of the collective agreement, trying not to rest on narrow interpretations.

> "The implementation of that contract is a 24-month proposition. And with the process that we're in now, I think it's becoming much easier to implement the contract because the language is scripted ...We agree first of all in principle to what we want to do as a group, and once we've got agreement in principle, then we script the language to deal with that principle. So when that language is scripted, there's never any question in anybody's mind in that group as to what it is intended to do ...If we do get a concern from a teacher or a principal in the system that says: "I'm not sure that that's what was intended," the first thing I do is pick up the phone and talk to one of the people from the teachers' team that was part of the process of scripting that language and ask them for their interpretation. We've never had a difference of opinion on the interpretation yet. And I always make it perfectly clear that I implement the intent of that language" (an administrator).

After the collective agreement was ratified, a workshop was held with representatives from each school to explain the interpretation of every clause of the agreement. The board's negotiator made a personal commitment never to attempt to use possibly unclear wording of the contract and to later re-interpret it in the board's favor. This was a key element in his trust-building strategy. . The result of the process was that there had not been a formal grievance from the teachers' groups for at least four years immediately preceeding our interviews.

Trustee Orientation

On a regular basis, following municipal elections, the Beta Board of Education provided a trustee orientation program designed primarily for the new trustees. Sessions were given on the history of the Beta board, budget and service, plant operations and transportation, special education, curriculum, and collective bargaining; the role of the teachers' federations and the principals' associations, long-range planning and policy development, the role of the Ministry of Education, of the trustee, and the media. The eleven two-hour sessions were spread over three months. The objectives of this program, and of encouraging trustee involvement in the leadership training courses, were to develop trustees' skills as well as re-orienting

incoming, new trustees who may have a particular concern or axe to grind, and to train them in the group norms.

Committee Structure and Process

Involvement in, and commitment to, the Beta system was encouraged by the widespread committee involvement of trustees, administrators and teachers. These committees gathered information and made recommendations in a number of areas of concern. The use of committees had been evident in the Beta Board of Education in the early 1970's, when six major committees were established (Capital Building, Finance, Management, Aims and Objectives, Advisory Board for the Trainable Retarded, and Advisory Council for Vocational Education). Seven joint committees or boards working with various community agencies, a number of sub-committees and task forces were also struck at that time. These committees, however, tended to by-pass administrative input and enabled small groups to exert a direct influence on the board's decision-making.

The 'new' committees had broader representation from all groups concerned; trustees, administrators and teachers' federations. Some acted as a consultative body to prepare policy recommendations to the board. Some were decision-making bodies for implementation of the board policy. The wording of this joint committee provision of the collective agreement was extremely broad, calling for a consultative process on many items which were, and still are, considered the exclusive purview of management in other boards. They included, but were not limited to: class sizes; teacher assistants; non-teaching periods; secretarial assistance; pupil/teacher ratios; departmental offices and storage spaces; improved board-teacher communications; new buildings, renovations, extensions; in-service teacher training; and others. Furthermore, the provisions of the agreement were such that involvement of teachers in committees was actively encouraged, rather than merely tolerated.

This process, however, meant a lot of extra effort on the part of teachers and was seen by some as potentially counter-productive.

> "You have so many committees operating with the consultative process and they do draw up fine results, but then it has to be communicated and in the communication, maybe far fewer people read it. We get a lot of paper produced and a lot of good things are produced in that paper, but the more paper you produce, the less people read it. In order to keep the consultative thing going, which is a long slow process, the administration becomes larger and larger. It doesn't appear to be larger and larger except for the secondments of people. And so they increase the administrative staff a number of ways through secondments" (a teacher).

Some frustration also arose from differing expectations of the consultative process held by different people.

> "Consultation is one thing, but decision-making happens in a very small base. The consultation gives a nice air to what's happening. One does feel that you are being consulted. However, if you give input and hardly any of it appears in what comes out, then you start to say, 'Hey, am I really putting in this time for nothing. Am I being listened to?'. What I'm starting to question is whether we are being listened to or whether the consultation thing is a defense" (a teacher).

> "Some people see consultation as a right to veto. We think that consultation is a right to add input" (an administrator).

Also, the discontinuation of the positions of co-ordinator and consultant resulted in increased committee activity on the part of teachers and administrators. This met with criticism by some teachers and administrators.

> "As an example, I'm responsible for curriculum. That requires very extensive involvement of people because of the teachers being implementors of the curriculum and very much part of the developers as well ... We don't have any persons of the stature of coordinators or consultants, and we have a very unique model that involves teachers exclusively on a resource team basis" (an administrator).

Long-Range Planning

One consequence of the movement away from the 'crisis management' characterizing the board's activities in the mid-seventies was the development of longer-term planning.

> "We have found that, because the attention and the energy of the system have not been absorbed totally by the current crisis, we have been able to begin to address the long-term objectives that we had set. There are many needs in educational systems that have been recognized for a long time, but have not often been met very adequately. This is in part because so much effort is focused on the demands of the moment that the continuing needs are always being set aside. Those other needs, as well, are often so complex that it is difficult to know how to begin to respond to them. Evaluation,

of both programs and people, is an example of something that is an obvious necessity, yet has been neglected by most educational systems, largely because it is such a difficult task. It is exactly those very large concerns that trustees are most often conscious of.

"The long-range planning process makes it possible to identify the needs that are perceived, not only by trustees, but by other groups and individuals within the system and in the community. Agreement can be reached on the validity of perceived needs and some priorities can be set. Step-by-step processes can then be developed for meeting even the most complex objectives" (board chairman).

This long-range planning process developed and matured over the last few years. The current plan, at the time we conducted this research, focused on five areas of emphasis: Relationships, Curriculum, Staff Development, Policy Development, and Physical and Financial Resources. As an example, under the broad area focus of Relationships were sub-categories including: Values and Expectations, Educational and Social Environment, Community Education, and Management of Information. Each of these sub-categories was broken down further into specific actions required, responsibility assignments and due-dates for completion.

The five-year plan also included broad statements of mission and goals, as well as detailed responsibilities of the director of education and the six superintendents. It was a public document, available for anyone in the community to see. Input into its development was constantly sought through the board's committees and from all stakeholders in the Beta system. Cited as benefits of this process were: the clear sense of direction it signalled to everyone in the system, the dimension of accountability to achieve the stated targets and objectives, the opportunity for periodic assessment and review by all stakeholders in the system, the creativity that such a process unleashed, and the elimination of the stress associated with uncertainty.

"The clear sense of direction that we can identify and relate our decisions to gives us a strong basis for explaining our actions to the public, and gives us real reassurance our accountability. There is an opportunity for regular reassessment of our overall purposes, our immediate goals, and our priorities. Each year, we take time to review achievements and recognize changing concerns.

"One further, highly significant advantage of this process is the capacity it has given us to anticipate problems and to respond to emerging needs in a constructive way. Truly creative solutions can

evolve when there is time for thinking and planning before a situation reaches crisis proportions. By anticipating the future we are able, in some small measure, at least, to act upon it and shape it more as we would want it to be.

"There is no question in my mind that long-range planning reduces stress in an organization. The process has all the elements of the stress management techniques that are advocated for individuals. It seems reasonable to believe that if stress in the organization is lessened, the stress experienced by individuals within it will also be reduced - people would then enjoy their work more, be energetic and more creative. Since, in the final analysis, all our achievements are directly related to the effectiveness of the contribution of the people who work for us, this in itself may be the strongest recommendation for long-range planning" (board chairman).

Budgeting

Over the previous seven years, responsibility for allocation of funds had gradually been given over to the individual schools. They did not have complete autonomy, but must work within the system's policies, practices and collective agreement. This process was part of the administration's plan of pushing much of the decision-making down to the school level. Workshops on budgeting were given to train school administrators in the budgeting process, but a certain number of mistakes were tolerated in order to train school leaders.

The overall budget was set in the spring, with interested groups invited to give input. The federations regularly submitted a brief outlining how they felt past budgets had functioned and suggesting improvements for the future. When we interviewed federation representatives, they felt that their concerns had been addressed in the final budget, even if they had not been completely satisfied. After all parties' input was received, the administration met and worked out its proposals. The trustees then held meetings to discuss and vote on the year's budget. The budget, after passage, was open information shared during the contract negotiations with teacher negotiators. This system was wrongly described as a 'decentralized' one. In fact, it was viewed by the administration as a highly centralized and tightly controlled budgeting system, but one which sought input from the operating units - the schools.

Community Involvement

Efforts were made to minimize community 'interference' in the board's operations and to maximize community support. Trustees elected on an activist or single-issue platform found little cooperation from the rest of the experienced trustee group. Narrow or political concerns were discouraged in favor of a broad system perspective.

> "As trustees, we are now more patient with the slow process of change. We have an increased understanding of what is involved in the management of complex issues, and derive a great deal of satisfaction from the knowledge that long-standing needs are now being addressed" (board chairman).

System Awareness and Value Sharing

One of the greatest changes brought about in the Beta board was a heightened awareness of the board as a complex system. People were encouraged to look beyond their own, narrow, sometimes parochial concerns toward the larger system. The goals became superordinate ones; the belief was that such a focus would benefit the whole system. School-based budgeting and decision-making were balanced by the conscious development of a system focus. This awareness was promoted by the use of many formal and informal information channels, the building of a unified management team, frequent transfers of personnel, cooperation between elementary and secondary panels, and the use of a system language or jargon.

> "Part of (the director's) long-term plan which has just about reached where he wants it in terms of his administration was to gradually have all his own people in the key positions. He's just about completed that with (another administrator) and myself. He now has four zone Supers. Quite frankly he's been a bit ruthless about it. He has had to move the old guard out . So now he has this new group with a high level of trust and communication. Trust with each other and credibility with the teachers. I like to think that one of the things I brought to the board and administration was credibility and a lot of experience in the system. So the four of us are talking a lot more about how we are doing things with the principals. By next year the schools will be treated in a more uniform way than they've ever been treated before because our styles are the same" (an administrator).

"One of his basic theories is that if people don't have information, they make up their own. So he encourages us to share" (an administrator).

"Rather than a resident force of empire builders such as coordinators, we have a revolving model. So a person comes in as a secondment and then goes back into the system. A lot goes with him" (an administrator).

Organizational Commitment

The secondary school teachers in the Beta Board of Education had more 'job security' language in their collective agreement than most teachers in Ontario. Although the elementary school teachers' collective agreement had little in the way of job security provisions. No teachers had been terminated during a long period of declining enrollment even though a termination mechanism existed in the collective agreements. The collective agreements stopped short of guaranteeing total job security, however. There had been amalgamations and closing of schools and, therefore, a reduction in the numbers of positions. However, transfers, attrition, early retirements, and other negotiated actions had coped with the displacement problems. These were outlined in one of the board's publications. They included: adult credit programs and continuing education; a deferred salary leave plan, (the first such plan in Ontario, and much copied); a provincial teacher exchange program; teacher exchanges and transfers; leaves of absence; an early retirement incentive plan; part-time teaching; severance allowance clause; secondment; alternatives for principals; and educational leave.

PHILOSOPHIES IN ACTION

It is impossible to explain the changes which took place in the Beta Board of Education without dealing with the basic philosophies of two of the key people in the system: the director and the board chairman. Rather than putting distinctive labels on their philosophies, the following represent statements - taken from various sources such as speeches, board publications, and personal interviews - which seem to represent basic values and beliefs which they held and, for the most part, shared completely.

"Ongoing personal and professional development is a cornerstone for improving our own capabilities."

"Once you know who and what you are, it is important to communicate that to others."

"We must promote alternatives to the present adversarial approaches utilized in schools and school systems. We can develop the capability of utilizing a problem-solving approach not only to collective bargaining but to all aspects of our operation. It requires skill, commitment and a basic belief system that is based on the principles that it is important to work hard for a win-win situation."

"People do care and for the most part are fair and reasonable. We must constantly search to see the other persons' position through their eyes."

"We must realize that our own behaviour is a reaction to inferences we make about another individual."

"A problem-solving approach to collective bargaining builds in concepts of decency, respect, constant search to see the other person's position."

"It is the system's responsibility to pay for an orchestrated training program for the key leadership group."

"The important aspect is that the teachers have the feeling that someone cares. It brings about a confidence that the organization is concerned. Our teachers are not just a number on a seniority list."

"What would happen to our teachers if they were given time and money to develop a personal P.D. (professional development) plan? If every teacher received $2000-$3000 over five years to have an in-depth personal professional experience? My speculation would be that many of the attributes of burnout would be decreased."

"If you plant corn, corn will grow. Whatever you plant will grow. Hopefully it will have a ripple effect."

"With effective long-range planning, the efforts of the system can be focused on areas of corporate priority so that resources are not being diverted to respond to individual demands."

"Over the past few years your administration has been decentralizing a number of responsibilities which had formerly been centralized. Hiring of teachers, budget allocation, utilization of budget community use of schools, professional development, curriculum development and curriculum implementation strategies are some of the responsibilities which have been decentralized."

"Carefully developed and well constituted policy statements provide a framework for decision-making and guidelines for the effective operation of the system. Sound policy development, therefore, promotes continuity and consistency in the decision-making and administrative processes."

THE STABILITY OF THE SYSTEM

Although the majority of teachers, administrators and trustees interviewed seemed satisfied with and proud of their system, some concerns and questions were raised by many people interviewed. In a study such as this, it is not possible to attach weights to these concerns; however, they were voiced by at least several interviewees.

Some felt that too much conformity was required, especially in order to 'get ahead' in the system. In particular, there was much discussion of the extent to which all the 'top administrators' seemed to use the 'managerial' jargon associated with the director. This jargon became the property of the 'in-group', often those who had been through the formal leadership training activities. And those who had not shared that experience felt left out.

There were many reservations about the value of single-team bargaining. These were expressed by teachers, federation officials both within and external to the Beta system, and by some administrators. They saw it as manipulative, coopting the federations against the long term interests of the teachers. And some saw it as carefully controlled by management, only being used for those items which management thought could be usefully defused through such a process.

"I mistrust people with management degrees and all this management psychology and nonsense. It's a manipulative process. But he (the director) has remained personable throughout it all, and some very positive things have come out of it. Personally I am not in favour of single-team bargaining such as has come out of this. It's a management tool and the consequence has been that we know very little of what our people are actually going for. I don't think the adversary process has to be an up-and-down, drag-them-out process. The adversary process better

represents the true situation of two equal parties meeting to discuss self-interest and to reach compromise" (a teacher).

"I'm not sure it's true consultation. It has the guise of consultation" (a teacher).

"I'm not sure that administration uses that approach (problem-solving) in areas outside of the bargaining process ...The commitment to problem-solving that exists only goes so far. We're going to do a lot of problem-solving down here but the decisions are made by a small group. Sometimes you wonder whether the final decision isn't already made, but we are going to go through the process of solving the problem to get to the solution which has already been decided upon by the small group that has already looked at it.

"You can control the process by the way the session is set-up" (a teacher).

"The adversarial process previously was a 'high' process in the year - a lot of energy, a lot of excitement. In the non-adversarial you keep everything low key. It tends to make you more complacent" (a teacher).

Some teachers feared that the consultative process and the integrative bargaining process would breed passivity, ignorance and a new form of paternalism in the Beta board. They saw the previous, adversarial system as democratic, educational, involving many teachers, bringing important issues to the forefront. It was a 'high-key' process, exciting, energizing. The single-team approach was seen by some as 'low-key', lulling the teachers into a false sense of security - a return to the benevolent paternalism of pre-collective bargaining days.

"The single-team bargaining has worked to our advantage to the extent that there have been no foul-ups, although there is always the radical element within your ranks that is not happy, and has achieved general improvements in the contract. But it has had this consequence where a large number of our members, some of them having gone through the strike, have ceased to be educated in terms of what goes on in negotiations, ceased to know what is really in the contract, and have the increasing perspective that the board is looking after us. That is a dangerous situation because the price of democracy is constant vigilance, and the tendency to relax and say

the board is looking after us is the price we pay for single-team bargaining" (a teacher).

"You have to get the information out to the 500-odd people. It's someone else's solution to the problem. If they agree with you, fine. If they don't, you've got the same sort of things. We found it hard to communicate with the people. Because you keep everything to such a low key and you try to keep everything calm and rational, fewer and fewer people go to the meetings. I'm not sure of the true commitment level" (a teacher).

"In the non-adversarial system you keep everything very low key. Whereas you do not get the same emotional stress, it makes you more rational. But for the ordinary teacher, like if you look at the number of people who are directly involved in the federation this year as opposed to over the last six years, the number is becoming smaller and smaller" (a teacher).

"Of the committees I've worked with, negotiating has been the most satisfying since it has the clearest task definition. You have to be careful as well that the committees are doing problem-solving, rather than just okay-ing what the administration has prepared for the meeting" (a teacher).

There was some concern that the changes in the Beta board were too closely tied to the particular personalities who initiated them, specifically to the director of education and the chairman of the board. Whether they would withstand changes in those key positions or not was a highly debated point.

"It can change. I think your study will show that it can change quickly. What we have now, we want to work at because if we don't it'll be gone ...in one election. And then what happened to (the director's) friend, (Mr. X) could happen to him. In one election, two or three new board members and zingo! Mr. X retired - he found the attitude of these new board members soured everything - no respect for teachers, no interest in what the classroom is all about, just dollars and cents, keep the taxes down, make the teachers work the P.D. days, that kind of mentality which is around" (a teacher).

In the view of several of those interviewed for this study, one of the key dangers facing the Beta board was complacency.

> "When things are comfortable, one slacks off and loses touch with what's really happening. You can see it at all levels, whether department head, principal, vice principal, board member, or superintendent. It's hard to keep up and be knowledgeable and not unilaterally making decisions without checking with the troops. I guess that's what happened back in the 70's. The administration and board isolated themselves from the rest of the system, seemed to be comfortable. That's what we have to be careful about right now. This is a comfortable place" (an administrator).

There was also real skepticism expressed by outsiders to the Beta system - trustees of other boards, professional negotiators, and others - about what had actually happened in the Beta school system. Looking at the published data on salaries in the Beta board, the analysis of clauses in the collective agreement with respect to management rights, and staffing ratios and redundancy provisions, these outsiders leveled the accusation that all management in Beta had done is 'give away the shop' - bought peace at the taxpayers expense. This, of course, was strenuously denied by most of the 'insiders'.

In 1982/3 the chairman who initiated the major changes and the director of education both left the Beta Board of Education and the superintendent who took on the responsibility for administering the collective agreement left soon after. Comments made by the chairman and director of education in 1983 are worth considering in light of these changes.

> "They'll (his successor and other administrators) do well. One of the responsibilities as leader is to develop people, to provide opportunities, to leave behind a legacy of human resources. They are responsible for its continued success because their names are on the line too. If I fail in (his new position), they fail too because they helped me develop the Beta policies which I believe can be exported and work in other places" (the director).

> "Many individuals would like to believe that the management policies of the Beta system cannot work, and our people continue to put tremendous effort into the attempt to prove such pessimistic views to be wrong.

> "While complacency can be a real concern, it has not yet surfaced in Beta. All participating groups express appreciation of the opportunity for involvement, and, in fact, seek ways of extending their participation to include more people.

"Surely, one of the indicators of a meaningful philosophy is the achievement of highly specific goals. We have backed up our philosophy with concrete, realizable plans, and have seen them work" (the former board chairman).

5

The Gamma Board of Education

In many ways, a strike in a separate school board is even more traumatic than one in a public school board. For apart from the normal clashes in values and beliefs which take place in all educational sector strikes, there is the added dimension of the incredibly strong commitment to a Catholic education held by separate school board trustees. Certainly the strike in Gamma was one example of this. What emerged from the nineteen-day strike in 1980 has been an uneasy truce, a sense of detente. Efforts have been made to change the relationship between the board and teachers in the intervening years, but little progress has been made.

BACKGROUND

The Gamma Roman Catholic Separate School Board offices are located in a city of approximately 75,000. The population of the city itself is a mixture of mainly British (57 per cent) and French (26 per cent) ethnic origins, while the surrounding rural areas have a larger French population. The city's industrial base consists of a large number of small companies and the workforce is not heavily unionized. Unemployment tends to run slightly above the Canadian average, while earnings are slightly below it. Gamma is relatively isolated from the large Canadian urban centres and is slower to feel the impact of major social developments.

THE ROOTS OF THE PROBLEM

Amalgamation

The Gamma Board services a predominantly Roman Catholic population within Gamma itself and in the surrounding communities. In 1969 the G.R.C.S.S. Board was amalgamated from twelve different local boards of education. Twelve different philosophies, procedures, salary schedules, and practices had to be reconciled. To add

to the difficulty, some boards were Francophone, some Anglophone; some were predominantly urban, some were rural. The ensuing struggle for influence in the new super-board consumed a large portion of the attention of both trustee and administration groups for the next decade.

Growing Teacher Militancy

Meanwhile, the Ontario teachers' struggle for power and a voice in educational decision-making started by the O.S.S.T.F. was spreading throughout the other teacher organizations in Ontario. The A.E.F.O. (representing elementary Francophone teachers) and O.E.C.T.A. (representing the Anglophone teachers) had begun to organize and direct the growing dissatisfaction of their members as they watched their colleagues in the public school system make significant advances in salaries and working conditions.

In May of 1980, the teachers in the G.R.C.S.S. Board went on strike. The only thing that everyone interviewed agreed on was that there were many causes of the conflict in Gamma, and that the eventual strike was the culmination of years of mounting hostility between the teachers and the board. Salaries and working conditions were certainly important factors. Teachers in separate school boards had traditionally been paid less than their counterparts in the public systems. In the late 1970's, as inflation got worse and large percentage settlements were made on top of much higher base rates in the non-sectarian schools, teachers in Gamma began to find this disparity more and more unacceptable. In part, this reflected the generally emerging desire of teachers to be part of a well-paid profession with good working conditions, but it was reflected in Gamma in a steadily increasing level of militancy.

> "Without a doubt, however, a strike situation had been building since the mid 1970's in Gamma. Let us go back to the amalgamation of 1969 and trace through negotiations history to find out why there was a strike in 1980. For four or five years, negotiations were fairly reasonable and cordial. There was no hard position on either part. Then of course we had the term (during the A.I.B. controls) during which salaries were controlled - there was not too much argument there.
>
> "But after the A.I.B. controls were lifted, it became much more difficult. In 1978, for the '78-'79 school year, we settled late in the Fall of '78, in fact after the teachers had been without a contract for a couple of months. And I guess the board started feeling that teachers were negotiating very slowly and somewhat reluctantly because - at least that was the board's perception - because time was on their side and the longer they could wait, the longer they could

> drag on, the more they could get. Mind you, a part of that picture is also the fact that inflation had been accelerating over the past few years. Therefore, that provided more and more arguments for them to ask for more and more money. So they saw that there was an advantage in not settling too quickly.
>
> "In 1979-80 we had a real problem. As a matter of fact, we were not able to settle during that year until May, the end of May 1980, and that's when we had the teachers strike on April 30th because we had not been able to reach a settlement" (an administrator).

Because of the history of volunteer teaching in the separate school system by priests and nuns, the separate school boards were not used to salary budgets as large as those in public boards. Some trustees also believed that Catholic teachers who worked for separate school boards should be prepared to accept lower salaries in order to support a Catholic education. Gamma had not always spent up to provincially legislated ceilings, in the belief that salaries and other expenses should be lower in separate school boards.

The trustees and administrators in Gamma clearly believed that separate school boards were caught in a financial bind. Although they received equal provincial funding for elementary schools, their secondary grants were well below the public schools. They received 1.15 times the elementary grant for grades 9 and 10 and nothing for grades 11, 12 and 13. If the school boards wanted to provide a Catholic education beyond grade 10, the last three grades had to be financed from tuition fees.

Another problem for separate schools arose because of the property tax structure. Most commercial and industrial assessment went to the public schools. Separate schools received taxes only from private homes and small businesses who were supporters. To offset this problem, the province funded approximately 85% of the separate system's needs from provincial grants up to certain spending ceilings. The other 15% were obtained by local taxation. If a separate board exceeded those ceilings, it must obtain the full 100% from local taxes. Trustees interviewed thought that to do so would raise taxes for separate school supporters and could cause them to switch to the public schools. Thus, separate school boards tried to keep their taxation mill rate close to the public system's mill rate.

Faced with the declining availability of well-educated priests and nuns capable of staffing the schools as inexpensive labor, the separate schools had to compete increasingly to draw lay-teachers from the community. To have a staff totally composed of lay teachers paid at, or close to, parity with the public school system caused severe budgetary strains for these boards.

But the need to pay more to the teachers was compounded by the problems of raising the funds from other sources. In fact, the only way that salary demands could be satisfied was by reducing programs. And this trade-off was difficult to

swallow for trustees, many of whom had a tremendous moral involvement in, and commitment to, providing a Catholic education. The demands from the teachers were seen directly as threats to the core mission of the board - providing that education. A growing awareness that Catholic teachers were demanding parity clashed with traditional attitudes and with real funding difficulties in Gamma.

Matters were complicated by the fact that, in 1979-80, many trustees were unsure about the actual financial state of the board. In fact, at the very time that they were trying to establish a negotiating position, some members of the board suggested that they did not know how much money was available to satisfy the teachers' salary and benefit demands.

Management Rights

Although the administrators and trustees believed that working conditions were a secondary issue, teachers considered them important. Pupil Teacher Ratios (PTR) and seniority clauses were not covered in the collective agreement up to that point. Trustees felt PTR and redundancy problems had not yet hit Gamma, and would be solved by the board when necessary. Teachers did not trust the board to deal with these issues fairly and so wanted them nailed down in the agreement. According to one local O.E.C.T.A. representative, PTR had been raised unilaterally by the board to 20.8:1 prior to the settlement before the strike. Although this figure was below the provincial average, future protection was considered necessary by teachers.

For their part, trustees either considered these matters part of their management rights, or not an immediate problem. Ignoring the fact that the teachers did not trust either the administration or the board, they were in fact saying "trust us - if there is a problem, we'll work it out." But the prospect of impending school closings, transfers and some redundancies had begun to surface by 1980, and teachers were determined to have a say in handling these problems.

Teacher representatives were also opposed to the board's hard line on Catholicity management rights, and 'just cause' provisions. Separate school boards across the province had been wrestling with their moral responsibility to employees who were not Catholic. Many were hired in times of teacher shortages and now that redundancy had become a problem, some boards proposed dismissing non-Catholic teachers or Catholic teachers who married outside the faith. Such proposals met with stiff resistance from the local and provincial affiliates who felt obligated to protect all dues-paying members and rank members largely in order of seniority. In Gamma, where redundancies were on the horizon, this issue was just starting to surface. There were also some rather personalized approaches to dealing with this issue. For example, one trustee felt it necessary to offer continued employment to non-Catholic teachers of long-standing service, but not to those Catholics marrying outside the faith.

'Just cause' related to the obligation of a board to give sufficient reasons in writing for dismissing, demoting or disciplining an employee. Under *The Education Act*, boards must show just cause for dismissing permanent but not probationary teachers. No written reasons need be given for demoting or disciplining a teacher. In Gamma, federation representatives were anxious to protect their teachers because of several alleged cases of unfair treatment. In one case, it was alleged that a principal was disciplined for defending his open-concept school and refusing to comply with a board request to provide supporting documentation for a board attempt to close it. In another case, the board had allegedly demoted seven vice-principals who had been involved in negotiations, using the guise of declining enrollment as the reason for the demotions. These were the perceptions of some federation officials and there was no hard evidence to support the truth of these allegations.

The other big working condition issue was transfers. Because of redundancies, certain teachers were declared redundant at some schools and were transferred to other schools. The teachers were extremely dissatisfied with the criteria used to select the teachers for transfer. The situation was especially difficult for older teachers and those without means of transportation, who were transferred to communities many miles away.

In several interviews with federation officials and some trustees there were completely unsubstantiated allegations that these transfers were a designed to force the resignation of certain teachers who were out of favor with the director. We note, however, the personal bitterness apparent in these interviews and there is no evidence to support such attribution of motives. Because there was no clause covering transfers in the agreement, the moves were not grievable. The federations were determined to write clauses to protect their members in the future.

> "They made a big issue of it (transfers). As a matter of fact they even introduced it into negotiations. And that's one of the things which I feel were unfair for the board, because it did hinder a settlement for a long time, and once all of the facts were in, it boiled down to no issue at all. But it was a good excuse, it was a good pretext to make a lot of noise and I guess to whip up a lot of sympathy for the teachers' cause. It came to the board, the board investigated it, and once all the facts were known, there was nothing to it" (an administrator).

Trustees did not want any working conditions written into the agreement, however, because they considered all working conditions to be included in management rights. In part because they felt that Gamma had been 'targeted' by O.E.C.T.A. as a 'breakthrough' board, they also felt a responsibility to trustees all across Ontario to refuse to negotiate working conditions.

Some teachers, trustees, and administrators placed the blame for this mistrust on amalgamation itself. The large superboard, the alienation of teachers from administrators and trustees, were reflected in many comments about deterioration of personal relationships following the amalgamation.

> "I think that before amalgamation, we knew every teacher. You're invited to schools, you know, when you are on a board. And the kids at Christmas, you know, do programs for the trustees where they sing songs or something like that. A very personal relationship and that was lost completely with the amalgamation. The personal touch was gone" (a trustee).

Mistrust Among Trustees

There was reportedly a high level of mistrust between trustees themselves. This stemmed from two sources. First, several trustees on the board were themselves teachers in Gamma's public school system. This led to alleged conflicts of interest when the budget was being determined since it was felt that such teacher-trustees had a personal interest in the salaries of their separate school colleagues. Apart from such a direct, pecuniary interest, some trustees also felt that the teacher-trustees were too sympathetic to the bargaining goals of the separate school teachers in the areas of management rights and working conditions. There were accusations of leaks of information from bargaining committee sessions, with the separate school teachers knowing the trustees' bottom-line positions as soon as they were formulated.

> "Now there were a number of reasons, I think, for not being able to reach a settlement. Some of them might have to do with the personalities involved on both sides and some of them, I guess, had to do with the board's evaluation of what it should be prepared to do concerning salaries, because there is no doubt that the main issue in the strike was salaries. One of the difficulties with our board is that, especially last year, and it's somewhat a little bit true still, but was more so last year, was the number of teachers they had on the board, with the result that the board always had great difficulty in deciding with any measure of trust what it would set aside for teachers' salaries. I guess the trustees who had no connection with teachers at all felt betrayed more than once, in regard to confidential discussions or confidential decisions regarding such things as how much should we set aside this year for teachers' salaries" (an administrator).

"They felt those trustees who were teachers, or were related mostly to teachers, leaked out the news (of bargaining strategy meetings) the next day, so that they could really not plan in confidence at all. And that had unfortunate results, because it placed the board in the position of doing either one of two things. Either we had to go at it frankly and put in the budget, for instance, the real amount that we were prepared to pay and then that leaves us no bargaining room, no bargaining power at all because the opposite side already knows what the bottom line is. Or we had to play cat and mouse. We'd put a certain amount in the budget, relatively low, knowing full well that it was insufficient. But then no one knows exactly where the ball is going to stop bouncing, because even the trustees don't know, and that puts the board in a very unfavourable bargaining position" (an administrator).

"That was one of the big problems with '79-'80 negotiations. From the start the allowance that we had in the budget was far from sufficient to hope to achieve a settlement with that money. I don't know whether it was an error in judgment or an attempt not to divulge what really the board had in mind, because of the danger of it being known by the other side right away. Anyway, it placed the board's salary committee in the position of having to resist the teachers' demands, which by the way started out at an unreasonably high figure, but I guess that's par for the course. It's ridiculous but I guess that's the way it's done.

"The board started at the other end of the spectrum. The first offer was for less than 1 percent, I think on the salary schedule, which is also ridiculous. At that time I think the board had something like 4 1/2 percent that it could give on the grid and then increments and category changes would cost us another 3 percent, so that we were looking at something around the 7 1/2 percent mark, under 8 percent anyway. And that's what the salary committee had to work with, and of course in retrospect it's easy to imply that was clearly insufficient because in the end the settlement was 11.3 percent. We were off the mark when you consider that 1 percent cost the board $100,000 in salary and there was a lot of money missing, with the result that when the settlement came, then it was a mad scramble to cut all over the place, to make up the difference.

"And in some cases we could do it without too much harm, but in other cases I think that this was really detrimental, for instance in

> direct supplies. They reduced the amount per pupil for direct supplies in the schools to $11, or something like that, which is clearly insufficient, when you consider that the previous year the figure was around $25 or $28 and the year before that it was $31" (an administrator).

This lack of cohesiveness among trustees, and their inability to share their concerns and views with each other, interfered with the collective bargaining process to a substantial degree. It meant that the salary committee of the board had to conceal its real 'bottom line' from the rest of the board.

But the divisions and mistrust within the board went much further than that between teacher or teacher-related trustees and the others. Rural trustees apparently distrusted the power and motivation of those from the city of Gamma itself. It was also clear that there were severe strains and stresses within the board because of the delicate balance of Francophone and Anglophone trustees. In successive elections, there were seven Francophone and six Anglophone trustees, or vice-versa. There was a dislike, a mistrust, which - according to trustees, administrators, and teachers interviewed - severely impeded the functioning of the board.

> "Basically, a lot of it was personal. Basically the rural area was French, the city area was English. I think, secondly, that a lot of the French people felt threatened. They felt that we'd down-play their culture and their language, and that things would be taken away from them, the strengths they had. There is no doubt, there were people who would do that. It was not entirely without foundation. But I think most of, well at least half the English speaking people, did not feel that way" (a trustee).

Some of the French-speaking trustees were perceived to be fanatical about French rights even by the French teachers. Their push for 'more' for the French sector led to stubbornness on the part of English trustees. However, they were pushing for equality, and some thought that despite the tensions, they made important gains for their constituency - gains which put them on an equal footing for the future.

Federation Militancy

Some trustees were convinced that Gamma was specifically chosen for a strike by O.E.C.T.A. because the association was looking for a good area to win a landmark settlement. It was a long way behind other boards in both salaries and working conditions and, because it was a relatively small board, any strike in Gamma could be supported by the provincial federations without breaking them financially. One

trustee thought O.E.C.T.A.'s militancy came from a leadership that was predominantly Irish and brought up in the English trade union movement.

> "It was very evident they (O.E.C.T.A.) were going to strike for something, somewhere. It was also very evident that they just couldn't afford (to strike in) Toronto" (a trustee).

> "I wonder if the teachers - and here I'm including their associations - the provincial associations - were not somewhat looking forward to having a strike in Gamma. I am not at all convinced that we had not been marked as the board who was going to get it that year. Whether the provincial association whipped up the storm in Gamma or whether it just came in to help guide the local is a chicken and egg problem" (an administrator).

Personalities

There is little doubt that personality clashes played an important, if not totally determining role in the conflict which erupted in Gamma in the mid- to late-seventies. Many people were involved in these clashes, but they centered around the chairman of the negotiating committee of the board, the chief negotiator for O.E.C.T.A., and the director of education. These three main protagonists were all repeatedly described as strong-willed, opinionated individuals, each determined to pursue certain priorities. When these priorities were at odds, the people clashed.

> "I think there was a mutual dislike originating outside of the scope of salary negotiations between the people who happened that year to be facing each other at the negotiating table - the chief negotiator for the board and the chief negotiator for the teachers. And I guess from what came out that during the strike there was some substantial dislike for the director of education. But the chief trustee negotiator, the teachers vowed that she'd be in deep trouble at the next election. She won the election, by the way, but anyway I think the intent was still there. And the chief negotiator for the teachers was a principal, still is, and that made him very unpopular with the trustees" (an administrator).

The teachers' chief negotiator in 1980 was also prominent in the provincial association (O.E.C.T.A.) and could muster strong support for his stances. He was widely perceived by both the administration and the trustees as trying to 'make a name for himself' within the provincial federation. And they were convinced that he was prepared to do this even at the expense of the Gamma board - and the children in

the school system. His alleged 'political' ambitions also made many trustees doubt whether he was truly representative of the views of the teachers in the Gamma board. Furthermore, when the strike occurred, the principals in the school system supported the teachers. The trustees felt that the teachers' chief negotiator, himself a principal, was primarily responsible for this. The chief negotiator agreed with the trustees; he believed that he had been responsible for getting the principals' support but saw that as the only way that the principals could retain their credibility in the reconstruction period that he knew would have to follow the strike.

The other key figure in the struggle was the director of education. His strengths were seen to be in organization, finance, and dedication to work. He was seen as hardworking, tremendously efficient, demanding the same commitment from others; he was also widely perceived to have a tendency to be somewhat dogmatic, opinionated, and inflexible.

> "Tremendously efficient. And the one before him was not. He was a nice fellow, but not efficient. So we needed an efficient man. I think he was a good man for his time. But then the efficiency started to strangle us a little. And then we needed a more human touch" (an administrator).

> "Well, he was a very competent and very dedicated person. He's a... I would call him a slave driver... but he certainly drives himself more than anyone else. The number of hours he's put in here in the five years that he was the director of education are just unreasonable, unreasonable. He would seldom go out for lunch, and many times if there was a meeting or committee in the evening he wouldn't go out for dinner until after, and I have to give him credit for that. He worked more hours than anyone else in here.

> "On the other hand he was tough in that - well one of the things that people had a hard time to accept about him, was that he wouldn't change his mind very easy. If he was convinced about something, he'd convince you before he'd give in. In some ways, some people felt a little bit overwhelmed by him, even some trustees I guess, would have felt that way. A strong personality. Not the best - not the best of listeners, no. I have to admit that" (an administrator).

His appointment was controversial from the beginning. A superintendent in Gamma, he applied for the directorship at the height of dissention among board members. His appointment by a six-to-five vote was controversial as well. At that time, there were two parallel systems, French and English sectors. He tried to

integrate the two systems into one by making both sides abide by a common set of rules and policies, rather than allowing them to continue to operate autonomously as before. This toughness was seen as needed by some trustees and administrators, but his ways and manner did not endear him to everyone.

> "When this board was established in 1969 there was legally one director, but he was perceived to be really head of the French section only, for school purposes. And then there was an English superintendent who was perceived to be, more than just perceived, was acknowledged to be, head of all the English schools. Now when the director came, and he had been here as a superintendent prior to that, now he clearly wanted to get rid of those notions. He wanted to be in charge. He was not acceptable to the people in the English section. So even though the board acknowledged him clearly as the number one man in charge of all of the schools, that wasn't the way it worked in practice. In fact he called a meeting with the principals and all the English principals boycotted the meeting. Pretty strong stuff" (an administrator).

> "Now getting back to the reasons for tensions besides the director of education; I think there is also maybe something within administration that is not as good as it could be. And that goes back a long time. I think it is because administration, at least at the school level, at the instruction level, is split between the two sections (English, French). I must say that that's an area that has improved considerably since (the new director) came. But for many years there was a very well dissimulated, but very much present, competition between the two, even, well right up to the superintendent's level. And sometimes some decisions were not as rational as they could have been. In other words, if those two systems had been operating independently of one another, some decisions would have been different. That's what I'm getting at. But because they are operating together, then they sometimes got in the way of each other. It has colored and it has influenced certain decisions in the central ofice here, which teachers, not being altogether a bunch of fools, have seen and have evaluated as something less than ideal. That is also one of the causes for some friction between the Central Office and the teachers" (an administrator).

> "You know, starting with our own administration - like the present director is totally acceptable with the English section. He's viewed

> as being somebody who is objectively bilingual. Not so with the previous man. He was a different sort of man, much stronger feelings about French rights" (an administrator).

The perceptions of one trustee whom we interviewed was that the director actually ran the board meetings and guided the negotiations, instead of leaving these jobs to the trustees who were responsible for them. Some were of the opinion that he encouraged the French-English dissention in order to exploit the power vacuum it left. The director himself pointed out that he was not involved in the final details of the salary settlement at all and that he had, throughout his tenure, attempted to do everything in his power to mend the Francophone-Anglophone rift and organizational schisms which he inherited. While there was much disagreement as to his motives, the personal integrity and commitment to quality Catholic education of the director were never impugned.

Some people saw the conflict in Gamma - and still see the situation today - as being closely tied in with the difficulties in managing a bilingual board, with the clearly different objectives, philosophies and beliefs about education among the two major ethnic groups.

> "Because you can always blame it on the English or blame it on the French. If you don't like what it is that the director is doing, you can blame it on him because he's French. And of course sometimes there is some validity in that. People who get onto one language group become protective of that group. I guess being protective is O.K., but being unfair is not O.K.; and there's a thin line between the two of them. I really think that hurts. If the English principals were more militant, it was the 'damn English'. If the French principals were not militant enough, they'd say, 'Oh well it's a French board. They're just not wanting to cause trouble with the French establishment'. I think that really made it much more difficult to reach a settlement" (an administrator).

> "You couldn't help but see it. It really was the biggest factor. I know we compare it with other bilingual boards, but I've heard enough stories to know that it's not a unique experience. Well, look at the (another city) experience where for one reason or another they're trying to create homogeneous schools. Like, the French do want to establish one, I think for good reasons. But I guess it's partly the same reasons for French and English groups, not being able to get along at our board level. It's just that they have different ambitions, different cultures or different goals, different priorities. And we are trying to accommodate those. We

still have difficulties, but I think this board has been successful in working around them.

"People who don't work for a bilingual board I don't think realize it, the difficulty. Although maybe a comparison could be made with some boards that have a strong urban and a strong rural component. Where the cultures clash, everything is different. I think nothing is quite so different as language, though. You don't understand what the other fellow is saying" (an administrator).

In summary, there were many events leading up to the strike in the spring of 1980. Certainly there were the traditional concerns over money. It seems likely that the focus on working conditions, including language, in the agreement covering transfers and PTR were not only desired in their own right, but also desired because of a deep mistrust by the teachers of the administration, particularly the director of education. The board was divided, with mistrust between trustees and an inability to get its act together in the bargaining process. There may or may not have been a conscious decision by O.E.C.T.A. to 'target' Gamma for a breakthrough - those we interviewed were divided on this matter. There is little doubt that strong personalities played a role. This was both observable directly in those we interviewed and mentioned constantly by many people. Some of the problems appeared to be structural, related to amalgamation, the split between Anglophone and Francophone interests, and between trustees from 'the city' and those from outlying, rural communities. It is neither possible, nor desirable, to lay any blame for the strike on any one of, or combination of, these factors. As with many conflicts, the origins are manifold.

THE STRIKE

The teachers went out on strike on April 30, 1980 and stayed out for a total of nineteen days. Despite its short duration, the strike was traumatic for trustees and administrators. One trustee recalled that board members became frightened by their own violent reactions during the confrontation. Some felt guilty that a Catholic system, which was supposed to promote a religious way of life, was embroiled in a dirty name-calling match. The media were accused of heating up the confrontation because it made good news.

The board members were unprepared for such a situation, and they were under incredible pressure because of the strike. For one thing, the teachers deliberately began the strike during education week, when Gamma was hosting education officials from around the province. They hoped to embarrass the board into moving on negotiations. The board was shocked that the teachers would actually strike.

Much of the teachers' media campaign focused on discrediting the director. The teachers published a newsletter and he was usually the butt of the jokes. The general opinion is that he was really hurt by this, particularly when the French teachers were not any more kind to him than the English teachers. Relations were also strained between teachers and the administration. The superintendents, themselves reportedly at odds with some of the director's policies, were nevertheless 'management.' And the teachers attacked the superintendents for being part of this management team. Caught as they were between the roles they had to play and their real feelings and beliefs, the superintendents suffered significantly.

The divisiveness and lack of cohesiveness at the trustee and administration level were not evident in the teachers during the time immediately before and during the strike. Teachers all pulled together during the strike and resisted any attempts to pit them against each other. Before the strike, the general impression was that O.E.C.T.A. was militant, was leading negotiations, and that A.E.F.O. was taking a back seat, being more passive. But the strike forged the two into a unified cooperative group. In the words of one representative, "it raised their consciousness." And as one trustee commented, "the teachers really don't want to see hostilities surface between language groups; they want input into a smoothly running board with a good harmonious administration."

The public comments of the board's chief negotiator were bound to put her on a direct collision course with the teachers. In the federation's files are a liberal sampling from published interviews, speeches, and board meetings:

> "I think a strike is basically unmoral, and I won't work where there is a union. It's a demeaning experience. I feel even more strongly about this now. I came from a union family. My father brought unions to Canada - in the railroad. My brothers are all union. My sisters are antiunion."
>
> "Unions have gone too far, beyond a just contract."
>
> "Teachers have gained monetarily, but have lost the respect of the community."
>
> "Strikes teach kids poor values and citizenship."

There was much bitterness over the extent to which the principals supported the teachers during the strike. Terms like 'defectors' were used to describe them. But there was also some recognition of the ambivalence of principals in such situations. The board and the administration expected principals to act as management during the strike and to get volunteer and supply teachers to fill in for the strikers. The principals upset the board by refusing.

"Seeing your principal whose position was always and was supposed to be on the side of management and the other view that they are the principal teachers. So they are legally required to be in the schools, but knowing that they were doing just about everything they could do legally to do as little as possible - to make sure that the strike succeeded" (an administrator).

"During the strike, of course, then the superintendents of the schools and curriculum had to get involved with the school principals because we kept the schools open, but then again there was a widespread and well orchestrated plan amongst school principals to close down schools. Within three or four days we had half the schools in the system who did not have a single pupil registered. And we had many calls from parents complaining that the principal had told her child to stay home, and get out of his hair. So, that created a lot of bad feelings. Some of this has not yet entirely disappeared.

"Then what do you do with the 30-odd school principals you have on your hands and are not allowed to strike? What kind of work do you give them for the duration? You have to pay them; since they are not on strike, they are entitled to their paycheque. Will you just give them the month off or whatever length the strike goes? There is something wrong in the legislation in that it is not sufficiently realistic.

"I think that hurt the system. The fact that the school principals could not go on strike. Well, I wish they could have been on one side or the other. See the ridiculous part of it is they are entitled to vote for the strike, then they can't put their money where their mouth is.

"So that part of it doesn't make sense; it's illogical and it has created tensions not only between superintendents and principals but between principals and their own staffs. It has created hard feelings" (an administrator).

The strike ended in a partial victory for the teachers. They got salary increases which were higher than those in the Gamma public school system; they got a commitment to a specific PTR in a letter of intent attached to the collective agreement, and they obtained satisfaction on the transfer issue. One of the pressures

on the board for settlement was the fact that fee-paying students in grades 11 to 13 would start switching to public high schools. There was a strong feeling by many trustees that once this happened, it would be impossible to get these students to transfer back to the separate school system.

AFTER THE STRIKE

In the three years following the strike, the views of the relationship between the teachers and the board moved from optimism about the possibility of improvement, to a realization that little appeared to have changed, to some concern that there may be further serious problems ahead.

When we first started gathering the data for this study, in the summer and fall of 1981, the relationship between the teachers and the school board in Gamma could best be described as one of cautious cooperation. People were still visibly shocked as a result of the strike, but they were encouraged by what they had seen change in the preceding year. Some were more optimistic than others about the possibility of developing a really constructive and cooperative relationship in Gamma, and there were several people whom we interviewed who were frankly skeptical about any sustained improvement. Nevertheless, all agreed that things appeared to be much better than they had been for a number of years.

When we went back to re-interview people in 1983, it appeared that little progress had been made. The collective agreement for 1981/82 required extensive mediation. It included language on a staffing formula and a revision to classifications that the board found extremely costly to implement. Faced with declining enrollments and financial constraints as a result of the high settlement in 1980/81, the board had laid off teachers with permanent contracts. Although this has been done on the basis of seniority, the federations demanded boards of reference (a special form of judicial enquiry) in each case.

The overall level of trust did not appear to have increased greatly when we re-interviewed people in 1983. The O.E.C.T.A. local officials did not have much confidence that the board was really representing the true financial status. There was a strong feeling that the federations were not being given the whole picture and that somehow the board's budget was concealing something. The federations were strengthened in this belief by the fact that the board appeared unwilling to show the federation "the books" when requested to do so, even - according to one federation president - when the teachers offered to forsake a salary increase for 1982/83 if the board could demonstrate financial need.

In 1982 it appeared that the trustees and the administration had clearly accommodated the teachers' concerns about issues apart from salaries. The fact that the two affiliates had been so united against the board during the strike tended to make the board focus less on the traditional differences between trustees and more on the problems addressed by the teachers, such as demands for improved working

conditions and salaries, input into decision-making, especially concerning redundancy, and a change in management style toward a more participative model.

However, in 1983 the federation officials were convinced that 'management's rights' were an even bigger issue with the board than ever before. Marching, so one federation president alleged, to a provincial trustee beat of 'contract-stripping,' the board was accused of trying to weasel out of PTR agreements anyway it could. The cancellation of certain special education courses - claimed by the board to have been regretfully necessary because of budget deficits - was seen by the federations as a way to cut down the PTR since the special education teachers were outside the PTR formula in the 1980/81 and subsequent agreements.

In 1981, there was the feeling that the trustees had started functioning as a school board, instead of as two separate and conflicting groups, English and French. As one trustee said, "they had to decide whether they were going to function as a bilingual board or as two separate boards." The decision was helped by the election of seven new trustees, replacing most of those described as 'extremists', and by the increasing provincial support of bilingualism. However, in 1983, the divisions between English and French factions of the board seemed as acute as ever.

FACTORS IN THE CHANGING RELATIONSHIP

Most of the factors which were cited by people as contributors to the conflict in the late seventies and early eighties had changed in some way by the time we conducted our interviews in 1981-3.

People Changes

There were many personnel changes. The board chairman retired, the director of education left to go to another board, and the chief negotiator for the trustees and the teachers had changed. The strong, locked-in, interpersonal conflicts which were so evident in the months preceding the strike and during it, disappeared with the disengagement of the key protagonists. The board hired a labor negotiator rather than using the trustees themselves to conduct negotiations, injecting an element of professionalism into the relationship. The board clearly did not really understand the settlement that it made in 1981/82 - particularly the impact of the staffing formula - showing that it has lost some understanding by distancing itself from negotiations. With the participation of a professional negotiator for the board, however, the trustees were less likely to give vent to their feelings and emotions in the highly-charged atmosphere of negotiations.

Trustee Cohesiveness

The trustees tried to forget their differences and pull together for the first time. The newer trustees had fewer memories of the way things used to be, more of an orientation to improving relationships, and had not been personally damaged during the 1980 strike. However, the evidence was that they still tended to break into English and French camps on many issues.

Joint Committees

Once it was clearly established that teachers were interested - and were going to continue to be interested - in working conditions heretofore considered "inalienable rights" of management, mechanisms started to be developed which facilitated communication and discussion. A teacher-trustee committee was established to discuss mutual concerns not related to salary, hopefully before they grew to explosive proportions. This committee met regularly, but its proceedings were viewed cynically by some, hopefully by others. The teachers have appeared to be unwilling to shoulder any responsibility for joint decision-making, according to at least one highly-involved trustee. The teachers, on the other hand, saw the trustees as unwilling to share real power. The president of the O.E.C.T.A. affiliate described this and other joint committees as "paying lip-service to cooperation." He went so far as to say that the board and trustees don't recognize teachers between contract negotiations.

The New Director

A major factor in the attempt to establish a new relationship was seen as the new director, formerly the director of a smaller board in which he had developed a reputation as a quietly efficient, committed, and caring educational administrator. It was clear that in its search for a replacement for the previous director, the board had sought someone with similar strengths in educational leadership, but with a very different interpersonal style. Although a French-Canadian, he stressed the 'whole system' approach to management and tried to avoid becoming identified with either Francophone or Anglophone factions.

> "He's very polite but firm. He did not stand back, he stated what he stood for. That he was French. He was speaking the French language, from the French culture. If you really want to know what he was, he was sincere. He was a Catholic, Canadian-French" (a trustee).

> "When we hired, we looked for a French-Canadian who'd be welcome in the English schools" (a trustee).

The new director saw his first year as a "healing" one, attempting to foster harmony and cooperation where none had existed before. He worked hard at it, directing his efforts in a number of ways. First, he visited every school and spoke with teacher and parent groups, asking for their inputs into improving the Gamma Separate School system. Second, he prepared and widely distributed a detailed set of objectives, designed to show everyone where he intended to lead the system. For example, he set as objectives in 1981 the following:

- Meet the teaching staff of each school within the school before April 30, 1981.
- Develop effective communications with parents and the media which will lead to a better understanding of our educational objectives.
- Have a one-day 'think-tank' session for trustees in 1981.
- Meet parish priests individually at least once in 1981.

In 1981, praise for his efforts was coming from all quarters. But it was a praise which was still tinged with some belief that there had been less than a total change in the motivation and orientation of the board.

> "There is a tremendous feeling of harmony. But I think we could give credit a lot mainly to the new director. And also because the trustees are so scared from the strike and poor relations that they are willing to do anything to get along" (an administrator).

Policies and Procedures

The previous director had generated a huge number of policies and procedures, to cover almost every aspect of the board's operations. But these were perceived to have been developed for the most part in a unilateral fashion although in fact there was extensive participation in the process by several layers of administration. Policy making under the new director was seen differently.

> "When we develop board policies, we now have a procedure introduced by the new director that's a pretty sensible one. We review policies every year. If you are not happy with a policy, you know that in one year's time it's going to be reviewed and everybody is going to have a crack at it. Before, we would probably prepare policy at a lower level. It would go up through the principals. They would make certain suggestions and then those suggestions would be lost as the thing went up the ladder. Then they'd get it in its latter form and all hell would break loose. I think that contributed very strongly to the feeling that maybe strike action or militant action was the only way to be heard" (an administrator).

Administrative Reorganization

By 1983, the breach between English and French speaking superintendents has been at least partially healed. There were no longer the separate posts of director of French instruction and director of English instruction, and attempts were being made to break down the barriers between Anglophone and Francophone administrators. Joint planning sessions were taking place at regular intervals, superintendents were being encouraged to work as a team, and there was some evidence from interviews with them that this was starting to occur.

Communications

Communications between the teachers and the board, in 1983, were either much better or unchanged, depending on whose view one took. It appeared that the new director - through his regular visits to the schools and through regular meetings with the principals - had made enormous efforts to improve the flow of communications with teachers. For example, minutes of board meetings were being sent to the principals, but whether or not they were being shared with the teachers, and on what basis, appeared to be very much up to the principal. The board had started to have open meetings and was in the process of considering open meetings in which everyone - parents, teachers, other employees - could express their views. But there was concern about this. Relationships between the trustees could still get rocky, particularly over French-English conflicts. And the tendency to closed meetings existed in order to cover up these divisions.

While there was greater communication, there was also some skepticism about the reasons for the communication and some questions about how 'honest' it was. One federation official alleged that communication only took place when the board wanted something, and that it was rigged to suit the board's purpose. According to this same federation officer, the director had become embroiled in this

battle, presenting one set of budget figures to the board, another to teachers, and yet another to parents but we were unable to substantiate this.

The Extent and Stability of the Changes

Among the administration and the trustees there was some concern that things had not changed at all. And there was some question as to whether the legitimacy of the federations - other than in the areas of salary negotiation - had really been accepted by some key people. In late 1982, long after the new collective agreement had been signed with various agreements covering transfers, there was still reluctance on the part of some people to recognize the legitimacy of the teachers' concerns in this area. In fact, there was almost pleasure expressed by one administrator that the teachers had somehow tripped themselves up in their insistence on more rigorous transfer language:

> "You see, it's too bad, but the teachers are starting to get caught in their own cobweb. The transfers had been done according to the collective agreement, which they had fought so hard to negotiate. I mean the previous year's agreement, but that was a tough one also. And now we have complaints from certain teachers. I was talking to a superintendent not very long ago and he'll have to transfer someone from here to the neighboring community. And it so happens that the teachers have made it so automatic now, that he has no choice in the matter and yet, the person who is earmarked for the transfer because of her placement on the seniority list has personal difficulties that would probably call for some kind of compassion on the part of the board, and try to get someone else to transfer instead. But this will not be possible. It's too bad - but they've made the system so tight that some of them are starting to get hurt, and more than one will get hurt as time goes on" (an administrator).

By 1983, some of the shine was beginning to wear off the new director's halo. The director was still personally respected and liked by those we interviewed, even those who disliked and discredited the board. But he was seen as increasingly ineffectual, unable to cope with the strengths of personalities in the system. He was seen as a "French-first" director by O.E.C.T.A., this resulting in fewer problems from the Francophone teachers (A.E.F.O.) than the Anglophones. He was sometimes referred to as a 'nice guy, but naive', hoping that his sentiments and beliefs could overcome very real problems between teachers and the board about management rights. By 1983, there was a conviction among O.E.C.T.A. officers that nothing had really changed. As one put it:

> "The issues have changed - but not the mentality (of the trustees). Its like a marriage that's gone sour but that you're bound in".

There was a tentative peace in Gamma. Perhaps there was some continuing change taking place in relationships. But there were still fundamental problems to be overcome; the future was very uncertain. The militance raised among the teachers had not died away. Indeed, their victory in 1980 may have whetted their appetites for another confrontation. The views expressed to us in the late fall of 1982 have not changed substantially.

> "It may be that the teachers strike last year was settled too quickly. I hate like hell saying that" (an administrator).

> "Maybe there was not enough pain. On either side. If we have another strike within a year or two or three, that will be enough to convince me that last year's strike was settled too quickly. We should all have had maybe more of it, from all angles. The bad sides, the indifferent aspects, the whole bit. It hurts a little when you hear, like I did a couple of months ago, a teacher telling me - 'the nice weather is coming, I wish we had another strike this year'.

> "If we go on strike it will be on money. There are three or four issues on the table, but the 'biggie' will be the money. It always is. I don't kid myself, I don't care what politicians or teachers say, it always boils down to money. That's the big one. If you can resolve that one you can resolve the others. Maybe you can't resolve the others to the full satisfaction of either party, but that's not always the best situation either. When one party is entirely happy with one of the settlements, one of the issues being accepted, maybe it's because it's one-sided. I think it is better when neither party is entirely happy or entirely unhappy. That means there was some give and take. It's probably reasonable for both sides and not really a killer for anyone.

> "So I don't know how things are. The situation has improved, but there are still scars" (an administrator).

The fact that in 1983, the administration saw all concerns boiling down to money, and the teachers saw management rights as the key issue, did not augur well for peace and harmony in the future for the Gamma Roman Catholic Separate School Board.

6

The Delta Board of Education

Some six years after the work-to-rule and lockout in the Delta County Board of Education, there was little evidence of a truly cooperative relationship emerging. However, collective agreements were being negotiated, sometimes before the preceding agreements expired, and the public had not had to put up with the intermittent sanctions which characterized the period 1974-78.

BACKGROUND

The Delta County Board of Education covers an area of small rural and suburban communities surrounding a highly industrialized city. Formed in 1969 from the amalgamation of fourteen small, predecessor boards, Delta includes several small towns, none of which were large enough to dominate the newly formed amalgamated Delta board. As a result, the board was, and still is to some extent, a loose coalition of sometimes conflicting interests. Most of the teachers who work for the Delta board lived in the neighboring city, and many parents worked for companies in the urban area. This, according to the director of education, posed a number of problems. Notably, both the parents of children and the teachers had their expectations shaped by the proximity of the large city. However, according to the director of education, the smaller Delta board did not have the resources to support those expectations.

> "A lot of them work in the big city. They would view themselves as being part of an urban conglomerate, no doubt, because of the linkage back a d forth. They have urban expectations. We don't have the urba. (tax) base, okay? And then the two of them are difficult to reconcile. You are looking at a combination of substantial management base and farm base, as such, both of which would be opposed predominantly to rapid increases in taxes. We've gone to the tax payers two years successively for increases in excess of $70 for the average $5,000 assessment. And that's

> heavy. A lot of it relates to the recognition of program requirements... But a lot of it relates to the gains made at the negotiating table and the difficulty in reducing the number of people involved in the bargaining unit" (the director).]

Early Problems

Of course, amalgamation caused problems for many boards. But they were severe for Delta because of the coincidence of a number of factors: the absence of a significant 'leader' board on which the policies, procedures, and practices of the new 'super-board' could be based; the very large number of constituent boards (fourteen) which were amalgamated; the fact that these boards were very different in composition, practices, policies, and procedures; and the fact that population in the Delta board's area was decreasing or static, thereby reducing the opportunities for increased revenue from growth in the tax base.

The early years of the new Delta board were described by the current director of education as representing the four P's: parochialism, procrastination, paternalism, and posterior-protection! The trustees were representing the interests of the communities from which they were elected rather than looking to the priorities of the new amalgamated board. They were firm believers in 'management rights,' even going to the extent of making representations to the Ontario government to enshrine management rights in the *School Boards and Teachers Collective Negotiations Act*.

The troubles of the 1974-78 period stemmed from several sources. On the one hand, there were the teachers' federations trying to achieve salary and benefit parity with the neighboring 'rich' big-city board, and striving to obtain job security and other working condition improvements through the negotiation of class sizes, pupil-teacher ratios, and other staffing provisions. And on the other hand, there was a fiscally conservative board of trustees, intent on holding the line on expenditures, fearful of the impact of declining enrollments, and unwilling to share any of the traditional management rights. In the middle was a vacuum created by an administration which was widely perceived by the teachers to be lacking independent academic leadership and to be dominated by the trustees who had become more and more involved with administrative matters rather than confining themselves to policy direction.

There had been a short work-to-rule action by secondary school teachers in 1974. They had refused extra-curricular activities such as the supervision of games, sports events, drama clubs, and other 'after-school' activities. This was not a minor irritant, since such activities were very much a part of the social fabric of the rural/suburban Delta area. The board had responded by declaring the official school day as '8.00 a.m. to 5.00 p.m.' There followed a great deal of public wrangling, high media interest, speeches, demonstrations, and so on. The work-to-rule continued through the spring and early fall of 1974 and was only terminated when a new

collective agreement was concluded. But this collective agreement was widely perceived by teachers as a 'sell-out' - nothing substantive was gained as a result of the work-to-rule. While not a severe disruption, this early work-to-rule was a harbinger of worse times ahead. One of the things that it did was to mobilize a small but highly active group of parents and other residents of the region to take a greater interest in the school board and to run for elected office as trustees.

In the 1976 school board elections, the teachers and their federations took a very active role, campaigning for a new, younger, more liberal group of trustees and succeeding in getting eight of the previous group of 18 trustees replaced. There was a sharp difference of opinion as to whether this new group of trustees in fact reflected a 'pro-teacher' stance or merely an opposition to the existing, very conservative and reactionary trustee group. Factually there was no dispute; they were either teachers in other boards, spouses of teachers, or related in some way to teachers. Whether or not this made them 'pro-teacher' or not was open to conjecture. It seemed likely that they leaned in general toward the idea that teachers should have a greater say in what happened in education and should have more rights regarding job security and working conditions. However, when it came to issues, many of the supposedly 'pro-teacher' group tended to vote against change, in support of fiscal conservatism and management rights.

Undoubtedly there was some ambivalence for these trustees, trying to reconcile their inclinations with their responsibilities as trustees. There was also a suggestion that some 'playing of both sides of the fence' took place, with a few trustees positively cozying up to the teachers and yet voting against the teachers' positions in secret ballots taken by the board. Despite their significant numbers, this new group were unable to prevail against the incumbent, conservative majority. They were simply not well enough organized. Although they shared a similar liberal philosophy, they were not getting together to vote as a group on issues.

THE 1978 WORK-TO-RULE AND LOCKOUT

As they moved into negotiations for a new agreement for 1976/77, the board changed its bargaining approach. Recognizing the new legislation (Bill 100) and increased professionalism of the federations with respect to negotiations, the board decided that it needed assistance in the negotiating process. So the trustees hired a professional negotiator, well-known in the area as a tough bargainer with extensive experience negotiating agreements for a variety of local companies. Another factor prompting the board's action was the belief - at least in the mind of some trustees - that the Ontario Secondary School Teachers' Federation (O.S.S.T.F.) had 'targeted' Delta as a 'board to break' in this set of negotiations. They thought that this was a possibility since the collective agreement in Delta clearly lagged surrounding boards regarding provisions dealing with working conditions in general and staffing in particular. Although settlements for a 1976/77 agreement were made with both

secondary and elementary panels without sanctions, in the words of one former trustee:

> "... the verbatim minutes taken at the first meeting of the board with the teacher's negotiating team and the board's professional negotiator, reveal a depth of antagonism and personal animosity not easily matched by fiction writers."

Friction with the negotiator was experienced by both elementary and secondary school federation officers during negotiations for a 1977/78 collective agreement, which dragged on into the spring of 1978. Certain negotiating sessions were so intense that the official spokesman for the elementary school teachers excused himself from negotiations and handed matters over to another spokesman as a result of the personal antagonism he felt toward the board's negotiator. However, the elementary school panel was clearly prepared to allow the O.S.S.T.F. to carry the real load of breaking new ground in an agreement with the Delta board. While both the secondary and elementary panels went through the fact-finding and mediation processes for the 1977/78 agreement, the elementary panel settled an agreement in the spring of 1978.

The fact-finding report for the secondary panel clearly recommended that the board yield on some substantive issues of staffing and other working conditions. Buoyed by this report, the O.S.S.T.F. hardened its stance in contract negotiations, demanding parity in salaries and benefits with the neighboring city board secondary teachers as well as a Pupil-Teacher Ratio (PTR) enshrined in the collective agreement at a level comparable to that in the neighbouring city board. They were not prepared to settle for the board's position, which was substantially less than parity on salaries and contained no movement on staffing levels.

In April 1978, the secondary teachers started a new work-to-rule campaign. The issues were clearly defined and, although feelings were running high, there was little acrimony and the possibility of some compromise settlement was always there ...until what has come to be known as 'The Great Examination Caper.' The examination situation developed over the Grade 13 March exams. Teachers, on a work-to-rule campaign, had not marked them and did not send in estimated marks for their students' university entrance records. The board claimed ownership of the examination booklets, and sheriffs were sent out to teachers' homes to collect them. In semestered schools where mid-term exams were subsequently written, the superintendents were dispatched to collect them immediately after completion. The teachers barred their entry into the schools. The next day, May 8, the board passed an emergency resolution locking out the teachers. Teachers were infuriated... and their determination increased.

The exam issue also brought involvement from parents, which the teachers turned to their benefit. Parents organized a meeting in the Town Hall. There,

teachers showed them the fact-finder's report which supported their desire to negotiate working conditions. The teachers also stated that they would welcome arbitration, assuming that the fact-finders report would probably form the basis of an arbitration award. The board resisted - for precisely the same reasons! Pressure from the parents and the media mounted and it was clear that if the lockout continued, students might be in jeopardy of missing the credits they required for university entrance. After about fifteen days of lockout, the board agreed to a process of mediation-arbitration in which a well-known mediator would first attempt to get the parties to settle and then, failing settlement, would arbitrate any outstanding issues.

The mediator-arbitrator handed down his award in August 1978. The award covered the period 1977/79 and completely changed the face of the collective agreement in Delta. Basically, the teachers got extensive working conditions included in the collective agreement, including language covering the Pupil-Teacher Ratio and Pupil-Teacher Contacts, preparation time, and extensive seniority provisions. On working conditions, the arbitration award represented a complete victory for the teachers. But they paid the price in immediate salaries and fringe benefits. The arbitrator's award left the secondary school teachers substantially behind parity with the city board and, for the first time, significantly below the salaries of comparably qualified and experienced elementary school teachers.

TOWARD A CHANGED RELATIONSHIP

The work-to-rule and lock-out might only have been one episode in a continuing conflict had it not been followed by a major change in the structure of the board, the adoption of a form of single-team bargaining, and the appointment of a new director of education.

Board Structure

The teachers were again active in trustee elections in 1978, and this time they succeeded in getting another four trustees with a 'liberal' perspective elected to the board; they could now count two-thirds of the board as people who were either teachers in neighboring boards or were related to teachers.

There was little evidence that these new trustees ran for office on the basis of changing labor relations or that previous trustees were defeated because of the work-to-rule and lockout. Many just retired, frustrated with trying to be a trustee in changing, more complex times. Five of the seven trustees who were replaced retired voluntarily, some of them clearly upset at being 'hassled' by the newer trustees. It was a changing of the guard. And many of the newer trustees ran for office with rather vague hopes of 'doing something' to improve educational quality within the county. Whatever the reasons were, there was a liberal, progressive, group of trustees led by a chairman who was himself a trustee in the neighboring board of

education. The progressive, liberal trustees held all three key committee chair positions (Education, Finance, and Salary); they were of similar ages, women, and well-educated; they were fed up with what had been happening in the previous few years and were willing to innovate.

A New Director

The second fortuitous event was the resignation of the previous director of education. This director was very widely perceived as ineffectual - in the words of one interviewee, an 'absentee' director. He had assumed a very low profile during both work-to-rule campaigns, allowing his superintendents to run day-to-day activities and personally offering little in the way of active academic or administrative leadership. This meant that the board had been directly involved in management decision-making, and the consequence had been an educational system which was 'managed by numbers.' Since this board had constantly tried to keep taxes down, the consequence was lip-service paid to Ministry of Education policies and a lack of progressiveness in the board's educational policies. Following the strike and the election of the new, more liberal board, this director elected early retirement, paving the way for a new administrative head.

The selection committee of the board interviewed many candidates for the vacant position before deciding on its new director. The appointee was surprising in many ways. He was young, and relatively inexperienced... but he made quite an impression on the interviewers.

> "He walked in, took off his jacket, rolled up his sleeves, and produced a set of plans from his briefcase. 'Here's what has to be done to put things right,' he said. And he then talked about his ideas, plans, objectives, and so on. He had really thought about doing something. He gave us confidence that things would change. He was the clearcut choice, even by some of the older trustees" (a former trustee).

The new director was only an associate superintendent in the Delta board. Appointing him as director meant leapfrogging over at least two other superintendents who wanted the position.

Single-Team Bargaining

Among the new trustees elected in 1978 was one trustee who became a strong proponent of trying single-team bargaining. As chairman of the Finance Committee she was in a position to suggest that this new, innovative form of bargaining be tried in Delta. She was supported in this by the new director and the majority of the board

who, while they may have had little appreciation of what was involved, felt that anything would be better than what they had just gone through. The teachers were skeptical at first - even antagonistic to the idea. But the teachers in Delta were themselves distressed by the events surrounding the work-to-rule/lock-out and were looking for some mechanism to prevent this from happening again.

It is questionable whether true single-team bargaining ever really took place in Delta, although there was a change in bargaining style and practices. For the 1979/80 agreement, the team of trustees negotiated directly with the teachers' negotiating teams (one for elementary, one for secondary), without the presence of professional negotiators. The teams had received one seminar from a consultant specializing in single-team bargaining, and he was present at several team meetings to facilitate the group process. However, virtually none of the members of any of the negotiating teams had received extensive training in problem-solving or had any intensive interpersonal skills training. Nevertheless, they were determined to discuss rather than negotiate and to try to develop and preserve a collegial approach to dealing with the problems they faced.

The settlement for 1979/80 was reached before the new school year started - the first time this had happened since the new Delta board was formed. The teachers' skepticism about the single-team approach turned to enthusiasm. But there appeared to be a variety of reasons for this enthusiasm. On the one hand, there were those who clearly saw the discussions, when compared with protracted adversarial negotiations, to be less stressful, somehow more collegial, and consistent with their self-images as professionals. Some saw the quick resolution of issues, before the previous contract had expired, as beneficial to the school system. Others saw the process as having given them major gains that either would not have been achieved under conventional collective bargaining or would only have been achieved with the threat or actual use of sanctions. And many saw the single-team bargaining as irrelevant, believing that with the particular group of trustees elected in the 1976 and 1978 elections, conventional bargaining would have led to the same outcomes if the same people had been involved.

> "That's why single-team was a miracle. We had contracts settled before expiry" (a teacher).

> "We started to make gains in PTR and in a number of areas we'd always been trying to. We got average class size with a year's grace. This has been a major breakthrough and helped us through declining enrolment. The board probably didn't realize what it had given" (a teacher).

> "We made gains in the following areas by single team: salary formula, leaves, four-out-of-five plan, early retirement incentive, job sharing and improved staffing ratios" (a teacher).
>
> "We couldn't explain these things to a paid negotiator. Single team is good for educational issues" (a teacher).
>
> "I feel there is no such thing as single-team bargaining (in this board) as we never followed (the consultant's) model. Adversarial at its best was really the process. Each side presented its points. It was not really problem-solving. Each side had different concerns. It was a tool for us to talk to board members and explain our positions, instead of talking to a professional negotiator" (a teacher).
>
> "I like what we've had, although it's not really single-team bargaining. It's less hostile" (a teacher).

The director saw both advantages and disadvantages to the process, but was for the most part enthusiastic. He gave considerable credit to single-team bargaining for helping to heal the relationship after the strike in 1978. He also stressed the fact that the two teams should actually talk with instead of at each other, and that creativity could develop when the teams approached the same problem from different points of view. Both the director and the former chairman of the Salary Committee pointed to the development of Delta's unique salary adjustment plan as evidence of the success of the creative process. The new Delta grid contained an escalator clause which was based on Hay (1) points (50 percent weight), Consumer Price Index (CPI) (25 percent weight) and the Industrial Composite (25 percent weight).

But the ambivalence felt over this provision alone was symptomatic of the lack of wholesale commitment to the single-team process - and its outcomes - within the Delta board. While some people saw this grid as a breakthrough, as a triumph of creative common sense, others had a different view.

> "What makes a lot of the trustees uncomfortable, and I would suspect a lot of the public, is that you just basically say, here's a blank cheque. It will be filled in when we get a pen. I guess that's what it says. On the other hand, teachers are not sure what they are going to be getting out of that circumstance either" (a trustee).

And even the director, a supporter of single-team bargaining, saw two kinds of problems arising from the single-team concept as practiced in Delta.

"One type of problem is that during the sessions, because of the nature of the process, very little is committed to writing, or has been committed to writing. So that when an agreement is struck, there are a lot of loose ends to be tied up. Often, from our experience, the language which is used to tie up the loose ends is less than precise. It's damn difficult to capture intent.

"The second type of problem that we've experienced this year is the problem of interpretation. It would appear that single-team is waved as a flag anytime there is a problem that arises in the interpretation."

This last comment was noted both by the director and other administrators. In effect, they alleged that the federations blackmailed them with the single-team process into accepting the federations' interpretation of the intent of an agreement. According to one administrator, if he disagreed with the federations' interpretation, the federation accused him of jeopardizing the single-team process.

Since 'professional' negotiators were not involved in the single-team process, and because agreements were often reached at the deadline, the language of the agreements was sometimes vague and ambiguous. Because the language was often less-than-precise, and because there were no detailed negotiating records, establishing actual intent was difficult. Over 100 grievances were filed in 1982 and there was an expectation that many of them would have to be arbitrated, since grievance meeting discussions were not leading anywhere.

"It's our contention, and I believe District X believes as well, that the grievance process as outlined in the collective agreement is basically a means of resolving disputes and interpretations. It's supposed to be. What it turns out to be frequently is a form of mutual heart-to-heart threatening. In essence, if you don't respond appropriately, here's what's going to happen. I think that's probably significantly the case with most grievance actions anyway. It's supposed to be a civilized process; in essence, it becomes a means of determining I'm right or I'm wrong and I'm prepared to go to the wall to get to the truth of the thing" (the director).

"Grievances should not be viewed as an attack, but as a clarification of language. The director, on a rational level, agrees, but not on a gut level. Principals have trouble with staffing policies and PTC's (Pupil-Teacher Contacts) as it (grievance) calls their methods into

question. We've gotten this across to them better this year" (a teacher).

Many grievances were launched by the federations to discipline principals into fulfilling the job-protection and staffing clauses of the agreement. Grievances mostly came from the secondary panel, but - at the time we conducted interviews - the elementary teachers were considering greater use of the grievance procedure.

> "We have never filed a grievance but probably will soon. They trade on our good will. They're violating the intent of the agreement.
>
> "Our federation doesn't like to file a grievance unless we're 90 percent sure of winning. But we're being accused of being chicken by the superintendents and perhaps the director. So they can do what they like with us. Before, we've always just gone to the superintendents and settled issues. They haven't lived up to their promises to do staffing earlier. This is a source of irritation to elementary teachers who may be subjected to a transfer of 25 miles because of declining enrolment. They have repeatedly asked that this transfer process be done early because of the severe inconvenience to those so transferred" (an elementary teacher).

Some of the administrators had more mixed feelings about the single-team process and about the number of grievances it generated.

> "The climate today is friendlier. Single-team has done that, but some board members feel they've thrown away the baby with the bath water to get it. Some teachers would feel that they're cozying up to the board to get it" (an administrator).
>
> "The trustees believe that the reason we have all these problems is because we gave so much away (in single-team bargaining)" (an administrator).
>
> "Principals have not felt properly represented .The regulations state that principals are legally responsible for the students' safety when the school is open (from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. by board policy). The collective agreement, however, states that principals cannot delegate supervision except 15 minutes before and 30 minutes after classes" (an administrator).

Another criticism of single-team bargaining in Delta, voiced by both administrators and teacher representatives, was associated with the secrecy of the negotiating process. Because of a desire to avoid media reports of discussions in progress, and because of the need to explore radical alternatives without mooting them as proposals, many of the discussions went unreported to the negotiators' principals - the board, the administrators not involved in the single-team process, and the rank-and-file teachers. And because so much was left up in the air until the pre-established deadline for negotiations, there was some cynicism about the true nature of the process. The process was variously described as

> "Single-team boiled down to those two (chief negotiators) sitting over a beer at two o'clock and coming to an agreement" (an administrator).

> "Single-team is a non-business-like, time-wasting exercise until the last moment, when a few people cook up a deal" (an administrator).

The openness and sharing of information, essential in the single-team bargaining structure, was also seen by some administrators as a counterproductive process. The teachers, they felt, were questioning aspects of the budget they had no right to challenge and the teachers were trying to decide how the budget money would be spent, instead of the board. They also felt that although the agreement reached by single-team bargaining protected the teacher, it conflicted with program concerns as it was based solely on seniority considerations.

These administrators were prepared to concede that the relationship between the teacher federations and the administration had improved and that the single-team approach had helped. But they saw many problems with it and particularly with its ability to withstand inevitable changes in personalities, agendas, and goals of both teachers and trustees. They pointed out that a critical variable was the degree of trust that existed between members of the bargaining teams and their principals.

In 1980 new trustees, with a more conservative approach than the 'pro-teacher' board of the 1976-80 period, were elected. But the same trustee who had originally promoted single-team bargaining was still chairman of the Salary Committee and, therefore, the chief spokesman in the single-team process.

> "The disadvantage of single-team if you're doing it 'properly', is that you're not talking to the troops. So it is hard to sell a package to your principals. They have to trust the negotiatiors. That's why it's going down the tubes this year. (The chairman of the Salary Committee) will tell you the board doesn't trust her. Why?

> They feel the contracts were too good to teachers (last time). I suspect they now want to take a hard line" (a teacher).
>
> "It's going to turn more adversarial. My successor is a technical teacher. He's brusque. The board members are more conservative. (The director) is going to have a hard time keeping a cooperative enterprise going" (a teacher).
>
> "The next election will be critical. The liberals are disappearing. This year there are four trustees (on the bargaining team), two liberals and two conservatives, who can't agree. Also, when it comes to the vote, so many trustees have to declare a conflict of interest (there are many teachers serving as trustees) that only the farmers are left to vote" (a teacher).

In our interviews it was quite clear that the 'success', or lack thereof, of single-team bargaining was strongly related to the interviewees' beliefs about what should be in a collective agreement. Certain administrators felt that 'loosey-goosey,' consultative language should not be in collective agreements. But the former chairman of the Salary Committee saw the progressive inclusion of such language in the agreements following the 1977/9 arbitration awards as the major triumph of the single-team bargaining approach. And, while many administrators and principals saw themselves as restricted by these newer staffing and workload provisions, others viewed them as the finalization of rights that teachers should always have had.

Planning, Policies, and Administrative Practices

One early development in the new director's tenure was the initiation of a rolling five-year plan, a plan which was updated on an annual basis. This plan contained both general statements of direction, goals and strategies, as well as financial estimates associated with them. It was a public document, approved by the board and revised through representations to the board and the administrative council. The tight link between this document and the budgetary process reflected the director's own view that "...a budget is a philosophy in action".

From the outset, the director made explicit his commitment to fundamentally change both the style and substance of administrative practices within the board. In effect, he stated that collegiality would replace unilateral decision-making, openness would replace secrecy, and a 'flat', non-hierarchical organizational structure would replace the 'tall', multi-levelled structure which was in place under the previous director.

Before 1978, all budgetary inputs had been made solely by the three senior administrators, the director and the two senior superintendents. For example, all

capital spending decisions for the school were made by one superintendent according to unestablished and certainly unannounced criteria. The school was simply told how much it had been allocated. According to the previous chairman of the Salary Committee, the dispensation of these capital funds to principals by this superintendent soon came to be perceived as a personal reward system for those principals who pleased him. This practice generated a good deal of resentment amongst both principals and trustees who saw a patently unfair distribution of capital, with some schools being severely run down at the expense of others.

Following the new director's appointment, a program of budgetary decentralization was started. He and the superintendent of business and finance worked through the budgetary process with principals, vice-principals, and department heads. All school staffs prepared their own budgets with a knowledge of the county's budget and with an opportunity to press the case for their own budgetary requests through representations to the central administration. Capital funds were allocated through a committee consisting of principals and superintendents. Conference funds were administered by a joint committee of teachers, principals, and administrators.

Each week the administrative council, consisting of all superintendents and members of the elementary and secondary school principals' association, met to make management decisions and policy recommendations to the board. Teachers, administrators, students, trustees, and parent groups were invited to make special presentations on request.

The deliberations of the Finance Committee of the board were made much more public. Submissions were received from many groups, including federations, teachers, parents, and students. The budgeting process was totally open. A newly created Policy Advisory Committee (recently renamed the Joint Advisory Committee) consisted of trustees, federation representatives, principal representatives, custodians and secretaries, and the director. This served as the main joint consultative committee. Its purpose was to deal with policy suggestions from all sources and to initiate policy recommendations to submit to the board for approval.

There was a proliferation of joint committees and an opening-up of many, previously 'secret' processes. And much of this was incorporated into consultative language in the collective agreement because of changes made during single-team negotiations. Just how much actually changed, however, remained. One federation representative, for example, believed that it was all window-dressing, that nothing was really more open, but the process only made it appear so.

> "Two years ago a joint committee was set up to draw up policy, and to approve policy before it goes to the board. However, it has had no real influence. It has just rearranged the policy book, not changed anything major" (a teacher).

"The director is not open. All the superintendents have become secretive with information. They have the window-dressing: they appear to be open but really are more closed to our input. Maybe that's because they can't afford what we want, but I don't think so" (a teacher). .

CONTINUED MISTRUST

When we conducted our interviews, there seemed to be consensus that relationships between the federations and the board had improved since 1978, but there was still a significant amount of mistrust evident among the three groups - administration, trustees, and teachers. On the one hand, secondary teachers expressed satisfaction with the collaborative effort between them and the administration in closing a school. On the other hand, some teachers expressed mistrust of the new director and the administration.

"He is a very political animal...I haven't always trusted him... He has Ministry connections. He came in from the outside. (Two recent additions to the administration) came in from the Ministry lately. There is a split between them and the local (incumbent administrators). I'm waiting to see how long before it comes to blood as the 'locals' control the schools, but the others want some things to happen" (a teacher).

"The board felt very strongly that they were 'management', so that superintendents had to cover their asses. In (the neighbouring large city), the administration tells trustees what's good for the schools. It's the opposite here" (a federation officer).

"Surprisingly enough, it (single-team bargaining) does not remove the vestiges of mistrust that are there on the part of people who are involved, heavily, in negotiations. Negotiations eat people. I think there are a lot of people who have paid heavy prices over the years, in this and any board where there has been a strike. The hard feeling there probably never goes away, really" (the director).

"Distrust is not limited to relationships between teachers and the other parties. Distrust is still evident within the teacher group, and is directed against principals. Teachers thought the principals were more trustee-oriented than teacher-oriented in the past. That still has echoes in this year's grievances being lodged largely against principals" (a teacher).

> "I would say you are talking about growing pains in some sense. I would say you are talking about basic stupidity in others - of not recognizing the need for cooperative enterprise. The mutual enterprise can only be sustained as long as people believe it's more important than (their) organization" (the director).

There were several reasons why this mistrust continued, according to those interviewed for this study. They fell into three basic categories: structural, historical, and personal. Structurally, there remained a problem of the division of responsibilities for contract negotiation and contract administration. Through the single-team bargaining approach, a group of trustees - historically dominated by the chairman of the Salary Committee - negotiated language which was often less than precise. This 'fuzzy' language had then been interpreted by administrators and principals who had little to do with its formulation and may not have understood the intent of the agreement. There had not been a superintendent of personnel with involvement in both contract negotiation and administration.

> "It falls to the superintendent of operations to interpret the contract and I guess to apply that interpretation in any of the staffing (decisions). The current superintendent of operations was a secondary school principal in here on exchange this year. But it would be awfully difficult to have in negotiations a secondary school principal acting out an acting-role when he's part of the affiliate essentially. So the people who have been involved in the negotiations to this point would have been other superintendents. We do not have a superintendent of personnel" (the director).

The involvement of the administration in contract negotiation at all was a relatively new development.

> "I've prepared for the board a review of present collective agreements and the recommendations to the board through Salary Committee. It has not been the practice in the jurisdiction previously to do that. Basically it's been a matter of saying 'O.K., it's negotiation time.' Teachers have asked for negotiations. Tell us what you want this year. And I guess my position is what I'm saying, let's take a look at the contract. I don't believe in the term 'contract stripping'. It's used to some effect in some jurisdictions. If everything is negotiable, everything is negotiable, and let's remember that from both sides of the fence. There have been some substantial changes this year in the tentative pact with the

> elementary panel as a result of that. I think it was something that was a shock to them - that the board had position too - as opposed to just saying no you can't, no you can't, no you can't" (the director).

Many problems which arose in contract administration in Delta seem to have been the legacies of poorly thought-out administrative procedures used for many years, and which, despite the efforts to rewrite policies and manuals by the new director, had not yet been changed. Many of the personalities who were involved in the conflicts of the late seventies remained a part of the Delta system during the attempts to change the relationship. So, for example, the new director was quite slow to replace superintendents from the old administration, even though they were identified with conflict relationships with the federations and teachers in general. His preference - and that of the board - was to either organize around those people, by removing them from key positions of individual power and influence, or wait for them to retire. Why this happened, why there was slow action to change the people who were part of the 'old' system, was not all that clear to us. In part there was a problem of the absence of grounds to remove them from their positions and, therefore, concern about potential legal liabilities for wrongful dismissal. There was also a moral issue - was it right to take action against people who were only doing their best under the previous leadership?

Whatever the reason was, the fact was that the attempts to build new relationships in Delta took place with essentially the same group of administrators. True, the director of education had changed, and there was a board whom the teachers considered to be generally sympathetic. But the principals and many of the vice-principals were the same, the superintendents were still in place - and most of them were the same people who had been administrators during the earlier periods of sanctions.

THE STABILITY OF CHANGE IN THE DELTA BOARD OF EDUCATION

There were two distinct views of the future in the Delta County Board of Education when we last contacted people there. The first - the optimistic one - came from the former chairman of the Salary Committee of the board.

> "I believe that even though superficially the board may have reverted to attitudes more reminiscent of earlier reactionary times, that the framework and contract changes which were made in the 79/80 and 81/82 boards were sufficient to retain the essence of of a more collegial style management.

> "I believe that these changes are so structurally commonplace and visible by now that they will remain virtually unchallenged by new boards or managements. I refer to the complex and collegial budget building procedures (both at the board level and the individual school level), the terms of reference governing the operations of the major committees, the external salary determinations of middle and upper management by Hay Associates, and the number of pre-crisis bargaining opportunities afforded by collective agreements.
>
> "In addition there are now various sub-committees which are well established, such as the Joint Advisory Committee, the Employee Assistance Committee, and the Affirmative Action Task Force Committee.
>
> "It is my contention that this basically collegial framework is so obvious that it has become invisible and therefore less assailable. It is, thus, the means through which inventive employees and enlightened trustees will continue to work collegially as an inherent part of their system, both consciously and unconsciously."

This contention that the changes which were made were irreversible, conflicted with the sense of fragility and instability in the existing relationship expressed less eloquently, but nevertheless with conviction, by others who were interviewed for this study, including the director of education:

> "The moment you carry the seeds forward the same types of things are going to grow again, and any time the administration interprets something not to the liking of the people involved in the district or in the region (federation) then it becomes a matter of 'those bad guys they're doing it again to us.' Then for every ten steps forward you take, if you stumble on one in somebody's interpretation, all the benefits of the ten are wiped out and you are back to where you were before."

1. A proprietary system of salary administration developed by Hay Associates.

7

Analysis of Cases

The previous four chapters have described situations in which efforts were made to change federation-board relationships. In two cases, Alpha and Beta, the relationships changed quite dramatically over several years and appeared to have stabilized. In Alpha, open warfare was supplanted by a tough, adversarial, but orderly relationship in bargaining, coupled with some significant cooperation in day-to-day relationships. It was not a cooperative relationship, but it was allowing the parties to get on with the jobs of managing a school board and teaching. In Beta, traditional bargaining had been abandoned in favor of the 'single-team' approach and, outside of the formal bargaining arena, there was a very high level of participative management and involvement of teachers in many aspects of the management of the system. Both represented major changes, although the end results were in stark contrast to each other.

The changes which took place in Gamma and Delta were more modest in nature. There was an end to overt conflict and even some limited development of cooperation. But the changes were fragmentary and seem to lack the scope and depth which characterized the changes in Alpha and Beta. Furthermore, the changes in Gamma and Delta appeared to be comparatively unstable.

The overall relationship between a union and management has been described as existing somewhere on a continuum from conflict, through containment-aggression (or a state of armed truce), to accommodation (or acceptance of the other party), to cooperation, and possibly to collusion at the other extreme. (1) Our four cases could be mapped on this continuum: all were examples of conflict at the outset; Beta moved to cooperation, Alpha and Delta to accommodation, while Gamma appeared to be locked into a relationship which was teetering on the edge of conflict.

FIGURE 7.1

Change in Federation-Board Relationships					
	CONFLICT	CONTAIN-MENT/ AGGRESSION	ACCOM-MODATION	CO-OPERATION	COLLUSION
BEFORE	Alpha Beta Gamma Delta				
AFTER		Gamma	Alpha Delta	Beta	

As a relationship moves from conflict to cooperation there is an increasing amount of trust between the parties, each acknowledges the legitimacy of the other's role, there is a cooperative rather than competitive orientation to their behaviors, and people on each side start to like each other more. At the extreme - collusion - the parties lose sight of the interests of those they represent and the maintenance of the relationship becomes an end in itself.

The purpose of this chapter is to seek explanations for the changes we observed in these four school boards, both those leading to conflict and the changes which were attempted as a result of this conflict. To do this we have looked at various theories of change; social change, organizational change, individual change, and specific theories associated with change in the area of union-management relations.

SOCIAL CHANGE

As one looks at the whole position of teachers in society through the sixties and seventies, there was clearly a change in the relationship between teachers as a group and school boards as employers. In part, of course, teachers merely reflected the expectations of a new generation of employees who had been raised in affluence for an ever-increasing standard of living, better working conditions and decreasing hours of work. These employees were more highly educated and taught to question the values of the previous generation, including the right of management to make unilateral decisions.

The phenomenally fast rate of growth within the teaching profession, including the trend toward 'comprehensive' education in the province of Ontario, brought many such 'new' employees into the school system. Their values differed from the traditional teacher values, and certainly were at variance with the values held by many board members and more senior teachers who were then in administrative positions. A sort of generation-gap emerged, one that was reflected in a basic conflict, not of objectives or 'ends', but of the 'means' whereby those objectives were to be achieved.

Historically, school boards employed teachers so that they could achieve the goals or objectives of the public as reflected in the policy direction established by the trustees and in the operational decisions of the administrators. Traditionally, school boards had exerted a form of normative power over their employees. (2) They were able to draw heavily on the shared values and beliefs of teachers - their commitment to achieving educational objectives. Nowhere was this truer than among separate school teachers where the commitment to a Catholic education was high. The boards also had a form of remunerative power, but it was not based chiefly on money. The rewards that the teachers valued were the respect of the community, the intrinsic rewards from doing a highly professional teaching job, and the prestige associated with belonging to a respected profession. The boards had no physical power over teachers, but could expel a non-compliant member for a number of transgressions (much like excommunication of heretics in the church in earlier times). Teachers were morally involved with the school system, and there was a congruence between this moral involvement and the normative power which was the primary compliance force in the school system. They identified highly with the stated aims of education. Many looked upon teaching as a calling for which they did not demand to be highly paid. They certainly did not feel coerced into staying in a board's employ, and alienative involvement was far from the norm.

There was always a certain amount of deviation from the situation described above. A number of teachers had always been concerned with salaries and their involvement was more calculative. Certainly it was this group which spurred the formation of the teachers' federations. In the sixties, however, the large influx of

'new generation' teachers caused a shift in emphasis from moral to calculative involvement. There was a shift in the value system of teachers as a group, a shift from a basically moral involvement to a more calculative one. The new generation teacher valued the extrinsic rewards of teaching such as salaries, benefits, and job advancement or security, more highly than the older generation.

The boards were not prepared to deal with this change and some reacted with outrage to what they saw as the 'immoral' behavior of teachers. Problems ensued in the form of strikes, walkouts, and other sanctions, until a new compliance structure emerged - one based largely on remunerative power exercised by the board and calculative involvement by the teachers.

Clearly, not all of the present-day compliance by teachers is based on remuneration. There is still a good deal of moral involvement, but the general feeling - among both teachers and administrators - is that it has diminished, and calculative involvement is more prominent than before.

Certainly this appeared to be the case in Alpha where the relationship moved from conflict to accommodation on the basis of remunerative power and calculative involvement. However, in the Beta situation, there seemed to be a new form of normative compliance base evolving. The involvement of many of the teachers in planning, budgeting, program development, curriculum change, staffing, and other decisions seemed to be producing a resurgence of this moral involvement. In the view of many of those interviewed in Beta, this moral involvement was being reflected in: a greater commitment to the educational objectives of the board; greater creativity on the part of the teaching staff, who loved to be able to use these creative abilities; and an overall preparedness to 'go the extra mile' to deliver the educational product.

At the same time, there was a real consciousness of the dangers involved in either deliberately exploiting this moral involvement or even in appearing to be doing so. Much attention was being paid to ensuring that remuneration remained competitive so that the conditions were right to foster the growth of moral involvement. Any sense that they were being exploited would not allow either of the parties to pursue the establishment of this new compliance-involvement basis. In Delta, for example, there was the feeling expressed by some administrators that the federation was exploiting an effort to build a new relationship based on shared-power in order to maximize monetary and 'rights' gains. This feeling was blocking the development of a different relationship based on normative power and moral involvement rather than remunerative power and calculative involvement. And, in both the Alpha and Delta cases, the relationship appeared to be moving more towards calculative involvement and remunerative power.

ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE

Kurt Lewin, (3) a psychologist, suggested that behavioral change progresses through three stages; **unfreezing**, in which the pressure from a current situation or change agent produces enough dissatisfaction so that resistance is overcome and a desire to learn new behavior is created; **change** which involves exposure to new information, attitudes and theories so that new perceptions and behavior patterns can be learned and which also involves gathering and interpreting both new and existing information, developing alternative courses of action, and developing a method of choosing among alternatives; and **refreezing** which includes reinforcement, confirmation and integration of the new behavior into the individual's personality and attitude systems.

Although this model was developed to apply to individual change, it has been widely used to describe organizational change as well. It forms the basis of modern change theory and its influence can be detected in the two major schools of change models which have developed. We have called these **adaptation** models and **planned** change models.

Adaptation Models

There are several models which describe common processes by which organizations adapt to perceived problems. Within this category, a distinction can be made between models meant to describe **incremental** change and those describing more **radical** change situations.

The Garbage Can Model: One of the best known incremental models carries the unusual but nevertheless highly evocative label of the 'Garbage-Can' model of organizational choice. (4) This model sees a change decision as flowing from the random convergence of several events or influences. It is so called because the authors see that a choice opportunity is like a garbage can into which certain problems and solutions are dumped by participants. More specifically, the model summarizes the four streams of influences as problems, solutions, participants, and choice opportunities. **Problems** are the concerns of people inside and outside the organization. Problems are distinct from choices and they may not be resolved when choices are made. **Solutions** are the products of people. They are answers looking for questions. **Participants** come and go. Substantial variation in participation stems from other demands on the participants' time. **Choice opportunities** are occasions when an organization is expected to produce behavior called a decision. Opportunities arise regularly and any organization has ways of declaring an occasion for choice.

This model does not predict whether a change decision arising from this process will persist. No judgments about the quality of the decision are made,

although presumably it could just as well turn out to be maladaptive as adaptive. Furthermore, it only really deals with "unfreezing". It offers no guidance about how the decision is subsequently implemented or reinforced. It is strictly descriptive in that it attempts to represent what **really** goes on in organizations rather than what **should** go on.

Alpha and Delta seem to be illustrative of this 'Garbage Can' model of organizational change. In Alpha the events and changes appeared to be the outcome of the interaction of participants, problems, solutions and opportunities in a rather random fashion. Problems were in abundance: there were severe labor disruptions in the form of mass resignation, strikes, litigation, and extended mediation sessions; there was a bad fit between the militant group of teachers and the other two power groups, namely a conservative untrained group of trustees and a surprised and also largely untrained administration; there were externally imposed financial constraints at a time of soaring teacher expectations; there was an initial absence of legislation to meet new bargaining challenges; there was a lack of time between bargaining rounds; there were perceptions of bad faith and/or incompetence on both sides; and others.

These problems, although different in some respects, were not unique to the Alpha situation. What was unique was the stream of participants. The composition of the board of trustees shifted over the period in question from those involved as community service (largely professional people), to those involved from personal or vested interest (largely teachers, retired teachers, parents, etc.) The composition of the administration shifted as well, from a group quite untrained in management towards a more professional cadre when key members were added or replaced. The teachers' representatives changed over time too, going from naive but enthusiastic negotiators, to the addition of a skilled professional negotiator, to a trained group without the need of a professional negotiator.

All of these shifts had implications for the solutions that were offered up at various times when choices had to be made. The solutions favored by the first group of trustees were hard-line management rights. Their solutions only escalated the conflict. A new group of naive trustees was elected, but the members of this group did not have any solutions to the problems and so they were walked over by the well-organized teacher group. By the time of the last set of negotiations, they felt no confidence in their solutions and had given over their tasks to a professional negotiator. The solution offered by the first set of administrators was unilateral top-down imposition of rules. When this did not work, new administrators were brought in and old ones retired or were shifted to new jobs. The solutions of these new participants were a more consultative management style, less stubbornness, and a more professional approach to bargaining. These solutions seemed to fit better with the problem set and with the other participants, especially as the trustees at this point had largely withdrawn from choice opportunities.

The solutions of the teachers were to be militant, discredit the other side, and to force it into submission. This worked for a time and so was retained beyond its usefulness, even according to key teacher participants. Eventually the teachers changed solutions to more accommodation without changing participants as drastically as the other groups. They developed their own negotiating expertise instead, although initially they had to buy it outside.

Outsiders' solutions also entered into the garbage can upon occasion. The governments' impositions of spending ceilings and wage and price guidelines, of bargaining legislation and of specific interventions such as mediation, changed the range of possible solutions that could be considered when choice opportunities arose. Outside solutions in the form of recession and weakening demand for teachers had their positive impact on the board's position, but were really problems not solutions for the teachers.

The choice opportunities focussed on in the cases were contract negotiations. These are highly visible occasions with far reaching consequences. They can seldom be avoided even if they may be counterproductive as they were at times in Alpha when one set was not finished before another was scheduled to begin, leading to a breathless dysfunctional pace. Interventions by outside participants with their imposed solutions, such as the Anti-Inflation Board and Bill 100, provided the breathing space between choice opportunities which allowed the participants a period of tranquility and truce vital to compromise.

The 'Garbage Can' model does not make predictions of success or stability. Success and stability will occur only if the solutions, problems, and participants continue to be in harmony. The participants in Alpha themselves had an uneasy feeling about their solutions and their continuing applicability. They expressed doubts about whether the relationship had been developed far enough and about its stability. When the next set of severe problems come along, the outcomes will depend on their confluence with the participants, solutions and choice opportunities in the garbage can of the moment. It is a haphazard process.

In Delta, the process was much the same. Problems in the form of contract difficulties, a work-to-rule campaign and a strike, exerted pressure on the organization. Participant and solution streams interacted with the choice opportunities (negotiations) to produce outcomes which may or may not have solved the problems, and may have led to unintended consequences and thus further problems.

For example, in the set of negotiations which led up to the lockout/strike of 1978, an 'old guard' trustee group and an administration characterized in the director's words as narrow and paternalistic, clashed with a militant teacher group determined to win salary increases and better working conditions. The solutions favored by the trustees and administrators were to maintain 'management rights' at all costs, to hire a professional negotiator to take a firm stand, and to use force if necessary to achieve their ends (as in the examination jurisdiction dispute). The teachers' solutions were

to meet force with resistance, to use the media to discredit the board and thereby to attempt to win concessions. Neither side considered developing new techniques or policies together. Each was out to force its solutions on the other. But the success of one party only meant the escalation of the other's desire to 'get even'. Conflict was prolonged in this manner.

When the participants changed - the director resigned and was replaced and a new group of trustees was elected, many with teacher support - different solutions were put forward. The chairman of the salary negotiating committee and the director both favored single-team bargaining and the teachers did not object to it, so it was decided upon as the new solution to be tried at the next choice opportunity, the 1980 negotiations. The legacy of mistrust from previous choice opportunities however, had conditioned the participants to be cautious and not too cooperative.

Whether or not this type of bargaining will be a stable change in Delta depends again on the confluence of problems, participants and solutions in the garbage can at the next choice opportunity. Even more than in Alpha, the participants seemed to have uneasy feelings about their future relationship. The organization seemed also to be less in control of its destiny than in Alpha where a critical mass of participants had adopted a basically similar set of solutions to solve their problems.

The Organizational Crisis Model: A second form of adaptation model, appropriate to represent a more radical change situation, is the 'Organizational Crisis' model of change. (5) According to this model, the human system - and, by extension, an organization - passes through several phases as it adapts to a crisis situation. **Shock** occurs with initial awareness of a threat to the organization's survival. Individuals become self-centered and engage in little communication. Planning is suspended except for that required to cope with very immediate results of the crisis. **Defensive retreat** focuses on survival of the organization by falling back on traditional approaches such as increased centralization and control. Short-term planning and goal-setting may result in actions detrimental to the long-term health of the organization. In-group loyalties prevent effective communication with other groups. **Acknowledgement** occurs when accusation and blame give way to acceptance of joint responsibility for the existence of the crisis and for its resolution. Communication, tentative solutions, and longer-term planning begin. **Adaptation and change** result from genuine interdependence, effective communication, and a commitment to follow the diagnosis of problems through to effective action.

This descriptive model covers only unfreezing and changing. It does not deal with refreezing. With it, a change agent can diagnose how far the organization has progressed and can help it along towards resolution.

In Gamma the environmental pressures were even more severe than in the other cases and took on many of the characteristics of a crisis or natural disaster. In all change models, dissatisfaction or crisis is seen as necessary, whether the

subsequent process followed is planned 'rationally' or not. The organization's response process depends partially upon whether the dissatisfaction or crisis is perceived as a dilemma or an opportunity to work toward a desired state.

Crises may result from a combination of events in the environment and defects within an organization. Ironically, these organizational defects may once have been changes hailed as successes in the organization but which now induce rigidity in the face of new situations. There may also be defects of communication, isolation, or over-centralization which also lessen flexibility in responding to problems before they blow up into crises.

This is just what had happened in Gamma prior to the strike and ensuing trauma. The French-English problem, the huge amalgamation difficulties, and power struggles among all groups called for the direction of a strong leader. The director was just that, but over time other changes took place in the environment and in the participant groups which made his leadership style a defect in their eyes.

Shock and a feeling of threat to the survival of the Gamma R.C.S.S.B., (the first stage in the crisis model), is not too strong a description for the trauma induced by the contract negotiations and strike of 1980. Guilt over the discrepancy between behavior and religious philosophy, revulsion against their own violent impulses, a strong sense of the immorality of strike action, and fear that the Catholic high school might not survive were all felt by some trustees and administrators. The very foundations upon which the separate school system were built had been shaken. Teaching used to be looked upon as a vocation almost like taking religious vows, and the inherent good of sacrificing salaries for the good of the system was a commonly held value. During this crisis people stopped communicating and indulged in self-centered behaviors such as name calling matches in the press. No planning was in evidence during this period.

Defensive retreat (the second stage) followed, and the trustees and administration tried to fall back on the traditional approaches to solving the strike by trying to hire strike breakers and by invoking administrative solidarity and control over the principals. The teacher group also made a bid for the principals' loyalty and gained it. This focus on short term measures to deal with the crisis at hand (school closure) did indeed have long term detrimental effects as the breach between principals and administrators had not yet been healed, several years after the strike. There was a strong feeling that one had to take sides. The director demanded it, and the federations and trustee subgroups demanded it of their members as well. This situation polarized the system for a long time and some polarization remained, years later, despite changes in director, trustees and negotiators.

Acknowledgement of joint responsibility for the existence and the resolution of the crisis had just begun to take hold in Gamma at the time this study started. The new director put communication as his first priority. He went around to all of the schools to give and receive input from all members of the organization regardless of hierarchical position. There was a commitment developing which might have led

to cautious experimenting with better relationships and bargaining behavior. A new procedure to develop board policy was put in place as a tentative solution to some of the problems, and superintendents were starting to work together. People expressed a cautious optimism that some headway was being made, but they were not certain it would not be interrupted by another crisis. Clearly Gamma had not yet entered the fourth stage of the crisis model where there is adaptation, effective communication and a commitment to follow diagnosis of problems through to effective action.

Planned Change Models

Whereas the models described above seek only to **explain** change, there is a literature on organizational change which deals with **interventionist** efforts to actually change things. Two different approaches can be identified - **prescriptive** and **heuristic.**

In one of the best known prescriptive models Beckhard (6) assumes that the change effort will be planned either by an outside consultant or an internal change agent. The model describes a process that the organization should follow in order to promote effective change. This process is summarized in sets of key questions that the organization must ask itself under the following five headings.

> **Defining the Change Problem** - Information must be collected from various parts of the organization as perceptions about the need for change can vary. The type and location of the needed change should be identified.
>
> **Determining Readiness and Capability for Change** - Dissatisfaction with the current state of affairs must be strong enough to mobilize energy toward change. If not, dissatisfaction may be increased. In addition, a clear picture of the desired state is necessary at this point.
>
> **Identifying the Change Agent's Own Resources and Motivations for the Change** - Whether or not the consultant or change agent has the necessary skills and what type of role he should play in the intervention should be determined.
>
> **Determining the Intermediate Change Strategy and Goals** - These provide a target and a measuring point en route to a larger change objective.
>
> **Maintaining Change** - Early success helps but a continued feedback and information system is critical.

This model is comprehensive, including unfreezing, changing, and refreezing phases. Diagnostic and implementation techniques are recommended with the underlying assumption that they will promote effective change of either a radical or an incremental type.

Heuristic models are somewhat similar to prescriptive ones in that they also provide a planning guide, the chief difference being their claim of actual empirical validation. Greiner (7) associated the successful change efforts with the presence of the following factors:

- The organization, and especially top management is under considerable external pressure for improvement. Performance, and/or morale are low.
- A new person, known for his or her ability to introduce improvements, enters the organization, either as the official head of the organization, or as a consultant.
- An initial act of the new person is to encourage a reexamination of past practices.
- The head of the organization and his or her immediate subordinates assume a direct and highly involved role in conducting this reexamination.
- The new person, with top management support, engages several levels of the organization in collaborative, fact-finding, problem-solving discussions to identify and diagnose current organization problems.
- The new person provides others with new ideas and methods for developing solutions to problems, again at many levels of the organization.
- The solutions and decisions are developed, tested, and found credible for solving problems on a small scale before an attempt is made to widen the scope of change to larger problems and the entire organization.
- The change effort spreads with each success experience, and as management support grows, it is gradually

> absorbed permanently into the organization's way of operating.

In one formulation of the rational change model, Beer (8) states that successful change can occur:

> "...only when sufficient (relative to the cost of change) dissatisfaction exists with the status quo by those who must change, when there is a new and clearly defined approach to managing the organization which is believed will solve the problems, and when the process for managing the change is sufficiently well planned, incorporates appropriate assumptions about change, and includes effective methods. Many organizational changes falter when one or more of these elements is not present in sufficient quantity or one of them is totally absent."

Although some of these conditions were met by all four cases, only Beta met all necessary conditions in that there was a clearly defined approach to managing the organization and the change process. Indeed, there is almost a perfect fit between the eight steps in Greiner's model of change and the Beta case. First, the board and its top management was indeed under significant external pressure from the community, the media, the federations, and even the government during the strike of 1975, before the major changes in relationship and policy were contemplated. Performance of the Administrative Council was low, as evidenced by the attempts made by many groups to by-pass it. The Administrative Council isolated itself more and more and seemed to flounder instead of trying to find a solution to underlying problems. The result of this pressure was the withdrawal of both the chairman and director from leadership roles, both under tragic circumstances.

Not just one but two new people entered the picture. A new chairman was instrumental in commissioning the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education (O.I.S.E.) study which provided one diagnosis of the Beta's problems. Then a new director was hired, with a mandate to introduce improvements. The new chairman's first act in her new role was to encourage a reexamination of the whole system while the director's was to commit himself to conducting a thorough review of all areas of board policy and operations in a consultative mode. These commitments to reexamination were carried out by the chairman and director personally, aided by the superintendents, the director's immediate subordinates.

Several levels of the organization collaborated to develop selection criteria for the new director. They also collaborated in the fact-finding mission taken on by the director as his first priority. For example, one such task in the mission was to "clarify the role and responsibilities of senior administration." This task involved

finding out what they were actually doing now, what they should be doing, and how to reduce the discrepancy between the two.

There was extensive consultation during the first years of the director's term including consultation with the federation representatives, principals and vice-principals, other teachers, trustees, and community leaders.

Many new ideas and methods for developing solutions to the problems were introduced. The director's ideas were garnered from the many management training courses he had taken and from his mentors in previous positions. The solutions were not generally tested on a small scale before their scope was widened as Greiner suggests. System-wide changes were made instead of being piloted in specific schools for example. However, Greiner's recommendation in this regard is more applicable to divisionalized companies than to a centralized and largely homogeneous operation like a small school board.

Finally, there was an extensive 'folding-in' of the new ways of doing things in the form of policies and practices, as well as changes in the collective agreements. People were promoted who 'bought-in' to this new way of doing things and, if they did not, they were moved aside. The reward system, the extensive training and development program, and other organizational systems were adjusted to support the desired, emergent relationship.

THE DYNAMICS OF UNION-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS

While the models described above deal with individual and organizational change, they have been adapted to serve as the basis of theory building in the dynamics of union-management relations. In his highly influential book on labor relations, Tom Kochan (9) stated six basic propositions about change in union-management relations:

> 1. Unions and employers will be reluctant to embark on significant efforts to change their established practices unless there are strong external and internal pressures to do so. Inertia must be overcome and, if things are running smoothly, people will not want to "rock the boat".
>
> 2. Both parties must see it in their self-interest to change in the direction being promoted. Alternatively, one party must see significant costs of failing to go along with the other's change efforts.
>
> 3. The implementation of any change involves major political risks to both union and management representatives. These risks must be managed. People will resist such changes for a variety of

reasons, and the political leaders of management and union groups must be able to anticipate and overcome this resistance.

4. The change must deliver the promised goods. People in diverse interest groups must be able to see tangible results from any changes if they are to be encouraged to pursue further change efforts. The change process is effectively energized or fueled by its own success.

5. The role of the union leaders at this stage is fraught with difficulties since they must walk the tightrope between appearing to be the source of the benefits yet remaining independent and uncoopted by management. This implies that either management or some third-party (government, consultant, mediator, or other) will be the driving force behind change at the implementation phase so that union leaders can avoid the political risk associated with changing the status quo.

6. Over the long run, successful efforts must be integrated with the formal collective bargaining and contract administration processes. Collective bargaining is too established for people to believe that it can be replaced by something which is seen as an alternative to collective bargaining.

Each of our four cases demonstrates, to a greater or lesser extent, the six propositions about the dynamics of union-management change described earlier in the first section of this paper.

The first of these propositions is that external and internal pressures to change must be felt before change itself can take place. In all four cases there was considerable external pressure to change the relationship because of the weight of public opinion resulting from strike action. This was probably strongest in Gamma, where the Catholic community saw the strike as a fundamental attack on Catholicity and where there was a very real fear of loss of students to the public school system if such actions were repeated. Perhaps it was less in Alpha, where the familiarity with the industrial model was greatest. However, the offsetting factor in Alpha was the frequency with which strikes and lock-outs had occurred and - even for strike-inured residents of Alpha - it was clear that something was fundamentally wrong with the relationship. There was additional pressure on Alpha from the direct intervention of the Minister of Education as well as several well-publicized fact finder's reports which drew further public attention to the state of the relationship.

In Delta the pressure on the parties to change was probably greatest on the board and resulted from the landmark arbitration award which followed a fact finder's

report, and which clearly indicated how far behind the Delta board was in areas such as working conditions.

Although there was some pressure from public opinion in Beta, the main pressure seemed to come from inside the board itself, particularly from the new chairman supported by other, relatively new trustees. The same was evident in Delta where the influx of many new liberal, teacher-oriented trustees and the control of key committees by this faction generated pressure to change the relationship. In both of these cases there was a clear 'champion' of change - a person who crusaded for change with considerable energy. In the Beta case change was strongly supported by the new director of education as it was to a significant, but lesser extent, in Delta.

It was only really in Alpha that there was much initial pressure to change from the teachers. In Alpha, the teacher's lawyer claims to have been the first to have mooted a desire to alter the nature of the relationship, but he feels that this was initially rebuffed by the trustees. In all four cases limited, guarded support for a changed relationship from federation officials developed as the process got under way and people were able to identify their self-interests and see some tangible results of the lowered levels of overt hostility and conflict.

In Alpha, the internal pressure to change the relationship stemmed from the new director of personnel and the director of education. They clearly saw the superordinate goal of an accommodative relationship, perhaps with elements of real cooperation. Internally they pressed both administrators and trustees to lower the levels of rhetoric, to improve contract administration, to listen to teachers, and to take other appropriate actions based on fairness rather than a strict, to-the-letter application of the collective agreement and the unilateral exercise of management rights.

In Beta in particular, the pressure to continue trying to build a different relationship gathered steam as success was experienced and the internal pressures strengthened. As a comparison, in Delta, these internal pressures waned as administrators ran into problems with the consequences of the changed relationship and as the liberal, teacher-oriented trustees were replaced with more fiscally conservative trustees.

In Gamma, the only real source of internal pressure appeared to be the new director who was less able than the directors of either the Beta or Delta boards to articulate and turn into solid programs his vision of a changed relationship. There was general support for his approach from the trustees but they were still so divided among themselves that this did not coalesce into strong pressure for change.

The second of Kochan's propositions suggests that either or both parties must see it in their self-interest to change in the direction promoted or one party must see a significant cost in not going along with the change promoted by the other.

The idea of 'parties' is hard to relate to in these cases. It implies that the trustee group, the administration, the federations, are somehow monolithic entities, thinking and acting as entities. This was simply not the situation in any of the four

cases. There were some trustees, some administrators, some teachers who saw the change in their self-interests, others who did not. Indeed, the 'parties' were so non-monolithic as to throw the whole idea of homogeneous parties into some question.

The self-interests served were also of many different types. In the Alpha case it was economic self-interest on the part of the teachers - following the lock-out - which indicated that a change in strategy and tactics was appropriate. In Beta and Delta, the teachers clearly saw some real potential for gain either in monetary compensation or improved staffing and working conditions. However, there were also individual teachers who saw the potential for realizing greater intrinsic rewards, such as an opportunity to develop themselves and gain a sense of satisfaction from doing a more professional job, from working under an improved relationship.

In both Beta and Gamma, the principals and vice-principals saw very considerable gains from improved relationships since they were in extremely difficult positions during periods of sanctions, and they were caught in the role-conflict of being both management and federation members.

In all four cases, some people in administration or on the boards of trustees saw change as in their self interest, but others did not. Self interest was most often served in terms of fulfillment of beliefs and/or values, rather than tangible gains, although in the Beta board there was a strong and explicit faith that the improved relationship would result in higher educational quality.

The differences between the boards might be best characterized as a matter of the scope of this perceived benefit. In the Beta board it was widespread, i.e. many or most of the trustees and administrators perceived benefits. In the Delta board it was narrow, confined mainly to three or four trustees and, among the administrators it was only the director who was really sold on the idea of single team bargaining. In the Alpha board it spread gradually as the relationship was perceived to change for the better and the results were seen to be positive. In the Gamma board it was primarily the new director who saw tangible benefits for himself if the relationship could be changed around. There was little evidence that others in either the administration or management saw great enough benefits to offset the costs (in concessions) that they thought the changed relationship would result in.

The third of Kochan's propositions is that the implementation of change involves major political risks to both union and management representatives. For change to be successful it must be managed so that the leaders desiring change can anticipate and overcome resistance to change.

This was clearly the situation for federation officials in three of the cases, but particularly in the two single-team bargaining situations. All federation officials in Beta and Delta expressed concern over the fine line between cooperation and collusion and the perception of the uninvolved rank-and-file about their activities. And there was a clear difference in the way in which this problem was managed in these two boards. In Beta there was a great sensitivity to the issue by both the administration and trustees and the teacher representatives. As a result they kept the

single-team bargaining activities as open as possible, ensuring that the groups were large, that they changed in composition, and that 'outsiders' - not normally members of bargaining committees - were invited in occasionally to see that everything was above board. On the other hand, in Delta these single-team sessions were allowed to degenerate into quiet meetings between key negotiators with the risks that they would be accused of 'cooking up some deal'.

Also, in Beta, there was a great deal of involvement by large numbers of teachers in various committees to 'co-manage' aspects of the school system. This widespread involvement served to reduce the sense that the relationship was becoming unhealthily cosy or collusive. Despite all of these things, the federation officers in Beta were continually fending off accusations that they were being co-opted against the interests of their memberships. The clear distinction between Beta and the other boards was that this political risk was identified long before the changes were implemented and key administrators - particularly the director - had identified where the problems would be and had developed the strategies to deal with them.

Nowhere was the political issue more apparent than in the Gamma situation where the teachers' chief negotiator during the strike was running hard for senior provincial office. Although personally interested in developing a more cooperative relationship, he was also acutely aware of the need to maintain a note of militance since this was expected of him by the other local federations in the province.

Political sensitivities were not confined to teacher groups. Within the trustee groups there were many who saw themselves as defenders of the taxpayers and were therefore unwilling to engage in any kind of relationship change which increased costs to the board. This was most noticeable in Delta, where the board swung sharply from fiscal conservatism, to liberalism, and back to conservatism. In Gamma there were diehard trustees who were defenders of management rights and who did not feel that they could take the political risk of appearing to be soft on basic issues that were at the roots of the teachers' problems with the board. And, within the administrations, there were clearly some superintendents who had aligned themselves with certain groups of trustees to resist changes being promoted by other administrators aligned to different factions within the trustee group. This was particularly evident in Delta where the director was clearly aligned with the 'liberals' and at least two of the superintendents whom we interviewed were aligned with the 'conservatives'. To some extent this may have been a reflection of the fact that the new director had been selected by a 'liberal' selection committee and had leapfrogged over the backs of more experienced administrators to get his position.

The fourth proposition suggests that for a change to be implemented beyond the first steps, it must actually deliver the promised goods. There must be tangible results if there is to be sustained energizing of the change process.

It is this proposition that is most clearly exemplified by the Beta case. First, the director in Beta announced an explicit set of objectives that he sought to reach, and a timetable for reaching them. He prepared regular reports on the progress

toward meeting these objectives. He kept people - trustees, his own administrators, teachers, principals and vice-principals, parents - constantly updated on what was taking place. He celebrated the successes, thereby energizing continued change. There were very real benefits to the federations. Improvement in staffing, better working conditions, greater job security, more 'due process' types of contractual language, and above-average salary and benefits gains.

The administration and trustees of the Beta board believed that they paid back the costs of these changes from improved productivity as a result of the improved relationship, the elimination of positions such as 'consultant' (since teacher committees have taken over many such functions), and other gains. The improvements desired by the teachers in contract language have not hampered the board's ability to be fiscally responsible to the taxpayers. What is critical is that the board and the teachers involved in the new bargaining relationship were able to deal with objections to their innovative relationship on the basis of clear, tangible gains. Furthermore, as they achieved gains so they tried more innovations.

There were similar gains in Delta, but to a lesser extent. The gains the federations made in staffing and working conditions were largely attributed to the impact of the arbitration award rather than to single-team bargaining and the federations were keenly aware of the desire of many trustees to roll-back the gains they had made. The superintendents we interviewed in this board perceived a definite loss of their authority and power and, therefore, were either luke-warm toward the changes or actually opposed them.

In Alpha, the accommodative relationship got both the teachers and the board out of a continuous and destructive cycle of conflict which had been increasingly perceived as a 'no-win' scenario by everyone involved in it. The absence of overt conflict and better day-to-day working relationships were seen as tangible benefits by all the administrators interviewed as well as some of the trustees who were seen.

It is really only in Gamma that there was very little sense of any gains from the changing relationships. The teachers and the trustees interviewed saw very little tangible benefit from an improved relationship, at least in material terms. There was a feeling from the trustees we interviewed that the price paid for peace was too great. And the teachers were very wary of the price that they thought the trustees might try to exact from them. Only some of the administrators were warming to the new, non-confrontational relationship which had some real benefits for them in reducing the amount of conflict they had to deal with and allowed them to do a better job professionally.

Kochan's fifth proposition suggests that the major risks are to the union leaders and that it is the role of management and government which is critical to getting change implemented.

Clearly, in the two cases of single-team bargaining, managements took the initiative and developed programs to change the relationship. The federations were

more passive, going along with the changes, associating themselves with the benefits, yet cooperating with some reserve. This reserve was more pronounced in Delta than in Beta, for the reasons mentioned above. Both Beta and Delta used outside consultants, the former extensively, the latter only at the very earliest stages of their planned change. The use of top, world-renowned consultants provided some additional influence for the teachers in Beta. They were able to defend their cooperation as warranted in view of the manifest benefits of an improved, problem-solving relationship as found in many other organizations and not just as going along with something that the administration or board wanted to do.

The sixth and final proposition is that any changes in relationship must be integrated with the formal, collective bargaining relationship. This suggests that efforts to side-step collective bargaining, to put in an alternative, will be unsuccessful since it will be seen as an attempt to suborn the accepted, legitimate process of bargaining.

It is clear that in the Gamma case the trustees saw a cooperative relationship as antithetical to collective bargaining. They viewed collective bargaining as appropriate for distributive bargaining - for carving up whatever 'pie' existed. They seemed unwilling to recognize that problems may be solved within the bargaining context. To some extent this lack of sophistication in understanding the multi-dimensional nature of bargaining is reflected in the administration of Gamma, the teachers and federation officials themselves, as well as among the trustees. It contrasted quite sharply with the approach in Beta which viewed cooperation as quite consistent with collective bargaining and where formal bargaining structures coexisted with a large number of committees, task forces, and other groups working on cooperative tasks.

In Alpha the relationship was still mainly adversarial with most consultation taking place within the traditional arenas of formal collective bargaining and grievance settlement. However, the parties had matured to the point where they were able to cooperate when there was clearly some joint benefit to be derived, and they were able to engage in the appropriate behaviors within the overall collective bargaining framework.

In Delta there appeared to be many points of view about the coexistence of cooperative relationships alongside, or integrated with formal collective bargaining. Some - teachers, administrators, trustees - saw the two as mutually exclusive. Others saw the possibility of the two being integrated.

ATTITUDES AND BELIEFS, MOTIVATION, PERSONALITIES AND SKILLS

As we stand back from these four cases and try to assess the key individual factors - as opposed to structural or process considerations - which were apparent, we are able to single out four things: the attitudes of the key people in the administration, the

trustee group, and the federations; the extent to which they were motivated to change the motivated relationship; the personalities of the major players; and the skills they had to manage such a change. (10)

Attitudes and Beliefs

It seems clear that in Delta and Gamma there was a residue of 'traditional' attitudes which effectively blocked the development of the kinds of attitudes which might facilitate improved relationships. 'Management's rights' remained uppermost in the concerns of trustees in Gamma; the federations were primarily interested in 'getting more'. While there were some people who believed they could see a better way, this sentiment was not widely shared by sufficient people in the federation, the administration, and the trustee group. In Delta, the composition of the board had swung quite widely from 'conservative' to 'liberal' and back to 'conservative' again. In Delta, however, we strongly suspect that it was the attitudes of certain administrators and federation officers which effectively blocked the development of a truly cooperative relationship, rather than the intervention of trustees. This occurred despite enormous efforts of certain individuals and, certainly in the case of Delta, some considerable actual change in the systems, policies, and procedures whereby the board was run.

The key dimension in these attitudes seemed to be quite basic: it was the acceptance of the legitimate rights and interests of the federation affiliates both to negotiate in the traditional 'economic' areas and to be involved in decisions affecting programs, staffing, administrative policies and procedures, and other things which affect the teachers' work lives but were outside the realm of traditional collective bargaining, narrowly defined.

Certainly in Beta there was the dual impact of the director and the chairman - both of whom were committed to an improved relationship with the federation affiliates - as well as the cadre of principals. There were several references to the ruthlessness of the director in removing people who did not share his philosophy and basic attitudes toward federation relationships. In Alpha, it took a little longer but there emerged a group of like-minded administrators who saw the value of changing the relationship and the impact of a new director, a personnel director, and a new superintendent of operations - all of whom shared similar attitudes and values - was apparent toward the end of the period examined in the case study.

In summary, in Alpha and Beta there was a sufficient number of like-minded people whose attitudes toward the other party were essentially tolerant and accepting of their legitimate roles in the relationship; we believe that in Gamma and Delta there were isolated people who thought that way, but they were insufficient to form a critical mass for major changes to occur and be reinforced.

Motivation to Change

In both Gamma and Delta, we were told of individuals or groups with vested interests - sometimes ideological and sometimes tied to personal security, ambition, or self-aggrandizement - in retarding or sabotaging change. They were not hurting badly enough as a result of the existing relationship to be motivated to change their behavior in such a way that the overall relationship would change. The desire to defeat the other party was apparent in at least one key administrator in Delta and in one federation officer in Gamma, and we sensed that it was only just below the surface in others to whom we spoke.

In sharp contrast, we noted very high motivation to change among both federation and board personnel in Alpha. Of course, with three work stoppages, the pain was at a high level among many people. Also, however, we sensed a real desire on the part of the teacher's negotiator - a key figure throughout the Alpha 'troubles' - to show that he could function in a more cooperative mode.

In Beta, action was taken by the new incoming director to remove people who were not interested in the change and to stack the supervisory ranks with those who shared his motivation, attitudes, values and beliefs.

Personalities

Personalities were critical in all of these cases. Certainly in all four cases - but particularly in Gamma - the conflicts were traced to certain people and, conversely, certain individuals were credited with significantly influencing the ways in which the relationships changed. The director and board chairman in Beta were perceived as caring, concerned, honest, people. The perceived integrity of the directors of personnel in Alpha and Beta were considered key factors in changing around those relationships. The openness and integrity of the new director in Gamma was the best thing going for that relationship at the time this study was started although, by the end, it looked as if that alone would not suffice. And the sincerity and creativity of the director and some members of key committees in Delta were mentioned by several interviewees as positive forces for improving the relationship.

We noted several attributes of these people which were mentioned repeatedly. Trust, integrity, openness, and honesty were often talked about. The willingness to look to the spirit and intent of an agreement, rather than to look only at the narrow legalities was also mentioned. The refusal to take advantage of a situation - perhaps to exploit some provision of the collective agreement in an unforeseen situation - was identified in two cases as real evidence of a desire to make a relationship work. Consistency, fairness, even toughness when indicated, were also personal attributes credited with improving relationships.

Management Skills

Our final observation has to do with management skills. It was clear that the skills of some key people were important in shaping the new federation-board relationships in both Beta and Alpha. The new director in Beta demonstrated outstanding management skills in managing the change from conflict to cooperation. Apart from his own interpersonal skills, he clearly understood the change process and was able to lay out a clear sense of direction, build the commitment of key people in the system, marshall the required resources, attract and retain the people needed to implement his plans, and invest in the building of necessary skills in those who needed them to make the new relationship work. People were not asked to do things that they did not know how to do, and the training and development provided both the **ability** to engage in new and different patterns of ability relationship and served to **influence** key participants in the direction of building a cooperative relationship. (11) He recruited an outstanding superintendent of personnel who knew how to **administer** a collective agreement as well as negotiate one. This superintendent was able to establish effective working relationships with other administrators whose actions could significantly impact the federation-board relationship.

Management skills were also in evidence in Alpha, although not as dramatically. The new director who came in after the second work stoppage clearly had excellent management skills, and the director of personnel received much of the credit for skillfully administering the collective agreement. The addition of highly competent administrators to the administration over the last three years preceding our study had helped to reinforce the emergent relationship.

SUMMARY

We believe that both the Alpha and Beta cases clearly underscore the ability to develop constructive, mature federation-board relationships in which cooperation is possible within an essentially adversarial collective bargaining system.

For changes of the type described in the previous four chapters to be understood, it is necessary to have a broad, historical and sociological perspective as well as some understanding of the key factors which impact change in union-management relationships.

Certain conditions must be right: there must be pressure for change, a clearly felt need to alter the existing relationship. For change to be successful there must be people in leadership positions with attitudes toward each other and toward the collective bargaining process which will give a new relationship a chance to work. They need, at a minimum, to acknowledge the legitimate interests of the other party, to be prepared to take some risks in trying to develop a new relationship, and to be prepared - perhaps on scant evidence - to trust the other party. They must not seek to undermine the bargaining relationship by substituting cooperative endeavors for

collective bargaining. They must be creative problem-solvers, capable of depersonalizing conflicts, focussing on issues rather than on people, and developing the potential for joint gain. (12)

Sufficient people, including the key leaders, must be motivated to try to change the relationship - the notion of a 'critical mass'. They must be able to see the value of an improved relationship, and must not be motivated through personal interests to sabotage the attempt. People who have lost the respect of the other party, who are not trusted and cannot build that trust, who are abrasive to the point of argumentitiveness, must be removed from the relationship if it is going to be changed for the better. Those promoting and working for change must be sensitive to the pressures that others are feeling, particularly the political pressures to avoid the semblance of collusion. Finally, the organization must develop or acquire the skills - in the form of skilled change managers - to initiate the change, change the relationship itself, and then reinforce and stabilize the new, emergent relationship.

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1. This is a contraction, by Walton and McKersie, of an original nine-category classification proposed by Selkman et. al. Although not originally proposed as a 'continuum', it has frequently been represented as such in various articles and books.
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2. This analysis draws heavily on the work of Amitai Etzioni in his *Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations*, Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1961, pp. 3-21.

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Kochan, T.A. and Dyer, L., "A Model of Organizational Change in the Context of Union-Management Relations", *Journal of Applied Behavioral Science*, Vol. 12, 59-77.

10. The importance of these variables, in a theoretical sense, is well established in Walton and McKersie, op. cit.

11. Schein, E.H. "Management Development As a Process of Influence", *Industrial Management Review*, Vol. 2, May 1961.

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8

The Management of Relationships Change

In the previous chapter we suggested that many conditions had to be right before a relationship between a board and federation affiliate could be changed. Some of these - the existence of severe conflict, the death or retirement of key people, government intervention in the form of wage controls, and others - are not things that people can summon at will. Yet there is a strong sense, from all of the cases but particularly from Beta, that good management of change can make a positive difference.

The extensive literature on organizational change in general, and the more limited literature on union-management relations, holds out hope that under the right circumstances skillful change management can increase the probability of success. We believe that the manager or administrator who is equipped with a good working model of change management will be in a better position to identify and exploit the opportunity for change than those who lack such conceptual frameworks. The intent of this chapter is to deal in some depth with the various components of such a working model and to suggest an approach to changing federation-board relationships which administrators, trustees, and teachers might find helpful.

CONSTRUCTIVE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING RELATIONSHIPS

In our view, it is naive to think of union-management relationships in simplistic terms such as 'cooperative', 'confrontational', 'adversarial', and so on. In most union-management relationships there are a variety of issues which are negotiated between the parties. They break down into three basic types: **conflicts of interest**, in which the gains made by one party are usually made at the expense of the other; **common-problems**, in which there is the potential for both parties to gain from problem-resolution, although not necessarily to exactly the same extent; and **misunderstandings**, in which one or both of the parties misunderstand or misinterpret the actions or intentions of the other. (1) Conflicts of interest are resolved through a process of distributive bargaining - negotiations over who gets what share of the pie. Common-problems are resolved through integrative

bargaining, or problem-solving - the process whereby the parties try to bake a bigger pie. And misunderstandings are resolved through **communication.**

The nature of any particular issue may not be clear to the parties at the time that it must be dealt with, either in negotiations or day-to-day relationships. Common-problems are often mistakenly approached as conflicts of interest - and sometimes *vice versa*! There are many reasons for this happening. At one extreme, it is possible that one party may be ideologically motivated to destroy the other - even if it means suffering itself in the process of doing this. More likely, the ongoing relationship between the parties is lacking in trust, is highly competitive in nature, is one in which there is denial of the other party's legitimate interests, and where the people involved dislike each other. In such a relationship there is a tendency to see all issues as conflicts of interest rather than seeing them as common-problems.

Not only that, but when the issues are perceived correctly, it is difficult to tackle them appropriately in such a climate. Problem-solving requires the parties to share information, venture tentative solutions, trade ideas 'without prejudice', and discuss various options. (2) It requires some trust, some acknowledgement of the legitimacy of the other party, a cooperative rather than competitive orientation ...and it helps if the people like each other - at least a little!

On the other hand, the conflicts of interest may require tough, power-based bargaining if each of the parties is to maximize its share of the pie. This bargaining may involve trade-offs and compromises. And, realistically, such bargaining is often going to involve the use of threats, sanctions, and the traditional job actions which unions and managements engage in as they try to wrest concessions from the other. The aftermath of using such bargaining tactics may be a legacy of mistrust, fear, dislike, and disrespect which makes subsequent problem-solving difficult or even impossible. This is particularly the case when the parties don't understand the complex nature of collective bargaining and react personally to the process. The issues become inseparable from the personalities. If, on the other hand, the parties try to maintain a very friendly relationship, it may become difficult to use the power-tactics which might be helpful in distributive bargaining.

The truly **constructive** relationship is one in which the parties:

- can identify their common-problems and opportunities and engage in the required behaviors to maximize their joint gain from resolving them;

- can engage in negotiations on conflicts of interest without personalizing the issues, maintaining trust and respect for the other party;

- can either prevent misunderstandings occurring or communicate in such a way that they are cleared up quickly.

It recognizes both joint and competing interests. It is not a 'love-in', it is not collusive, it might be quite adversarial in nature or have the surface appearance of cooperation - but it allows for the maximization of joint gains as well as the pursuit of self-interest.

We believe that the mature, constructive relationship can coexist within an adversarial system. Indeed, we go further to suggest that it is only by maintaining an adversarial system that the union, federation, or association can afford to engage in cooperative endeavors without subverting the collective bargaining process and losing the support of its membership.

BUILDING THE CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP

It is as well to recognize at the outset that this is not a simple process. There are no six, or eight, or ten golden rules to follow to ensure successful change of any kind, let alone the changing of a complex relationship. Such change requires more than the mere change of one or two interpersonal relationships. After many years of interaction, the relationship between the parties has almost certainly become institutionalized and embedded in the culture, structure, policies, and practices of the board and the federation affiliate. Many people will have come to share attitudes, beliefs, and assumptions. These will be reflected in the ways in which things are done, the nature and tone of communications, the venues of meetings, the seating of people at those meetings, and a thousand and one substantive or trivial dimensions of their interactions. They may be rooted in the past needs of the parties and in the past success which was associated with those behaviors - and such past success has reinforced the value of those behaviors for the parties, thereby encouraging them to carry on in the same way. (3)

These behaviors and attitudes must be 'unfrozen', change must be initiated and implemented, and then the new, emergent, desired behaviors and attitudes must be consolidated. (4) In many situations, widespread, radical, sweeping change may not be possible, and something short of this may be all that is achievable. A change in staffing procedures, the avoidance of work sanctions, or the smooth functioning of a joint problem-solving committee might all be the objects of a change effort. In total, and over time, they might add up to a change in the relationship. Even if this is not the case, they may be valued in their own right.

What Change Means to People

To one person, or to one party in a relationship, change might be an obviously attractive proposition. However, for other individuals within the organization or involved in some other way in the relationship, change may be an unpleasant or even terrifying threat. For administrators, trustees, federation officials, and teachers, change might well mean that they are expected to demonstrate different and new behaviors such as 'problem-solving' or 'cooperative team efforts'; they may have to abide by new policies and practices; they may have to interact with unfamiliar people; and so on. A changed relationship, or the changes that people may have to make in order to effect such a change in overall relationship, may have extensive personal implications which must be understood and managed.

Accepting and Rejecting Change

A useful place to start developing a change model is to consider **why** it is that people either accept or resist change in the first place.

There is an old adage - "people don't change until they are hurting badly enough". Or, as the joke goes:

> "How many psychologists does it take to change a light bulb?
>
> "Only one... but the light bulb has really got to **want** to change!"

As a rather general rule, unless most of the people who will be affected by a proposed change can see, or be made to see, the **need** for change, then the probability of success is low.

Change initiators must consider what **motivates** people to change their behaviors. At the simplest, they will be motivated if they see something which they value coming from the change - there is something in it for them! This 'something' may be personal career advancement, money, fewer hassles doing work they dislike, greater job satisfaction from intrinsically rewarding work, a heightened sense of professionalism from doing a better job, and so on. It could also be the avoidance of something they dislike, fear, or find distasteful. Different people will value different rewards according to their psychological, social, and material needs.

> Consider the superintendent of personnel who is asked to start a process of single-team bargaining. He may be interested in doing this because it represents a professional challenge. He may also see some real value to establishing a more cooperative relationship in which he can spend more of his time on staff development work, an aspect of his job which he finds more satisfying than

negotiations. There is something in it for him, it **offers a reward which he values.** If he has high confidence in his **ability** to engage in problem-solving and to maintain the good interpersonal relations that single-team bargaining needs, then he will be encouraged to try it even more.

But suppose that he has very little faith that the federation affiliate is interested in this approach or that he has heard that the president of the branch affiliate has publically stated that he will oppose any such effort and try to sabotage it. Although he is interested in the outcome, although he believes that he would be able to do what is required of him, he has a very low expectation of a successful outcome. His motivation to engage in single-team bargaining will be low.

In summary, for a person to be motivated to change behavior:

- he achievement of the required task must offer the prospect of some outcome which satisfies their needs (a reward) or the avoidance of something they negatively value (a punishment);
- they must expect that their efforts will lead to successful achievement of the required task;
- they must believe that the successful achievement of the required task will in fact lead to receiving the desired reward. (5)

There is an extensive academic and practitioner literature on why it is that some people resist change. (6)

Change may be contrary to self-interest: (7) Many changes threaten the real interests that people have in maintaining the status quo. They may lose power or influence because of a proposed change, they may have to give up some activity that they enjoy, take on some tasks which they don't like doing, interact with people they dislike, or the nature of the tasks they do may change considerably. This is more than mere inertia - there may actually be some harmful impact or, at least, the possibility of harm. The hardened negotiator may fear that he will be less important if there is a cooperative federation-board relationship; the

federation officer may feel unneeded if a grievance-free era is established; teachers may fear additional workload if joint committees are established; a superintendent responsible for staffing may believe he will be 'blackmailed' by threats from the federation to 'destroy' the cooperative relationship the board chairman is so keen on establishing.

Change may be misunderstood or misinterpreted: It is not unusual for those affected by a change to misunderstand what is happening, or to misinterpret the reasons for the change and the motivations behind the move. (8) This is very likely to happen when there is competition between parties, mistrust, dislike, and other attitudes associated with conflictful union-management relations. It is, of course, even more likely to happen when various people are actively involved in misinformation related to the change - a common occurrence in labor-management conflict.

Change may violate ideals, values or norms: (9) People have strongly held beliefs about many issues including such things as 'management rights', the duty of the elected trustee, the role of the teacher, the responsibilities of a federation official, the involvement of teachers in all aspects of educational decision making, and others. There are often established norms relating to things such as the confidentiality of certain budgetary information, the rights of teachers to be involved in certain 'policy' matters, the ways in which negotiations are conducted, and so on. Many changes actually threaten these values, ideals, and norms which are usually quite strong in highly cohesive groups.

Change may generate different opinions about its value to the organization: One group may resist change when its members assess the situation differently than another group. Apart from the question of self-interest, the resisting group may believe that the unintended consequences of a change may far outweigh the proposed benefits as assessed by others. For example, the local federation affiliate may resist the proposal of an administration to try single-team bargaining because - in their view - it will be bad for the health of the school system, breeding complacency as a by-product. Whether their view is correct or not is irrelevant ...as long as one party disagrees with the other as to the value of change they will tend to resist it.

Change may result in differential benefits for different parties: Both parties may benefit - but if one party benefits more than the other, and the parties are competitive, then the party which benefits least may resist the change. Where two federations see themselves in competition with each other, then one may oppose a changed relationship because it feels that the other stands to gain more from it.

Change may upset established patterns of relationships: People get used to interacting in certain ways, either cooperating or confronting each other for example. It is upsetting to try to adjust to different ways of interacting, to be 'nice' to someone with whom you have traditionally argued, or to 'get tough' with someone you have been dealing with on a friendly and informal basis. This is most noticeable when people lapse into familiar and traditional ways of negotiating, start playing their 'usual games' at meetings, continuing the ongoing war they have come to expect.

Change may create feelings of incompetence: (10) To be successful at demonstrating new behaviors, people must have the **ability** to perform them, as well as the **motivation** to do so. And whether or not they are motivated to try them will depend, at least to some extent, on their perception of the probability of success if they do try. To the extent that they feel unable to do what is asked of them people will resist the changes which call for these new behaviors. To the extent that they try and then fail - because they lack the ability - they will not be encouraged to persevere. While it may seem a simple matter to ask people to 'problem-solve', instead of negotiating over who gets what share of the pie, it is not that easy! And without the appropriate training and confidence building, they may resist such urging.

Change may come too quickly for people to accept: Some people may resist change, even if its in their self-interest, because it is unexpected, sudden, or radical in their view. (11) An innate desire to maintain the status quo, or inertia, must be overcome. Lack of advance information and adequate preparation often seems to result in such a reflex rejection.

Change may be required when people lack the capacity to change: Although people may agree that change is required,

at the time that new behaviors are being demanded of them they may simply be overworked and lack the capacity to respond to the new demands. If the new relationship requires membership in many new committees, for example, this may be beyond the capacity of an administrator at a particular time. Or if additional training is required to deal with the change, who will get the day-to-day work done while the training is undertaken? People may lack the time, the resources, the assistance to respond to new requirements.

These reasons why people may resist change - or may resent it when they are coerced into change - may be based in reality or may be perceived by people. There may actually be a state of overwork which prevents people participating in joint committees, or a person or group may just believe that is the case. There may be an actual reduction in importance of the chief negotiator when work sanctions are only a remote possibility or the chief negotiator may just think that is the case. Someone may be mistaken about his or her new role in a changed relationship - they may simply lack the facts. What is important, however, is that it is the perception rather than the reality which will shape the individuals' feelings and behavior.

Managing Change

When people resist change they may show it overtly, in clearly recognizable form, or it may be covert - hard to identify but nevertheless apparent in the lack of progress. Either the change is completely thwarted or its momentum is retarded, and the eventual outcomes may be far short of initial expectations or aspirations. We think that if the initiator of change manages the process, there is a better chance of it being successfully implemented. This involves:

- carefully **selecting** the change so that it is one which people will view as important and needed;
- **analyzing** the potential impacts of the change on people
- choosing the **appropriate change strategy** to gather support for the change and overcome any resistance to it;
- **planning** the change so that the desired strategy is operationalized;
- **implementing** it effectively;
- **monitoring** the change as it is implemented;
- **changing** the change when responses and developments indicate that it is not producing the desired results.

Selecting the Change

Since people have a limited capacity to change, and since there are many reasons why they might resist change, it seems prudent to limit the initiation of change to those changes which will make a major contribution to the achievement of the organization's purpose. This is no more profound than saying "invest effort and energy - a limited resource - where it will do the most good". The change must be one which most people, although not perhaps everyone, can see value in and which stands some chance of success with a good change strategy and plan. And we are aware that a need for a changed relationship between a board and the local affiliates of teachers' federations tends to develop only when the relationship reaches a crisis stage.

The diffusion of change beyond its initiation depends in large measure on perceived success. Continuation of change is fueled by such success and unless early success is apparent, the chances of realizing the change goals are slim. (12) Given the difficulties involved in managing change, and the energy required to drive the process, it is important not to waste it on trivial changes unrelated to the organization's central mission, or changes which people will have great difficulty seeing the value of. The odds are stacked too heavily against the change initiator under such circumstances

We do not mean to indicate that small changes are bad. Indeed, there are many writers on the subject of change who would say that it is the small, incremental changes which stand the best chances of success. (13) It is the irrelevant, inconsequential, time-consuming changes - which annoy and irritate people rather than energize them - which should be avoided.

Analyzing the Impact of Change

Given that a worthwhile change has been identified, there are a series of critical questions that the change initiator must ask before launching into the change process. These are laid out in detail in Figure 8.1 below. They involve defining the **target group** for change; identifying the **sources of support** for the change; identifying the **sources of resistance** to the change and the **reasons** for the potential resistance; assessing whether the reasons for the potential resistance are well-founded in fact or are just **incorrect perceptions**; and estimating the **shock-value** of the proposed change and, therefore, the potential for **reflex rejection.**

FIGURE 8.1

Change Impact Analysis

1. Defining the Target Group for Change
   - 1.1 Who will have to change behaviors?
   - 1.2 What behaviors will they have to change?
   - 1.3 When will this change be required?
   - 1.4 Who else will be affected by the proposed change?
2. Identifying the Sources of Support for Change
   - 2.1 Who will see the need for change?
   - 2.2 Who will benefit from the change?
3. Identifying the Sources of Resistance to Change
   - 3.1 Will members of the target group resist change?
   - 3.2 What will be the basis of this resistance?
     - 3.2.1 Will change be perceived as contrary to self-interest? What will the individual or group perceive itself to be losing?
     - 3.2.2. Will the nature of the change and the motives of the change initiators be misunderstood or misinterpreted?
     - 3.2.3 Will one party be relatively disadvantaged?
     - 3.2.4 Will change be perceived as not beneficial, independent of self-interest?
     - 3.2.5 Will change be perceived as violating ideals, norms, values? What are these and how will they be perceived as being violated?
     - 3.2.6 Will change be perceived as upsetting familiar patterns of relationship? What are these?
     - 3.2.7 Will they perceive themselves as potentially incompetent to demonstrate new required behaviors? Do they see themselves as lacking the aptitude for required behaviors or just lacking the appropriate training?
     - 3.2.8 Will they perceive themselves as lacking the capacity to change? Is this a matter of time, money, resources, workload priorities?
   - 3.3 Are these perceptions accurate? Do they exist in fact or just in the minds of people affected by change?
   - 3.4 Will the change be so sudden reflex rejection may occur?

We cannot overemphasize the critical nature of this change impact analysis stage of the change management model. It is the foundation on which the change management strategy is built and failure to do it well will result in subsequent delays or derailments.

DEVELOPING A CHANGE STRATEGY (14)

There are many ways in which a change initiator can try to overcome resistance to change by someone or some group of people. They include education, consultation, facilitation, negotiation, rewarding, co-optation, manipulation or deception, and coercion.

> One strategy might be to **educate and inform** people as to the intent and purpose of a proposed change so as to ensure that it is clearly understood. Clearly, such a strategy is indicated where the resistance is based on unrealistic perceptions of a situation, and a clear presentation of the facts might help change such perceptions. Indeed, this strategy appears to be necessary in almost all change efforts if the type of reflex opposition we have described previously is to be avoided. At the same time, one must recognize that attempts to communicate in low-trust relationships frequently go awry, and such a strategy might actually backfire if the climate is poisoned to the extent that all communication is distorted.
>
> Sometimes, resistance to change can be overcome through the process of consultation which, of necessity, also includes communication and, therefore, education. Quite often, people who initially resist change may lower that resistance as a result of having the opportunity to make their point of view known through a consultative process. They are able to live with the outcome - even if it is slightly distasteful to them - because they are satisfied that they had some role in shaping it. Consultation has the additional advantage of identifying possible glitches and unintended consequences the change initiators may be unaware of. Consultation tends to take time; while this may be a disadvantage under some circumstances, it does allow for adaptation to occur while it minimizes the surprise effect that can lead to reflex rejections.
>
> We have suggested that people may resist change because they fear being incompetent or that they simply don't have the capacity to respond in the manner requested. We use the word **facilitation** to

describe a number of strategies that might be appropriate for resistance based on these causes. It may be necessary to provide additional resources, training and development programs, some time away from the job to prepare for a new role, or perhaps just some encouragement and social supportiveness where the fear of incompetence is unjustified.

Faced with strong resistance to change, or the desire to have someone actively support a proposed change, it may be necessary to **negotiate** the change, agreeing to something that the change resistor wants in return for the resistor going along with the change. The 'want' might be positive - a reward, for example. Or it might be the avoidance of a negative, such as a punishment. There could be an agreement, for example, to allow a federation affiliate to have veto power over the implementation of a new program in return for an agreement to try single-team bargaining. Or a guarantee of job security may be given in return for some concession with respect to seniority. It has even been known to offer someone a promotion to get them out of a position where they could have blocked a needed change.

Another possible strategy is to **co-opt** the change resistor. This often involves making them such a key part of the change, involving them in a genuine power-sharing arrangement and extensive consultation, so that they begin to feel that they 'own' the change. They may also start to lose sight of the reality that the change may not be in their long term interest. For example, one joint staffing committee in a college worked so well and was such a genuine cooperative effort between federation affiliate members and board administrators, that the teachers' representatives started suggesting a reduction in the number of teachers employed. It took a sharp reminder from others, not involved in the committee, to make these teachers realize that they were not acting in the best interest of the people they represented, at least in the short-run.

That is somewhat different from **manipulation** or outright **deception** - getting someone to agree to a change by convincing them that it is in their best interest, even if it might not be. For example, a federation might be induced to give up some seniority protection to allow for the retention of some teachers who are more junior but whose qualifications are better. And, once this breach in

seniority is made, it might be used to get around strict seniority in recalls.

Finally, of course, there is always the option of trying to coerce someone into changing their behavior. Threats, explicitly stated or merely implied, are often made in the service of initiating or promoting change! They may involve telling an administrator that she will not keep her job unless she can change the way she does things, or even threatening a federation affiliate or administration with sanctions unless things change.

Given all of these potential strategies for overcoming resistance to change, the logical question is "Which one(s) should be used, when?" We suggest that there are six factors that should be considered when selecting change management strategies:

- the basis of the resistance to change, that is basis of the resistance whether it is a matter of some real or perceived loss, the violation of some value or ideal, or any of the other categories described above. If the resistance stems from ignorance or misperception, then communication and education is appropriate. If it is based on fear of the real loss of something, it may be neccessary to negotiate some compensation.

- the relative power of the change initiator over the people resisting change; specifically whether the resistors have the ability to slow down or totally sabotage the change effort if they decide not to cooperate or to actively oppose it. If the 'resistor' has power to resist, negotiation may be required. If there is no such power, coercion might be employed.

- the locus of information required to design the change process; specifically, where are the data to do the change impact analysis, and who knows what has to be done. If the change manager does not have the right information, there may be no alternative to consultation.

- the desired outcome in terms of the relationship between the change initiator and the change resistor; specifically if

it matters that there be a residue of trust, some respect, perhaps even some friendliness. If the desired outcome is a trusting relationship, the strategies of coercion, cooptation, manipulation, or deception are clearly contra-indicated.

- the current climate within which the change is being initiated; specifically whether there is trust and acknowledged legitimacy in the relationship, and whether people respect and like one another, and whether they are predisposed to cooperate. Where there is no trust, meaningful consultation is difficult, and any communication or education efforts may well be interpreted as insincere and misleading.

- the amount of time which is available. Many of these strategies - consultation, for example - take considerable investment of time.

These five factors are summarized in Figure 8.2, below.

FIGURE 8.2

Contingencies Affecting Choice of Change Strategy

1. What is the basis of the resistance to change?
2. Do people have the power to fight or effectively resist the proposed change?
3. What is the current state of the relationship between the change initiator and members of the target group for change?
   - 3.1 Is trust high or low?
   - 3.2 Is there a cooperative or competitive orientation?
   - 3.3 Is there interpersonal liking or animosity?
   - 3.4 Is there acceptance of the legitimate interests of the parties to the relationship and those in the target group?
4. What is the desired state of the relationship between the change initiator and members of the target group for change?
   - 4.1 Trust to be high or low?
   - 4.2 A cooperative or competitive orientation?
   - 4.3 Interpersonal liking or animosity?
5. Who has the information required to manage the change well?
   - 5.1 The change manager?
   - 5.2 Members of the target group?
   - 5.3 Others?
6. Is sufficient time available for the selected strategy?

The choice of change strategy must be made looking at all six of these factors simultaneously, as is suggested in Figure 8.3, below. One example has already been cited. While it is intuitively appropriate to use education and communication in cases of misperception leading to resistance, it may backfire if the current climate is one of mistrust and hostility. While it may be expedient to try to coerce someone to change, the other party may have considerable power to withstand the coercion, and the aftermath of coercion, in terms of the emergent relationship, might be dysfunctional. For example, trying to coerce a reluctant superintendent to change the way he handles grievances may be difficult for a director to do if that superintendent is well connected to influential trustees and if, as a result of the attempt to coerce, this superintendent subsequently attempts to block other changes because he resents the attempt. There may be problems with the use of negotiations, particularly where they amount to appeasement. 'Giving in' to the unreasonable request of someone in order to overcome resistance to a proposed change establishes a precedent. That person, or others who see the transaction as having taken place, may demand similar concessions for future changes. The costs of the change may mount to the point where it is not worth it any more.

FIGURE 8.3

Selecting the Right Change Strategy



We do not propose to go through each possible combination of change strategies, their advantages and disadvantages, and the situational conditions under which they might be effective. These are summarized in Figure 8.4, below. What should be clear however is that the choice of change strategy is a critical choice, requiring careful assessment of the task that has to be done, the individuals affected, the situation within which the change is taking place, and the desired short and long-term outcomes. Since some strategies take longer than others - education compared with coercion as one example - it puts a premium on the type of analysis described previously. If the people affected by change are not identified early and their potential reaction to change is not considered, then the only strategy that time may permit is coercion, deception, or buying them off through some major, costly concession. And these may be sub-optimal strategies.

It should also be recognized that it might be appropriate to utilize multiple strategies. While it may be necessary to negotiate substantively with an adversarial party in a relationship, a communications program or some consultation may be all that is required to promote and manage the change as far as other members of the administration are concerned, particularly if their resistance to change is expected to be minimal. A federation affiliate president may need to do some serious consultation and even horse-trading with members of his executive, but may be able to effect certain changes without extensive consultation with the membership. In other situations, of course, the executive might be 'on-side' but extensive consultation with the rank-and-file is essential.

DEVELOPING A CHANGE PLAN

In thinking about trying to change a board-federation relationship, the complexity of the task can become quite overwhelming. So many things may have to change - new people may have to be hired, existing staff may have to be trained, committees may have to be set up, board policies amended, and so on. Furthermore, these things have to be timed properly.

Successful changes are managed using a road map or game plan which defines the actions to be taken, who is responsible for taking them, when they have to be taken, how they will be monitored, and so on. This should be a **flexible** plan, capable of being changed as circumstances change or unanticipated problems arise. Yet it must be there. Most changes of the type we have been talking about are complex and they need thinking out ahead of time. The discipline of working out a detailed plan helps the change initiator ensure that the analysis has been done, the necessary choices have been made, and contingency plans have been made if things do not work out as expected.

The plan should address - at a **minimum** - the points identified in Figure 8.5, although the actual components of any particular plan will vary with the choice of change strategies and tactics.

FIGURE 8.4

Selecting a Change Strategy

STRATEGY	USES AND CRITICAL CONTINGENCIES
Education and Information	For resistance based on incorrect perception of reasons for change or the ways it will impact people. Works well in high trust or neutral climates. Can help overcome inertia and the surprise effect. Results in building of openness and trust. May be costly and time-consuming for major changes and may require long lead-times.
Consultation	When information needed to plan or implement change is required. When full understanding of, and commitment to, change is required. Similar conditions required with similar outcomes as for education and communication.
Negotiation	Used where individuals will lose something (power, job satisfaction, etc.) as a result of change and have the power to frustrate change implementation. Also used to get important members of target group to support the change. Price may be high when the individual has the power to frustrate change plans and knows it. Strategy may work in both high- and low-trust climates.
Facilitation (helping)	Needed where perceived or actual inability to perform required tasks exists. May be in the form of training or social support. Social support difficult in low-trust climate but may lead to improved climate when neutral.

FIGURE 8.4 (continued)

Selecting a Change Strategy

STRATEGY	USES AND CRITICAL CONTINGENCIES
Co-optation	May be possible in high trust climates and may overcome resistance to change no matter what its origins. Produces hostile reactions if exploitation is perceived. Takes much time and effort.
Deception/ Manipulation	May be easy, fast, and tempting. May be used independently of prevailing climate although its easier to deceive in high-trust relationship. Results are low-trust climate if deception is revealed.
Rewarding	May be hard to find rewards when the basis of resistance is rooted in self-interest. May be costly. Can work independently of prevailing climate although more likely to be effective in high-trust relationship where promise of rewards has credibility
Coercion	Can be used independently of prevailing climate. Not useful when people resisting change have high power relative to the change initiator. Produces climate of resentment, low trust. May be the fastest thing to do.

Leadership Support

Successful organizational changes are characterized by the visible and stated commitment of the organization's leaders to change. (15) It is these leaders who control many of the actual variables which are critical to others' behaviors. They dispense rewards of many kinds - task assignments, promotions, pay raises, etc. - and control the resources which people need to do their jobs. They will decide if required resources are allocated to change projects, if budgets for staff development and training will be made available, if adequate staffing will be provided. Particularly in the attempt to change federation-board relationships, the public statements of the leaders will be scrutinized to assess the sincerity of the desire to effect change. If the leaders are **not** perceived to support the change then it is unrealistic to expect others in the organization to be enthusiastic and, if enthusiasm is generated, it will likely be short-lived in the absence of leadership support.

Under ideal conditions, all the leaders in the relationship will be supportive of change, including federation affiliate officers, trustees, administrators, principals and vice-principals, as well as the 'informal' leaders - those highly influential people who may hold no formal office or position of responsibility but who are opinion leaders. Seldom is the ideal ever realized! In practice, the change initiator must attempt to get as **many** as possible to support the change, to do so **openly** and consistently, and to be consistently **congruent** with each other about their support.

There are many different tactics which can be used to build leadership support for change, but they all amount to demonstrating the net benefits of the change relative to the costs. Some education may be involved in this process since, for the most part, people are unlikely to have much knowledge of bargaining relationships other than their own. There are consultants with knowledge and experience of various techniques of improving bargaining relationships such as 'single-team bargaining' and 'relationships by objectives', to name just two of the more popular approaches. (16) Under ideal conditions, both board and federation officials would be exposed to this educational process simultaneously so that there is some shared understanding of what it is all about. However - as is often the case - it may not be logistically or politically possible for the ideal to take place.

FIGURE 8.5

Key Ingredients of a Change Plan

Leadership Support
How to get support for the change from the leaders of the board and federation affiliates.

Change Agent(s)
Who the designated change agent(s) will be.

Required Actions
The actions necessary to promote the change and overcome any resistance identified at the impact analysis stage. This to include responsibilities and timing.

Resources
The additional resources required for the proposed change.

Training and Development
The training and development required to facilitate the required change, including where, when, how, to whom, and by whom this should be delivered.

Communications
What should be communicated to organizational members concerning the change.

Measuring Success
How success is to be measured and reported.

Reinforcement
How behaviors which lead to success should be reinforced.

Contingency Plans
What should be done if things do not work out as planned.

It is quite possible that one or other of the parties to a bargaining relationship will feel the need for change either before the other or more acutely. Under such circumstances, a gesture of some kind might be needed before the leadership of the other party can feel secure enough to participate in joint explorations designed to assess and improve the current relationship. This is often a major impediment to getting the process started. Many people, in 'management' and 'union' organizations, have a doctrinaire dislike of making any form of concession unless they are under pressure to do so. The idea that management might offer some greater measure of job security, some more favorable contract language, some degree of co-determination or power-sharing, or even some significant increase in staff development funds, without having to do so, is anathema to some trustees and administrators. Equally, the idea that a federation affiliate should moderate its demands, or might pass up seeking modifications to every article in the collective agreement each time negotiations take place, is also incomprehensible to some federation officers. But this may be the price that has to be paid to get support from the leadership of both organizations.

Change Agents

One of the most common reasons that change efforts fail is because they are either not being managed at all or because the responsibility for the change is not assigned to an appropriate person. As this chapter has demonstrated, and as the four case studies show quite graphically, change requires effort and skills, both conceptual and analytical skills as well as action skills. The effective change agent must understand the change process and be able to communicate effectively and mediate or adjudicate conflicts which arise during the change process and as a result of change. It is also important that the person responsible for the change - the 'champion' - is a high status individual, clearly identified with the leadership of the organization. Nothing is more likely to convey a sense that the leadership does not support the change than assigning it to a low status individual within the organization.

This creates a dilemma. Change management is time-consuming, and you need a senior person to manage the process. Where do you find a senior administrator - at the director or senior superintendent level - or a senior federation official with the time to spend on change management? We have no easy answer to this. If the change is important, if it is worthwhile, then the priorities of these senior people have to be adjusted so that they can do it.

Many changes involve the use of high-prestige consultants as change agents, and they may be intimately involved in all aspects of the change management process. They can bring expertise, credibility, and a high profile to the change. But, in our view, they can be only temporary change agents. At some point in time, whatever process is set in motion must be internalized.

Required Actions

The plan should clearly contain the answers to the questions raised by the previous analysis. The plan should identify the actions which will be taken to obtain support for change and to overcome resistance to it. Where training and development are required, for example, they should be specified in the change plan so that implementation is not held up unexpectedly while these are provided. Common techniques of change management - such as Relationships by Objectives, Preventative Mediation, T-Groups, Role-Analysis Technique, or other forms of 'sensitivity training' - require long planning horizons and often involve considerable costs and, therefore, it is important to plan them well. (17)

Resources

This could almost be considered a subset of the 'Required Actions' category except that it is so often overlooked that it needs clear attention to be drawn to it. We mentioned earlier that an incapacity to change - because of the day-to-day pressures - was a key factor associated with change failures. Since change itself consumes energy, takes time, it usually requires resources. If someone is to attend a training session, who is available to do the work? If data-based problem-solving is to occur, who has the time to gather the appropriate data? If a decision is made to form some joint committees, who has the time available to sit on them?

While it is true that, over the long haul, a changed bargaining relationship might reduce workloads, that is unlikely to occur in the short-run. Therefore the change plan should explicitly recognize the need for additional resources where they are required. It is particularly important in those cases where long lead times are required to free up some resources - particularly to get well-trained people. Failure to have the right people available can inject months of delay into any change project, especially if they have to be hired from outside the system.

Training and Development

The change plan should also include plans for the necessary training and development associated with whatever change is being considered. Apart from the need to budget for such efforts, plans must be made to run whatever courses are required, arrange for personnel replacements when they are required, and for people who are taking courses to make whatever domestic arrangements may be necessary. If courses are to be custom-designed there are the associated lead times to incorporate into the plan. The type of training required depends, of course, on the objective of the change process. If it is to involve working together in small groups, task forces, or committees, then a program involving group dynamics, group problem-solving, and related subject areas might be appropriate. Sometimes individuals need to brush up on their

interpersonal skills with programs such as active listening, giving and receiving feedback, and so on. If the change involves adopting new styles of negotiating - such as single-team bargaining or relationships by objectives - these usually come 'packaged' in courses which seek to build the required skills as well as introducing the techniques. Sometimes it is a technical skill which is needed, such as collective agreement administration or performance appraisal, and these may be gained through various courses offered at colleges and universities or through private consulting firms.

Communications

It is also surprising how often major changes are initiated without enough thought being given to the issue of communications. A good communications plan is even more important in organizations such as school boards where both the administration and the teachers' representatives must function in extremely political environments. The communications plan must be thought out so that the right messages are communicated to the right people. There will be those who will be directly affected by whatever changes take place - probably only a small number of people. Then there are all the others who will hear about the changes in one way or another, and who - in the absence of definitive communication - will read their own interpretations into what they observe or hear!

The Beta case was one in which the director made excellent use of his communications skills, using formal communications to establish his own commitment to improved relationships, to instill expectations among others, and to reinforce the successes that were experienced. The Gamma case, before the new director took over, was one where poor communications frustrated many of the previous director's sincere efforts to improve the educational system there.

There are many avenues of communication which can be used. Public statements, newsletters, memoranda and policy statements from the administration or the board, federation meetings, other gatherings with various groups of people, and so on, all represent communications fora. It is important that the messages communicated in these fora are consistent, otherwise people will become confused about the intent and nature of the changes that are being made. And confusion is a breeding ground for rumors, some of which may be very harmful to the change process.

Measuring and Monitoring Success or Failure

It is surprising how many different types of organizational change are undertaken without much prior thought being given to measuring the progress or impact of the change. If the desire is to improve the relationship, how will the parties know it is being improved? If the objective is more modest - perhaps just to reduce the level of

personal animosity being expressed in negotiations, how will this be assessed? If the objective is to improve the ways in which joint staffing committees operate, how will this be monitored?

First, it is important to recognize why such assessment, or measurement, is required. We stated earlier that people are motivated to change if they see the need to do so, if there is 'something in it for them'. Furthermore, their motivation to change is impacted by their confidence that their efforts to do so will be fruitful. Clearly, without measurement of progress and success these required stimuli are missing and the momentum of the change process might well falter. The second reason for measuring progress is to try to influence the skeptics about the change so that they become supportive of it. Many people who are skeptical about cooperative bargaining, for example, require convincing that it is benefitting them or, at least, that they are not suffering as a result of it. Where additional resources have been spent, an accounting has to be made, and this is the third reason for measuring the success or failure of the change.

We do not want to minimize some of the difficulties in measuring the impact or progress of various changes. Nor do we want to turn this into a technical tome on measurement! There are many ways in which measures of change outcomes and progress can be made utilizing surveys, informed assessment, quantitative and qualitative measures, subjective and objective measures, which vary in their validity, reliability, and practicality. At a minimum the change plan should identify some objectives for the change and suggest how the achievement of these objectives, and progress toward their achievement, will be assessed.

Reinforcement

Closely related to the issue of measurement is that of reinforcement. Once a change has been made, once the parties are engaging in new behaviors or a committee is working well together, or an administrator is doing a better job, the next challenge for the change manager is to ensure that these new behaviors are consolidated and established as the new 'norm'. In part, of course, the reinforcement will come from the success of the change. If, in fact, the change reduces the hassles for an administrator, lessens the amount of time spent in acrimonious discussion around the bargaining table, results in better utilization of staff in the schools, or allows grievances to be settled more promptly, the behaviors producing these results will be reinforced.

But such outcomes may not be readily apparent, particularly if the improvements are marginal. The change manager must be constantly aware of the various ways in which success can be highlighted and fed back to those involved in the changes, recognizing and rewarding the achievements with praise, recognition, or more tangible rewards and celebrating significant milestones along the way. And this will tend to be done if thought is given to it **before** the actual change is

implemented. In other words, think of how to reinforce the change during the planning stage!

As well, the change must be institutionalized - that is, incorporated into the rules, policies, and standard practices of the organization. Failing this, the organization may find itself in a schizophrenic state - operating by two different systems; the desired and the existent. Since many of these systems and practices take time to change, they must be planned for in advance so that they are ready to reinforce the desired, emergent behavior. Some research has indicated that attention to this may be the most important step in ensuring the success of a change effort. (18)

Contingency Planning

It is a brave person who tries any complex change without giving some due consideration about what to do if it does not work! What if we try single-team bargaining and it doesn't work? What if we establish a joint committee to process sabbatical leave applications but we end up at loggerheads?

Before starting on any sort of change project, the change manager will have given some thought to the possibility and consequences of failure and particularly whether such failure might leave the situation worse than that which the proposed change was designed to remedy. One way of ensuring that this important step has been considered is to make sure that it is addressed in the change plan and that a course of action if the objectives are not met is clearly identified.

Implementing, Monitoring, and Changing the Change

It is often at the implementation stage that the change falls apart. One of the reasons, we suspect, is that boredom sets in. The creative part of change management is in the early stages: thinking about what types of change are needed, analyzing their potential impacts, and developing strategies and plans. The implementation often involves great amounts of detailed work and may extend over a substantial period of time. By the implementation stage the change initiator - the original fount of enthusiasm and energy for the change - may have mentally moved on to other things. The implementation may be abandoned to others who have less understanding of it, less commitment to it, and may be less skilled at doing it.

There are other reasons why change falls apart in the implementation stage. There may be discrepancies between expected and actual results which cause people to brand the change as a 'failure' even though good things have been achieved. Expectations tend to shift during the change process, and they may reach unreasonable levels. Key sponsors of the change may leave or become disengaged from the process and the enthusiasm for the change may not be transmitted to successors. (19)

While great effort may go into a good, comprehensive change plan, the probabilities of absolutely smooth implementation are remote. The assumptions that went into the plan may have been wrong in a number of respects, and there may be totally unforeseen reactions to the changes as they start to be apparent to more and more people. One problem with implementation may lie in the very enthusiasm which the change initiator has for the change objectives and plan. While this enthusiasm is important in getting the change going, it can also blind the person, make him insensitive to problems that are arising, make him defensive about the original change plan. Implementation must be carried out with the same sensitivity that a good coach implements his game plan - knowing when to stick to it and when to change it! Throughout the implementation phase the change manager must be monitoring the impact of the changes, seeking feedback from those affected, and reevaluating the strategies and plans. It may be necessary to change strategies, to alter time frames, to adjust objectives so that they are more realistic. Sometimes it may be necessary to abandon it altogether and try something else.

Change and Participation

A debate continues about the value of involving people in planning changes which might affect them. On the one hand some writers argue that involvement is critical if people are to comprehend the nature of the changes and to develop commitment to them. (20) Such writers tend to view commitment as a natural outcome of involvement or participation in decision-making. Furthermore, participation has the advantage of bringing more and different perspectives, views, opinions, and knowledge to bear on the issue, and there is much evidence that certain types of decisions are improved when there is involvement of those affected by them. The advocates of participative change management also suggest that for true commitment to be obtained, people must be involved in all aspects of the issue, from participating in the analysis of the problem through to deciding on the actions to be taken. And there must be some real degree of influence or power-sharing, a perceived opportunity to shape the nature of the change. (21)

In part, the controversy hinges on the very different forms of participation and the ways in which people define what participation means. Participation may mean just communication, or it may mean consultation, or it may mean involvement in decision-making in terms of some measure of co-determination. We believe that two-way communication is almost always required, that consultation of some form is usually desirable, but that true co-determination - joint decision making - may not be as crucial in most situations.

There is a point of view which says that change managers should be selective about the extent to which participative management is used. This school of thought suggests that participation is appropriate when: those affected share similar objectives as the change initiators or, at least, can subscribe to some common,

superordinate goal; they are affected by the change; the nature of the change is not 'cast in stone' and there is a real, meaningful opportunity for those involved to shape it in some way; there is time to engage in a participative process. If the decision has already been made or if time is not available to allow for meaningful consultation then attempts to get people involved in the process will be perceived as manipulative and insincere, as indeed they are. If people are not affected by the change, they will not become involved in the process and may resent the time that they have to spend participating in it. And, if the people do not share some common goals, they may well subvert the process and use it to pursue their own objectives.

In considering the challenge of changing collective bargaining relationships, it seems to us that there is room for both participative and non-participative change management. Clearly, any decision to change the way negotiations are conducted must be participative... it takes two to tango! On the other hand, a decision to improve the quality of contract administration - perhaps by hiring a full-time, experienced labor relations practitioner - can be a unilateral decision that need not involve the federation affiliate. Realistically, the initial climate may be so poor that one party will refuse to participate, and some unilateral decisions have to be made to get the ball rolling. On the other hand, people may be hurting so badly as a result of the relationship that the superordinate goal of relationship improvement is attractive enough to encourage participation. Whether to seek participation or not should depend on the answers to the kinds of questions posed above and summarized in Figure 8.6.

FIGURE 8.6

When to Seek Participation (22) in Change Management

1. When information necessary to plan and/or implement change is needed.
2. When there are common objectives or a shared superordinate goal.
3. When people are affected by the change and they must understand it and be committed to it.
4. When there is meaningful opportunity by those affected to influence the nature of the change.
5. When there is time to conduct a participative management process.

SUMMARY

There are several key steps involved in developing and implementing any change initiative.

- Conducting the change impact analysis. Care must be taken to define the target group and identify sources of support for, and resistance to, the proposed change.

- Selecting the appropriate mix of change strategies and tactics to maximize support for and minimize resistance to the proposed change. These strategies and tactics must recognize: the different bases of support for and resistance to change; the power of members of the target group to frustrate the change effort; the locus of information for planning and controlling the change; the current relationship; and the desired relationship.

- Developing the change plan which: considers how to get leadership support; identifies the locus of responsibility for change (the change agent); specifies actions to be taken and resources to be provided, with careful attention to the timing of actions; establishes criteria for measuring success; specifies how emergent changes are to be reinforced; and also includes contingency plans.

- Implementing the change plan, remembering that flexibility is required in its implementation.

- Reinforcing the emergent changes by rewarding and recognizing those involved, celebrating success, and changing any organizational systems, processes, or procedures which are inconsistent with the desired, emergent relationship.

While we suggest that these steps are useful for managing any form of change within complex organizations, they are essential in trying to initiate and implement a 'change' as complex as the kind of relationships change that we have been dealing with in this book.

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9

Conclusions

We have reached a number of conclusions based on these four case studies and our review of the extensive literature on change management and union-management relations.

The first conclusion is an obvious one. It is very difficult to make wholesale, fundamental, large-scale, changes in federation-board relationships. There are an incredibly large number of factors which entered into the Alpha and Beta experiences and many of these factors - such as resignations, deaths, elections, and government policies at federal or provincial levels - are beyond the control of administrators, trustees, teachers, or federation officers.

The second conclusion is that the establishment of a constructive relationship requires considerable maturity in three dimensions: personal maturity, structural maturity, and process maturity. (1)

> The individuals involved must be capable of handling mixed forms of conflict, dealing appropriately with both conflicts of interest and common problems. They require the intellectual ability to understand these forms of conflict, the temperament to handle episodes of each in a sequential manner without allowing the behavior manifested in one episode to contaminate the approach to another, and the skills required to be effective 'hard' bargainers as well as problem-solvers and communicators. This is what we mean by **personal** maturity.
>
> We use the words **structural** maturity to refer to the existence of effective contract administration procedures, the establishment and maintenance of necessary joint committees and other consultative bodies which allow common problems and misunderstandings or misinterpretations to be processed separate from distributive bargaining over conflicts of interest, without undermining the fundamental, adversarial, collective bargaining process.

> The words **process** maturity refer to the recognition of the **ongoing** nature of collective bargaining as a process for resolving conflicts of interest, common problems, and misunderstanding or misinterpretations of actions or intentions. This contrasts with the use of collective bargaining on an infrequent, episodic basis as required by statute.

The third conclusion is that the establishment of a constructive relationship must recognize the fundamental concerns of each of the parties to the relationship and cannot exist when one feels subjugated to the actions of the other. Whether through a balance of power, as in Alpha, or through cooperative co-management, as in Beta, there must be some sense of self-determination for the constructive relationship to exist. Where one party seeks to abrogate 'rights' that exclude the other, such a relationship cannot be established.

The fourth conclusion is that the probability of successful change is enhanced when there is a high visibility of the need for change and when many people are psychologically hurting as as result of the current relationship. Where people are enjoying the conflict - where they personally revel in confrontation, for example - it is almost impossible to develop the constructive relationship.

The fifth conclusion is that skillful management of change can make a difference. Other things being equal, when there is a rational approach to change management, by people with the conceptual and intellectual foundations and planning and action skills, the probability of success is higher. While there must be a confluence of factors, many of which are outside the change manager's control, skilled change managers can exploit a window of opportunity to effect change.

The sixth conclusion is that these skills are not magical ones. They should be within the repertoire of skilled administrators. They should be mandatory requirements for supervisory officers and should be high on the list of selection criteria for directors of education. They can and should be taught in faculties of education and on supervisory officer courses.

The seventh conclusion is that, while large-scale change may not be possible, small, incremental changes may be feasible and may lead to a gradually improved relationship. The establishment of a joint staffing committee, investing time and effort in getting a teacher-board relations committee to operate well, or extensive consultation with respect to professional development, may all lead to activities which - over time - result in changed attitudes.

Our final conclusion is an optimistic one. Changing the fundamental nature of the federation-board relationship is possible! In this study we have looked at two cases where it occurred to a significant extent, and a couple of others where efforts were made with less spectacular results. Despite the difficulties, two boards succeeded . . . and there is little doubt that children, parents, trustees, administrators, and teachers benefitted from the effort of those who made it work.

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1. We are indebted to Paul Bergman for his insights in this area.